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Abstract  
The primary contribution of the thesis is to propose the idea of collaboration from self 
efforts and social efforts to promote well-being in the research area of income 
inequality. The literature merely concerns the effect of income inequality on well-being 
based on social efforts which reflect on the measurement of income inequality 
according to social comparison. The thesis argues that this unilateral examination is 
unable to achieve coherence and unity between theory and empirical structure with 
respect to individual well-being and its corresponding statistical evidence is likely 
biased. Hence, the thesis introduces the new two-effort framework which enables a 
comprehensive and fair evaluation of social efforts such as government assistance and 
action on the issue of inequality.  
Through the application of such an idea into the analysis of China’s income 
inequality, the thesis has the following unprejudiced conclusions. China’s economy has 
retained strong growth over the past decades. Yet, the road to relieve the parallel 
outcome of rising income inequality from the robust growth is not optimistic. There is 
appreciable government policy on living standards in the short run but unfortunately, 
sustainable government intervention is scarce. This claim is drawn from three 
investigations of inequality by: i) examining the returns on social efforts and self 
efforts with respect to income inequality on living standards; ii) the influence of 
economic opportunity and security on individual income inequality; and iii), a case 
study of social efforts, government policy, particularly focusing on residential 
electricity pricing on household life burden.  
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CHAPTER 1 Introduction 
The thesis aims to argue the importance of joint efforts from the self and social sides in 
the research area of income inequality with respect to individual well-being. In this 
introductory chapter, we begin by briefly describing the initial motivation based on 
present affairs in China and then provide definitions for the key terms, followed by the 
research objectives and rationale for the methodology, data and methods and an outline 
of the chapters.      
1.1 Brief background 
As the world looks upon China as an emerging economy, no one will question the size 
and speed of economic expansion in China over the last three decades, on average an 
annual growth rate of 10 per cent (%). The positive consequences of such expansion 
are remarkable such as the reduction in massive poverty (over 600 million people out 
of poverty1) and the substantial improvement in the means of living conditions (from 
251.246 GDP per capita (PPP $) in 1980 to 7,544.202 GDP per capita (PPP $) in 
20102). Nevertheless, the parallel outcome of rising inequality from the robust growth 
is alarming.  
According to the official figure from China’s National Bureau of Statistics, the 
Gini coefficient is 0.47 in 2012 and 0.48 in 2007. In contrast, the Gini coefficient is 
                                                        
1 According to the World Bank (2010, p.91) estimates, between 1981 and 2005 
China’s poverty rate fell from 85% to 15.9%, or by 620 million people. In contrast, 
Morrison (2012) believes the figure is 500 million. 
2 According to World Economic Outlook Database (2011, April Edition), International 
Monetary Fund. 
2 
 
0.61 in 2010 based on the estimate by Chen et al. (2010) in the Southwestern 
University of Finance and Economics. In addition to this plain index, the frequency of 
“mass incidents”, the official euphemism for protests and riots, increased from 8,700 
incidents in 1993 to over 180,000 in 2010, according to Demick (2011).3 One may 
argue these incidents can hardly be attributed to the growing inequality due to a lack of 
scholarly empirical evidence. However, it is true that rising inequality is on the top of 
the central government’s agenda as well as a ‘hot’ conversation amongst the ordinary 
Chinese. Particularly, the ordinary Chinese are easily able to experience government 
officials or their family and friends accumulating vast wealth at the expense of a 
politically powerless working class. These ongoing conditions direct our concern about 
how this rising income inequality affects the ordinary Chinese well-being. 
At the same time, the achievement of social-economic development by the 
central government is well recognised in social media and academic research studies. 
In contrast, it is also possible to hear another adverse claim frequently. The claim is of 
an increasing concern for the inappropriate social efforts of government policies being 
principally responsible for the rise in income inequality that further aggravated the 
process of improving living standards in China. This opposing voice of praise and 
criticism of the government’s actions can be well described by an ancient Chinese 
idiom of “raised up by Xiao He,4 cast down also by Xiao He”. Hence, such dilemma 
                                                        
3 See also Tanner (2011).  
4 Xiao He (died 193 BC) was a Chinese statesman who lived during the early Han 
Dynasty. In the beginning of the Han Dynasty, Xiao He recommended Han 
Xin become a general, later he helped Empress LüZhi to have him killed. Later, this 
phrase was used as a metaphor to describe a situation in the success or failure of an 
endeavour deriving from the same person or thing. 
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attracts our attention towards re-evaluating the social influence by the government for 
the rising income inequality in China.  
In contrast to the overwhelming discussion of government functions in China’s 
economy, there seems to be far less inclination to mention of the role of individuals in 
the same market. An economy is not fundamentally shaped by policy or government, 
but by the hard work of individuals. That is, the ordinary Chinese put in their own 
efforts to pursue the self-interest of survival and wealth accumulation, leading to 
benefits for their well-being and society. The ethos of hard work and relentless efforts 
captured in the slogan “labour is glorious” and the folk tale “Yu Gong Moving Away 
Mountains”5 is an important part of Chinese culture. Therefore, it is important to 
foster an appreciation of the role that individuals can play in the economy and affect 
their economic well-being that benefits social-economic development. This importance 
also attracts our attention towards addressing the self efforts by individuals. In this way, 
it could provide comparative objective judgment for government actions.         
1.2 Definitions of key terms 
Economic inequality is a topic of perennial concern discussed by economists, 
philosophers and policymakers. The term “inequality” is derived from some idea of 
equality (Cowell, 2011). The fact is that equality is a “highly contested” concept 
(Gosepath, 2011), as well as intricate. One of the biggest issues in the controversy is 
the sub-conceptions of distributive equality that have come to be widely associated 
with the demand for economic (i.e. income) equality. This firestorm mainly lies in the 
                                                        
5 This folk tale is a well-known fable from Chinese mythology about the virtues of 
perseverance and willpower (Giddens and Giddens, 2005). 
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simple but difficult core question of “equality of what” (i.e. equal economic recourse 
and so on).6 The diversity of understanding from various different people has resulted 
in “equality” having no unified meaning or even that it is devoid of meaning (Gosepath, 
2011).  
For this reason, a normative doctrine of egalitarianism is viewed as a 
fundamental idea. This study does not stress egalitarianism from either a communism 
or socialism idealism, but from the modern egalitarian perspective. In general, the 
focus of the modern egalitarian efforts is to realize that equality is on the possibility of 
a good life, i.e. on equality of life prospects and life circumstances (Gosepath, 2011).  
A good life is generally regarded as quality of life or well-being in the literature, 
and both have attracted momentous attention worldwide in the past decade. Its scope is 
very broad in the international literature and is generally evaluated on a wider range of 
indicators than just income. However, what does quality of life mean in the Chinese 
culture? There has been a long historical influence of western culture on Chinese 
culture which could be traced back to around two thousand years ago. Regarding 
contemporary history, particularly since 1978, such an effect has been prominent in 
many aspects, including the concept of quality of life. 
The concept of quality of life was started by Galbraith and Crook (1958) in their 
work entitled The Affluent Society and was then introduced into China in the 1980s. 
This phrase has appeared more in social media, scholarly research and government 
                                                        
6 Under this context, many theories of equality deal exclusively with what should be 
equalized (opportunity? Economic resource and so on), or what the parameter or 
“currency” of equality should be (Gosepath, 2011). 
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reports than in the broad masses over the last three decades. Their measured 
dimensions are close to the meaning in western countries. For instance, in the first 
China Urban Quality of Life Index Report (2011), jointly released by the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences and the Capital University of Economics and Business, 
since 2011, the term quality of life refers to that used by the World Bank,7 covering 
twelve domains to evaluate the quality of life in urban areas. They are income, 
consumption, dwelling, transportation, education, social welfare, medical and health, 
life expectancy, leisure, employment and social security. 
From the perspective of the broad masses, the phrase a good life is more 
frequently used in daily life with a particular focus on high income and influential 
social position. The reasons are the following five aspects: 1) people have enjoyed the 
virtues of capitalism with the remarkable development in living standards since the 
economic reform; 2) the overemphasis on the high rate of economic growth that leads 
to individuals being exclusively concerned with money; 3) the influential social 
position such as a high position as a governor official indicates money, power and 
privilege; 4) one typical striking conversation between ordinary Chinese is highly 
associated with money, which is reflected in discussing investment opportunities; 5) 
the pursuit of materialistic hedonism and a belief in money worship have become a 
normal social phenomenon (Hong, 2001; Jianhua, 2005; Al-Khatib et al., 2007). Hence, 
it is not difficult to understand why many ordinary Chinese consider material affluence 
(or the objective side of quality of life) as crucial for one’s good life. In this sense, the 
                                                        
7 See Beyond Economic Growth (2004). 
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perception of a good life from the social perceptive is close to the meaning of the 
standards of living. In this respect, the standards of living are considered the main 
indicator for the quality of life for contemporary Chinese in this research.  
Income inequality is often described as the gap between rich and poor, but more 
generally it refers to differences in income between different parts of the population 
(Cribb et al., 2013). The present study uses the term income inequality regarding its 
general meaning. Self-interest is regarded as: “my self-interest is what is in the interest 
of myself, and not others” (Crisp, 2013, para.3). With this reference, self-interest 
means a person not only concerned about his own income status but others, in the 
present research. In contrast, social influence is the generic term to be considered 
beyond the individual’s control, which can affect one’s thoughts, actions and feelings 
through other people, government policies, environments, social norms and so on. 
Similar terms in the literature include social efforts, social interaction, social impact 
and social preference.  
1.3 Research objectives and rationale for the methodology 
An understanding of the cause and consequence of income inequality is still rather 
necessary because of its complexity, despite the abundant literature. In mainstream 
economics, the explanation from functional income distribution mainly goes with land, 
capital and labour, and from personal income distribution it is close to human capital 
such as skill-based development, knowledge, and social and personality attributes. 
Both perspectives actually seek to provide a field of play to bringing the human nature 
of self-interest into effect. This belief is the fundamental basis for western economics. 
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In other words, the political and economic philosophical idea is that individuals are 
capable of enhancing their well-being through their own self-interest according to the 
supply of equal economic opportunity by a government and a market. This idea 
suggests that self efforts and social efforts are the two essential elements for personal 
income distribution or inequality. 
Yet, the measurements of income inequality are not consistent with such an idea; 
rather, they exclusively focus on measuring social influence based on a single index 
(i.e. the Gini coefficient or Theil index). This exclusion reflects that the index is 
calculated based on social comparison. In other words, the index is the result of the 
comparison of an individual’s income with the average income of the population or of 
a group. Accordingly, the index is used to examine the effect of social-economic 
development on income inequality, or vice versa. This unilateral measure is 
inconsistent between theory and empirical practice because of a lack of taking the 
individual’s efforts into account. Hence, this inconsistency is the primary motivation 
for this research project. 
Why has this been so? It may be partly that modern economics starts with an 
individual’s self-interest (Edgeworth, 1881) but ends up with the interest of the 
corresponding action in relation to the social rather than individual life (Marshall, 
1890); and partly that there used to be a dearth of rich statistical information on 
individual living. However, this convention has been challenged along with the 
significant development of statistics in longitudinal data over the past several decades. 
In other words, the concentration has turned into observing the same individuals and 
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households through their life time.    
For these reasons, the first study begins by constructing a novel index of income 
inequality caused by individuals’ efforts based on the Theil’s statistics, namely, the 
individual index. This index is computed by self-comparison instead of social 
comparison. Such an index can extract detailed knowledge about income inequality 
relative to the individual’s efforts in the theory. Besides, it enables economists and 
policymakers to observe self-interest explicitly and to connect to ethics issues easily 
and focus on appropriate target groups. Furthermore, this extra index allows us to 
examine the joint effects of the two elements on a person’s well-being further. This 
examination enlightens the belief that the distribution of a person’s life is driven by 
social efforts as well as self efforts. Such a belief can represent different aspects of "a 
good life" compared with previous studies on an individual or household level in the 
inequality context.  
Moreover, the link between income inequality and good life closely correlates to 
the hackneyed debate on the inequality and growth. Despite numerous studies, the link 
is still not well understood since there are no conclusive empirical results on the 
relationship. Previous investigation also solely concentrates on the unilateral social 
influence estimations which may provide biased results. The present study intends to 
present a model that explains the bilateral effects of social efforts and self-development 
on the living standards in one chapter.   
In addition, since the political and economic philosophical idea also highlights 
the importance of economic opportunity to lighten the pressure of excessive income 
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inequality, the thesis further asks the following questions. Can concomitant economic 
opportunity in the emerging market offset income inequality given all these years of 
social efforts on developing the market economy in China? Does any economic 
insecurity emerge from the rapid economic growth? If so, how does it affect the 
inequality? Along with these questions, there are also limited studies in the literature, 
particularly on the concept of income mobility (Fields and Zhang, 2007; Chen and 
Zhang, 2009; Nichols, 2010). These reasons therefore inspire the second essay to 
address these interests empirically.         
Thus far, the distinct contribution of the first two essays is firstly to introduce the 
notion of self-development into income inequality research and put emphasis on the 
collaboration of self efforts and social efforts to promote well-being in the research 
area of income inequality.  
The final essay is about a specific policy analysis and intends to evaluate what 
social influence and efforts from government action can help to lighten the income gap. 
The basic consideration for such a design is that there is a need for a prior condition of 
opportunity or choice for releasing economic preferences and there is a lack of such 
luxuries in some circumstances. For example, the nature of a state-owned monopoly of 
a residential electricity sector in some developing countries leads to households having 
no choice of supplier. Additionally, to rely on households (especially low-income) to 
save energy is unrealistic. Hence, the help from government to smooth out the gap and 
lighten the burden on some individuals becomes vital. Particularly given the 
complexity and difficulty in China, there is a heavy responsibility and a long course to 
10 
 
go towards diminishing the rising gap because of its complexity and difficulty in China. 
Thus, this issue has not only appeared in the general plan by the state council, but also 
become an objective across various sectors, including education, health care, the tax 
system and the energy sector. Therefore, Chapter Five is designed for this purpose. 
1.4 Data and coverage 
The present research contains two sets of secondary data to analyze the above issues. 
The first two essays apply longitudinal data from the Chinese Health and Nutrition 
Survey (CHNS) with 14,667 adults, based on the nine selected provinces (Shandong, 
Jiangsu, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang and Liaoning8); and 
eight waves (1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006 and 2009). This dataset is one 
of the most widely used for the study of income inequality. Its collection is an ongoing 
international collaborative project between the Carolina Population Center at the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the National Institute of Nutrition and 
Food Safety, and the Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention. According to 
the CHNS, the survey applies a multistage, random cluster process to draw on a 
sample of thousands of households and individuals. The sample of households/adults 
was randomly drawn from nine provinces, including three coastal provinces, Liaoning, 
Shandong, and Jiangsu, and six inland provinces, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, 
Guangxi and Guizhou. These provinces vary by geographic location and economic 
development and can be considered as regionally representative. Four neighbourhoods 
in each city, one county-town neighbourhood, and three villages in each county were 
                                                        
8 Heilongjiang and Liaoning are not represented in all waves. 
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then randomly selected.  
The last essay uses average household panel data taken from multiple resources 
between 1998 and 2011. The data cover the majority of provinces, except Inner 
Mongolia and Tibet because many data from these two provinces are not available. In 
terms of data analysis and methods, the project adopts various appropriate statistical 
techniques and models.     
1.5 Outline of the chapters 
The above discussions guide us to seek alternative ways of understanding the rising 
income inequality. The following part of this thesis consists of four chapters that deal 
with the issues and questions raised above. Chapter 2 provides the general context and 
theoretical background. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on presenting the main argument of 
this thesis and Chapter 5 is a case study for a policy analysis, followed by the final 
Chapter 6, the conclusions. 
Chapter 2 is designed to discuss the practical context in China generally and 
seeks to answer the questions concerning what rising income inequality is, why 
inequality has increased and whether we should care about it; followed by a review of 
relevant historical economics related to self-interest and government intervention; then 
providing a discussion on the theoretical background of income inequality. The review 
focus is mainly on the inevitable interaction between self-interest and social influence 
in inequality with respect to individual well-being as well as the importance of 
economic opportunity. Hence, two claims are expected to be that the traditional index 
for income inequality is incomplete, which may lead to biased results when examining 
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the link between inequality and living standards and evaluating government actions. 
Secondly, sufficient and equal opportunity provided by a society may be the top 
priority but being able to perceive opportunity by individuals is also another essential 
issue.    
Chapter 3 follows the theoretical guidance and intends to substantiate the first 
claim. By doing so, a new index is introduced to measure income inequality for 
presenting self efforts, namely, the individual index. Meanwhile, the traditional 
inequality index is for measuring social-economic development, namely, the social 
index. The second objective is to use the generalised moment of method analysis to 
examine the joint effects of the two measures on living conditions. Through the 
comparison of income inequality based on self efforts and social efforts, this essay 
expects to explore any lesson that can shed light on a better way to solve or understand 
this acknowledged problem in the debate. 
Chapter 4 is designed to substantiate the second claim by examining the 
relationship between income inequalities, mobility and volatility, applying quantile 
regression with the same set of longitudinal data from the previous chapter. In the 
literature, income mobility presents economic opportunities and volatility indicates for 
income security. In the present study, self-interest is presented by individual income 
difference and is taken from Chapter 3. This essay expects to explore and evaluate 
whether social efforts in the sense of proving economic opportunities and income 
security can function efficiently on self-interest through this examination.        
Chapter 5 aims to evaluate the implications of the new residential pricing system 
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in China by examining price and income elasticity of demand by different household 
types. We use pre-reform annual panel data for 29 provinces over a fourteen-year 
period, from 1998 to 2011, applying feasible generalized least squares models. The 
expectation of the finding is that the new system may not benefit low-income and rural 
households due to much public criticism. If this is the case, the promise of lightening 
the life burden though social efforts is unlikely to be carried out.     
Chapter 6 intends to tie together, integrate and synthesize the various issues 
raised in all the previous discussion chapters, provide answers to the thesis research 
interests, identify the theoretical and policy implications of the study in respect of the 
overall study area, highlight the study limitations and provide direction and areas for 
future research.  
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CHAPTER 2 Context and Theoretical Background 
2.1 Introduction 
The term “economics” comes from Greek, originally meaning the art of household 
management (Harper, 2013). Economics in this original sense was more focused on the 
skills to manage a community, family business or home, including training servants, 
furnishing a house, and procuring food and so on. For nearly 150 years, Anglophone 
distribution theory deviated from the initial aspiration to aggregate levels and followed 
the Ricardian emphasis on functional distribution, the income shares of labour, land, 
and capital (Goldfarb and Leonard, 2005). Beginning in the 1960s, and consolidated 
by a research outpouring in the early 1970s, mainstream economics moves from the 
functional back to families and individual distribution (commonly named, personal, 
individual or size distribution in the literature) (Goldfarb and Leonard, 2005). In other 
words, the functional role of the three broad classes of workers, landlords and 
capitalists is less favourable than the role of well-being across individuals in modern 
economics. The fundamental need for such changes is the desired consideration of 
social reference into economics since the functional distribution is no longer sufficient 
to explain personal distribution as Goldfarb and Leonard (2005) summarize. 
Additionally, the functional role relentlessly treats human beings as an input factor of 
economic production. Nevertheless, the role of well-being changes the philosophical 
idea of people for production to that of production for people and draws attention to 
poverty (Brady, 1951), income dispersion (Brady, 1951), the determinants of personal 
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income (Friedman, 1953) and the development of human capital (Goldfarb and 
Leonard, 2005). Briefly, in contemporary economics, functional distribution remains 
with the original meaning and refers to the share of the national income accruing to the 
primary factors of production, land, labour and capital. The extended functional 
distribution disaggregates the functional distribution by sector and modes of 
production. The personal distribution looks at the share of national income accruing to 
each segment of the population (for example, quintile and decile).  
The shifts from functional distribution to personal distribution also show the 
progressive demand of a rigorous understanding of human economic behaviour in a 
society. Many economic theories have been developed based on the exclusive 
fundamental theoretical basis of human nature of self-interest since Adam Smith (1775, 
1776). The role of self-interest has been serving as fundamental to our understanding 
of how market economies function in mainstream economics. It is true that self-interest 
is the essential motivator in economic activity. It is possibly also true that there is no 
alternative to self-interest as the core to economic development since it has succeeded 
in many circumstances. However, this unique centre is narrow as a growing body of 
criticism and evidence from some economists themselves, and sociologists and 
anthropologists, supporting the view that people are social beings (homo socialism) 
concerned with the well-being of others as well as their own well-being. That would 
explain that government intervention always plays an important role in an economy.  
In the area of income inequality, there is always a debate on the preference of 
either self-interest or social-interest based on the demand of government actions. 
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However, the ultimate solution generally relies on social influence rather than 
self-interest since the former is believed to be the main driving force of income 
distribution. Such belief reflects on social efforts on redistributing wealth from the rich 
to the poor and using productivity increases and human capital investment as 
instruments to reduce the level of inequality and poverty. However, there is a 
preference for whichever of the interests is unable to deal effectively with the 
complicated issue of inequality because the ultimate purpose for investigating 
inequality is to promote the well-being of individuals (Gosepath, 2011). One’s 
well-being depends not only on self efforts but also on social efforts.  
The following chapter does not intend to argue the importance of the 
fundamental belief of self-interest, but rather its incompleteness to address personal 
income distribution. Meanwhile, the chapter also argues the importance of the 
collaboration between self efforts and social efforts in the area of income inequality.  
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 looks at income inequality 
in China descriptively; Section 2.3 and Section 2.4 are mainly a literature review of the 
relevant history of thought on economics, the role of social comparison in inequality, 
the importance of economic opportunity and an appropriate concept of mobility for 
looking at opportunity in China. The conclusion of this chapter is in Section 2.5.  
2.2 Income inequality in China 
2.2.1 The rising income inequality 
The high level of income inequality has strikingly attracted nationwide attention in the 
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past decade, besides the fast growing economy of China. It is universally accepted that 
the gap between the poor and the rich has been warned about by scholarly attestation 
and public perception. The rising income inequality not only constrains further 
economic development to deal with poverty, but also affects political and social 
stability nationally, regionally and locally.  
A popular measure of income inequality is the Gini coefficient which was 
developed by the Italian statistician and sociologist Corrado Gini in 1912. A Gini 
coefficient of zero expresses perfect equality, where all incomes across individuals are 
the same. Meanwhile, a Gini coefficient of one (100 on the percentile scale) expresses 
maximal inequality among values, for example, where only one person has all the 
income. According to the United Nations, the Gini coefficient of 0.2 represents an 
absolute equality; 0.2-0.3 means relative equality; 0.3-0.4 is relatively reasonable; 
0.4-0.5 refers to a big gap; and 0.6 indicates a sharp difference. In international 
practice, 0.4 is seen as the warning level. 
On average, the official Gini index is below 0.30 at national level in the 1980s, 
followed by 0.34 in the 1990s. In recent years, the Gini coefficient has been increasing 
gradually to 0.45 in 2004 (see Figure 2.1), and then hitting a peak of 0.491 in 2008, 
dropping to 0.490 in 2009, 0.480 in 2010 and 0.477 in 2011, according to Ma Jiantang, 
director of the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Some studies argue that the official 
Gini coefficients for income inequality are underestimated. Chen et al. (2010) list 
some studies that have more than 0.40 Gini coefficients for the year of 1995, and their 
study reveals the Gini coefficient at 0.61 in 2010, a much worse wealth scenario than 
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officially claimed.   
In fact, China is not the only country in developing Asia to experience rising 
inequality. The latest report by the Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2012) shows that 
the Gini coefficient increased in more than one-third of Asian countries with 
comparative data in the past two decades, including India and Indonesia. However, 
China's Gini coefficient has escalated the most and at the fastest rate.  
Figure 2.1: Income Disparity in China 
 
One distinct income inequality is between urban and rural areas in China. 
Economic reform has truly made some people exceptionally rich and created an 
affluent urban middle class. Yet many millions, particularly in the countryside, have 
been left behind (Figure 2.1). The gap also noticeably reflects on all provinces, 
especially the disparity in the inland and coastal regions. The coastal-inland 
development gap and the rural-urban divide are the two principal components of 
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overall inequality in China. Both urban to rural household per capita income ratio and 
coastal to inland GDP per capita ratio increased by almost 50% from 2.3 times and 1.7 
times in the late 1980s to 3.2 times and 2.4 times, respectively, in 2004 (Huang and 
Luo, 2008). Several years subsequently, the growing tendency continues, that is, 3.5 
times between urban and rural areas and 2.7 times in coastal-inland provinces in 2010, 
according to the official claim (NSB, 2011).  
Residential electricity consumption is also used as supplementary information to 
present the issue of income inequality in China in considering the following five 
aspects. Firstly, the shortcomings and the quality of statistics for macro data from the 
NBS lead to either overestimated or underestimated results (briefly, Chen et al., 2010; 
Benjamin et al., 2005; Fang et al., 2002; Khan and Riskin, 2001; Rawski, 2001). 
Secondly, electricity data are recorded as a physical quantity, which may avoid as few 
measurement errors as possible. Thirdly, there is a highly correlated relationship 
between electricity usage and income growth. Fourthly, there is also unbalanced 
proportional spending on electricity in household consumption expenditure. Finally, 
the importance of energy services is a fundamental determinant of the quality of life as 
well as the economic vitality of both industrialized and developing nations.  
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Table 2.1: Proportional Residential Energy Consumption Per Capita 
 HCE Real 
Per Capita 
REC 
Per Capita 
Percentage of popular residential energy 
  Coal Electricity LPG NG Gas 
Year Yuan kgce % % % % % 
1980 204.29 112 94.57 3.96 0.61 0.24 0.62 
1981 209.19 101 94.27 4.16 0.74 0.23 0.60 
1982 213.65 102 94.32 4.10 0.72 0.22 0.63 
1983 216.74 107 94.15 4.29 0.84 0.11 0.61 
1984 221.20 113 93.52 4.66 0.79 0.41 0.62 
1985 240.82 127 92.29 5.84 1.06 0.37 0.45 
1986 256.19 127 91.34 6.37 1.29 0.55 0.45 
1987 274.94 132 90.64 6.96 1.25 0.62 0.53 
1988 322.35 141 89.25 7.81 1.28 1.16 0.50 
1989 356.56 139 87.39 9.03 1.53 1.27 0.77 
1990 363.44 139 85.33 10.94 1.55 1.37 0.81 
1991 374.30 139 83.30 12.29 2.00 1.38 1.04 
1992 395.74 134 78.98 15.35 2.49 1.65 1.52 
1993 455.53 133 76.49 17.59 2.96 1.38 1.59 
1994 572.81 129 70.84 21.30 3.96 1.63 2.27 
1995 682.41 131 68.87 22.91 5.15 1.45 1.61 
1996 738.61 121 59.37 28.25 8.04 1.80 2.54 
1997 760.77 119 54.72 31.58 8.39 1.79 3.51 
1998 756.10 119 51.76 33.10 9.32 1.99 3.82 
1999 739.77 122 49.95 34.91 9.24 2.21 3.69 
2000 739.71 124 47.53 36.62 9.19 2.73 3.94 
2001 745.82 127 45.25 39.08 8.75 3.34 3.58 
2002 743.13 134 43.08 40.44 9.45 3.47 3.55 
2003 749.57 153 41.23 42.30 9.65 3.48 3.34 
2004 779.82 176 39.26 43.24 10.37 4.02 3.11 
2005 801.54 194 36.53 47.06 9.22 4.28 2.93 
2006 821.79 212 33.24 49.61 9.13 4.98 3.05 
2007 860.02 234 28.48 53.21 9.09 6.20 3.01 
2008 910.03 241 25.98 56.11 7.89 7.12 2.91 
2009 908.31 254 24.54 58.42 7.59 6.99 2.47 
2010 951.30 258 22.66 57.30 6.92 8.37 4.74 
Source: China Statistics Year Book 2011, and China Energy Statistics, 2011 (Table 
1-6).  
Notes: HCE stands for household consumption expenditure and is adjusted by base 
year 1978. REC is annual average residential energy consumption. LPG is liquefied 
petroleum gas. NG is natural gas. The percentages are calculated according to GB/T 
2589-2008 of coal equivalent conversion coefficient: 0.9000kgce/kg (coal), 
0.4040kgce/kW.h (electricity), 1.7143kgce/kg (LPG), 1.3300kgce/cu.m (Natural Gas), 
and 0.5714kgce/cu.m (Gas).  
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As noted in Table 2.1, by 2010 electricity usage dominates residential energy 
consumption among five types of household common energy: coal, electricity, 
liquefied petroleum gas, natural gas and gas. Particularly in the past decade, the 
percentage of electricity usage gradually rises to more than 50% of the annual average 
residential energy consumption per capita. Coal used to be a large proportion but it 
has declined over the period of time, and such decline is opposite to household 
consumption expenditure. Conversely, electricity closely responds to the increased 
tendency of household consumption expenditure, and the correlation is 0.97 between 
the two.  
Figure 2.2: Residential Electricity Consumption across Coastal and Inland provinces, 
1998-2011 
 
Source: Author’s calculation.  
Notes: Coastal region includes provinces of Shanghai, Beijing, Zhejiang, 
Guangdong, Jiangsu, Tianjin, Shandong, Fujian and Hebei and inland-low indicates 
the five lowest income provinces of Gansu, Shanxi, Guizhou, Xinjiang and Qinghai. 
Inland region is the remaining 15 provinces. Each of which of three lines is OLS 
fitted line.  
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Figure 2.3: Residential Electricity Consumption across Urban and Rural Provinces, 
1996-2010 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
Notes: RE-u is the average residential electricity consumption in urban area while 
RE-r is the average residential electricity consumption in rural area. 
Regarding coastal-inland and urban-rural inequality, residential electricity usage 
displays clear positive changes and significant differences in coastal-inland regions 
from 1998 to 2011 and in urban-rural areas between 1996 and 2010 (see Figure 2.2 
and Figure 2.3). These statistics suggest that residential electricity consumption ought 
to be reasonable and indicate household income inequality in China well.  
In contrast to aggregate data, we also use household survey data since research 
finds a different picture of income inequality according to the two types of data. That 
is, per capita household income is substantially higher and more unequally distributed 
than suggested by the NBS estimates in Khan and Riskin’s study (1998).  
In this section, the subsample of non-negative and zero income CHNS data of 
wave 1989, 1997 and 2009 are used to analyze the changes in an individual’s income. 
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There are 7994, 7844 and 5792 adults (18 years of age or older) in year 1989, 1997 
and 2009, respectively. In the CHNS dataset, personal income in different survey 
years is adjusted to rural/urban Consumer Price Index at the provincial level.  
Table 2.2: Income Inequality Changes Between 1989, 1997 and 2009 
 
 Individual income (Yuan) Gini Coefficient Theil index 
Year 1989 1997 2009 1989 1997 2009 1989 1997 2009 
Total  3622 5639 17615 0.450 0.463 0.493 0.402 0.410 0.454 
Decomposition by area 
       
Urban  4000 6575 21586 0.412 0.434 0.412 0.317 0.353 0.305 
Rural  3332 5158 15920 0.492 0.471 0.521 0.443 0.421 0.514 
Between  
   
0.328 0.325 0.348 0.222 0.243 0.251 
Decomposition by region 
       
Coastal  3725 6941 19363 0.421 0.440 0.456 0.335 0.358 0.378 
Inland  3560 5205 16742 0.476 0.451 0.505 0.419 0.366 0.493 
Between  
   
0.451 0.447 0.472 0.360 0.354 0.394 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
Note: Gini coefficient is the extended Gini coefficient (Yitzhaki and Lerman, 1991); 
Between-group index is estimated using the Elbers and alii method (2005); Theil 
index is based on Theil statistics and its parameter is 0.5. Data source: The CHNS 
individual data.  
 
Individual income increases manifestly from 3,622 Yuan in 1989 to 17,615 
Yuan in 2009. The inequality also interlinks with such growth. The Gini coefficient 
increases from 0.450 in 1989 to 0.493 in 2009, while the Theil index increases from 
0.402 in 1989 to 0.454 in 2009. Within rich coastal and urban areas, adult income 
inequality has an increased tendency in coastal region but not many changes in urban 
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areas over this period. Within poor inland and rural areas, the income inequality 
clearly increases in both places. Furthermore, inequality decreases between rich and 
poor areas.      
Overall, the index of income inequality is larger than some previous studies in 
Table 2.2. There are several reasons that lead us to believe this index is acceptable. 
First, the Gini coefficient is generally low, based on macro national official data 
(Kanbur and Zhang, 2005). Second, different data may lead to different results. For 
example, studies by Luo and Zhu (2008) and Huang and Luo (2008) use household 
data, while the present study applies adult survey data. Third, the figures in the table 
show that the index is greater in less developed rural areas and inland provinces than 
in the advanced developed places (for similar results, see other calculations by Luo 
and Zhu, 2008). In other words, poorer areas have larger income inequality than richer 
areas.  
2.2.2 Why has inequality increased? 
The transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented economy has 
led to trade liberalization and productivity increase and efficiency since 1978. As a 
consequence, the size of the economy has expanded rapidly as well as the speed of 
growth being remarkable. China’s share of global GDP on a PPP basis rose from 3.7% 
in 1990 to 15.0% in 2012 (in contrast, the US share of global GDP peaked at 24.3% in 
1999 and declined to 19.0% in 2013) (see Figure 2.4). Furthermore, China’s real GDP 
grew at an average annual rate of nearly 10% from 1979 to 2012 (see Table 2.3).  
25 
 
This development in widening inequality is inevitable as development does not 
happen everywhere at the same time. Yet, the source of growing inequality should not 
be justified solely because of economic growth. To some extent, the rise in inequality 
is inevitable because of the introduction of a market system. As the 
Nobel-prize-winning economist Sir Arthur Lewis noted six decades ago, 
“development must be inegalitarian because it does not start in every part of the 
economy at the same time” (Lewis, 1954, p.26).  
Figure 2.4: The Size of China’s Economy and US Economy in Percentage 
 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2013 
Note: Based on estimates of GDP on a PPP basis and Projection between 2013 and 
2017. 
To some other extent, it has been exacerbated by the Chinese central 
government political institutions. Inequality is demonstrated as a multi-dimension 
phenomenon, and the central matter is often a failure in the development of the 
political economy (Gottschalk and Justino, 2006; Gravier-Rymaszewska et al., 2010). 
Particularly, it is three aspects of unwillingness to adjust its fundamental political 
institutions (Huang, 2008), government discriminatory behaviour and the inefficient 
implantation of policies that have worsened the inequality issue in China. 
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Table 2.3: China's Real GDP Growth Rate 
 
Year Real Growth Rate % 
1979 7.6 
1980 7.9 
1981 5.3 
1982 9.0 
1983 10.9 
1984 15.2 
1985 13.5 
1986 8.9 
1987 11.6 
1988 11.3 
1989 4.1 
1990 3.8 
1991 9.2 
1992 14.2 
1993 13.9 
1994 13.1 
1995 10.9 
1996 10.0 
1997 9.3 
1998 7.8 
1999 7.6 
2000 8.4 
2001 8.3 
2002 9.1 
2003 10.0 
2004 10.1 
2005 11.3 
2006 12.7 
2007 14.2 
2008 9.6 
2009 9.2 
2010 10.4 
2011 9.2 
2012 7.8 
2013* 7.8 
 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit and IMF Projection for 2013 (*for July 2013) 
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2.2.3 Should we care about the rise in inequality? 
Inequality might not be a matter of concern in itself. In economics, there is a tendency 
to believe that with the Pareto principle a change is considered to be good (Pareto 
improvement or Pareto optimality) if it makes someone better off without making 
anyone else worse off. Table 2.4 on income distribution shows an increased change of 
total income share in the richest group over the past two decades from 49.43% in 1997 
to 53.74% in 2009, while there is a decrease of total income share in the poorest group 
from 3.04% in 1993 to 2.07% in 2009. Such changes clearly do not satisfy the 
common sense of the Pareto principle and indicate economic allocation is not efficient 
during that period of time. Whether this change is to be perceived as acceptable by 
members of Chinese society may depend on social norms, however.   
Table 2.4: Income Distribution Between 1989 and 2009 
 
Quintile of  
population  
Percentage of total wave income 
1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
Poorest 20% 3.28 3.78 3.04 3.08 2.74 2.28 2.22 2.07 
Second 20% 9.51 10.10 8.86 8.73 8.63 7.75 7.75 8.57 
Third 20% 14.55 16.06 14.83 15.24 15.60 14.59 14.02 13.96 
Fourth 20% 21.50 22.88 22.76 23.51 23.81 24.27 22.67 21.65 
Richest 20% 50.87 47.19 58.51 49.43 49.22 51.11 53.33 53.74 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
Perception of economic equity derives from social and cultural norms and each 
society will emphasize its own values as to what is equitable or not (Hofstede et al., 
2005). Many areas in modern Chinese society have no small amount of influence from 
western culture, but ancient Chinese culture has spent thousands of years largely 
developing on its own. It is conceivable that Chinese society has its own view about 
economic equity. For example, the western public may be concerned about the high 
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level of economic inequality with regard to perfection of legal systems (i.e. the Occupy 
Wall Street9 in the United States of America and the talk of tax avoidance in advanced 
economies in 2013). In contrast, the Chinese public may pay more attention to the 
inequity in relation to political corruption, particularly illegitimate private gains and 
unequal opportunities. This public attitude reflects on common daily life conversations 
among ordinary Chinese, and they can easily have heard of government officials or 
their family and friends accumulating vast wealth at the expense of a politically 
powerless working class, and can have experienced discrimination of economic 
opportunity. According to the report from the Pew Research Center by Wike et al. 
(2012), there are growing concerns about the high level of inequality and corruption.  
Despite the different concerns between the two societies, they share common 
ground in that individuals are motivated by fairness. In other words, people dislike 
unequal distributions or outcomes (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Yet, they are not only 
concerned about their own fair return, but also the intention of their fellow citizens 
(Bikhchandani et al., 1998; Fong, 2001). For example, if some members get rich 
unfairly, individuals are likely to react more negatively than when they “deserve” it. If, 
for instance, a political leader favours one ethnic group above others, people from the 
other ethnic groups probably do not have a positive attitude towards this inequality and 
behave accordingly. One typical example in China, inequality is generally perceived to 
be caused by corruption and discrimination and members of a society might be less 
motivated to cooperate with others or might behave improperly to gain a higher return. 
This improper or unhealthy behaviour in turn affects the health of an economy. More 
seriously, separation can lead to social tensions as the “haves” and “have-nots” are 
                                                        
9 Occupy Wall Street (OWS) is the name given to a protest movement that began on 
September 17, 2011, in Zuccotti Park, located in New York City's Wall Street financial 
district (see Gabbatt, 2011). 
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divided, with the opportunity to bridge that gap becoming limited. Such tensions could 
eventually lead to political instability as was the case in Egypt and in Syria when 
driven by a young population seeking economic opportunity and a better way of life 
(Roudi, 2011). 
Nevertheless, regardless of the variation in public attitudes and similarity 
towards such issues, an increased high-level of income inequality has a large impact on 
further aggregate economic development as well as individual’s economic behaviour 
and motivation in any economies. Human motivation is fundamentally important for 
economic behaviour, and it is relevant to consider its impact on economic performance. 
A solution to relieve the high level of income inequality can be influenced by those 
self-interest and social-influence concerns. Given the general picture of the rising 
income inequality and contemporary political-social-economic circumstances in China, 
the next section turns to discuss the historical development of economics in terms of 
self-interest and social-influence. 
2.3 Historical review of economics 
2.3.1 Appreciation of self-interest 
Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations in 1776 is usually considered as marking the 
beginning of classical economics. This great distinction, of course, attributes to 
Smith’s trenchant insight of the causes of the national wealth which is not the metal of 
wealth, but rather the stream of goods and services that it creates. Simultaneously, 
more profoundly is his understanding of economics closely connected with human 
nature which is superior to that of his contemporaries (Coase, 1976) and led him to 
have been the accomplished father of modern economics. 
In Books I and II of The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith lays out how the 
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economy works. People seek material comfort and are naturally sociable, having a 
predisposition to "truck, barter, and exchange". From this derives market exchange, the 
division of labour, specialization, high productivity, accumulation and investment, 
higher productivity, comfort, and material wealth. This process, driven by human 
nature, Smith says, starts in the countryside with the expansion of productivity in 
making the necessities of life; moves to the towns with the subsequent expansion of 
productivity in making the conveniences of life; and then shows itself at last with the 
development of long-distance international trade in luxuries. That, at least, is the 
"natural" history of the economy. 
His view on the nature of man in particular draws attention to the self-interest 
that is certainly a powerful motive in human behaviour when a condition of 
competition exists, but it is by no means the only motive (Coase, 1976) since he also 
asserts The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith, 1759). These two arguments do not 
contradict each other. In fact, the latter serves the former, and the former also requires 
such essential condition to economic prosperity. Smith believed that the ability to think 
long-term would curb most businesses from abusing customers. In other words, Smith 
expected people to practice thrift, hard work and enlightened self-interest, and thought 
the practice of enlightened self-interest was natural for the majority of people. Hence, 
based on the two arguments, Smith argues for the use of the market and the limitation 
of government action in economics’ affairs, briefly free market, to provide high 
degrees of competition and no coercion which will permit individuals to get their 
interests out through their economic actions. Thus, this argument inspirits an essential 
theoretical basis of developing the subsequent neoclassical and present economics. 
Similarly, John Stuart Mill’s belief, in his book Utilitarianism (published in 
1863), is that in a society where everyone is equal, each person eventually learns that 
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cooperation, at least in the long-run, will bring more pleasure to the individual than 
complete self-interest (since self-interest favours the interest of the individual over 
other equally as deserving people). If people forget their place in society, sanctions 
provide the reinforcement needed to help them remember. Consistently, a century later, 
Edgeworth’s (1881) view that self-interest is a matter of preferences and explicitly 
states self-interest with great precision with “the first principle of Economics [being] 
that every agent is actuated only by self-interest” (p.16, cited in Vriend, 1996, p.265). 
In other words, this statement is clear enough to deliver a message that this is the first 
principle, the starting-point, of economics.  
Even though Smith's brief goes thus, Shear and Healy (2011) categorize the 
understanding of self-interest into groups. For some, self-interest is treated as positive. 
It motivates hard work and innovation and balances supply and demand. Acting on our 
self-interest allows the economy to be the proverbial tide that lifts all boats. In 
agreements, we need to do as much as possible to allow people to follow their "natural" 
inclinations, which include deregulating the economy and creating new free markets 
and lower taxes. For others, this self-interest can quickly morph into untrammelled 
greed and cause many negative issues, including an imbalanced economy, market failure, 
social and environmental degradation and political corruption. In this respect, the 
economy needs to be carefully monitored and regulated; taxes should be raised to 
redistribute wealth, and policies should be legislated to protect people and the 
environment. People and political parties disagree about economic policy, but across the 
whole political spectrum, the pursuit of individual self-interest is presumed to be what 
motivates people in the economy itself. For the rest, the self-interest may be never 
understood and appreciated by this group. 
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2.3.2 Limitations of self-interest 
Neoclassical economics may belong to the first group and remains only self-interest as 
the central feature to derive key economic issues with the combination of competition 
and disaggregates the functional distribution by sector and modes of production 
through supply and demand in a market. However, there are many criticisms about this 
exclusive fundamental and many demonstrations that human beings are not only driven 
by self-interest.  
In a narrow sense, warnings have been issued in that the application of the 
calculus of self-interest may face decreasing marginal returns (Hirshleifer, 1985; Frey, 
2001). A book on giving and altruism, appearing under the auspices of the International 
Economic Association, even describes itself as an “obituary of homo oeconomicus” 
(Kolm, 2000, p. 32). Studies of important activities such as charitable giving 
(Andreoni, 2002), voting (Mueller, 2003), and taxpaying (Andreoni et al., 1998) have 
similar conclusions. Thus, for example, it has been stated that a “purely economic 
analysis of the evasion gamble implies that most individuals would evade if they are 
‘rational’, because it is unlikely that cheaters will be caught and penalised” (Alm et al., 
1992, p.22). Furthermore, the self-interest model has been clearly rejected in a great 
number of laboratory experiments (see Ledyard, 1995 and Davis, 1993 for surveys). In 
the income inequality context, shortly, Fong (2001), Alesina and Ageletos (2005), and 
Boarini and le Clainche (2009) demonstrate that actions to handle income inequality 
cannot be explained by relying on the strict self-interest axiom.   
In a broad sense, Davidson (1989) and Davidson and Davidson (1996) criticise 
the current conventional wisdom of neoclassical economics having ruled out the 
intellectual history of economic thoughts and propose how to make civic values (ethics) 
work with self-interest to create a more civilized economic society. Lazear (2000) and 
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Myerson (1999) provide two different perspectives on the broadening of economic 
theory. These authors differ substantially in their emphases but agree that the 
broadening is well underway. Frey (2001) criticises the shortcoming of the unique 
view of self-interest as the core of human behaviour from a moral perspective. Manski 
(2000) discusses the inherency of social interaction in economics, summarizing the 
five dimensions of constraint, expectations, preference, equilibrium and more general 
processes involved in social interactions. Baddeley (2010) also demonstrates that the 
study of economic behaviour is merely simplistically a dichotomous categorization of 
such behaviour as either rational or irrational, and narrow and stark from a social 
psychological and neuro-scientific perspective. The socioeconomics is a comparatively 
explicit consideration of social influence to economic decision making, which seeks to 
broaden its scope in economic analysis in the past decades (Manski, 2000; Zanella, 
2004).  
The reasons for these criticisms and challenges of mainstream economics in the 
present day are that, in statistical language, the focus of traditional economics (rational 
or irrational) may well explain the means of agents’ economic behaviours, but the 
distribution of responses about their means was not tied to the theories (McFadden, 
2001). Secondly, it may be about the perception of self-interest of economics that 
derives from economists and others. In these respects, economics has increasingly 
widened its domain today (for example, social economics and behavioural economics). 
At the same time, the rapidly increasing availability of microeconomic data and 
booming empirical techniques lead economists to pay more attention to the variations 
in human behaviour across individuals.  
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2.3.3 The role of government intervention 
The classical view of income distribution is mainly concerned with functional factors 
for the growth of the wealth of a nation which comparatively advocates government 
intervention. These factors, in turn, guide politicians to make economic policy to affect 
the whole economic performance of a country. The most influential of classical 
economists such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo among others, in short, believed 
that the distribution of income is between the main factors of production, land, labour 
and capital. David Ricardo (1817) further classified the aggregate source of income 
into rent, profit and wage. One difference between Smith and Ricardo is that the 
former’s influences are on the grounds of his prosaic observations about how the 
economic system operates (Samuelson, 1992) in terms of the general causes and the 
nature of the wealth of a nation, but rather statements. In contrast, Ricardo critically 
reviews Adam Smith’s work and specifically translates it into pure economic 
considerations, namely, economic principles which comparatively attract academic 
attention. In short, Adam Smith provides more discussions in a broad sense than 
Ricardo, while Ricardo further develops Smith’s work in a narrow focus (Samuelson, 
1992).  
The common ground is the same from these two great economists. Smith and 
Ricardo both argued to limit the power and size of government since the invisible hand 
is capable of illuminating self-interest. Subsequently, John Maynard Keynes (1936), on 
the other hand, advocates government intervention, particularly in fiscal and monetary 
policies in war time and post-war. Paul Krugman (2008) was one of the most 
prominent advocates of the 2008–2009 Keynesian resurgence and called for greater 
use of stimulatory fiscal policy to reduce unemployment and boost to fix the economic 
downturn since 2008. These views are not contradictory. The former concentrates on 
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the long run which believes that the economy is self-regulating and the latter two are 
for the short run which explains the need for government intervention to achieve 
economic stability (Minsky, 2008). More importantly, the historical background is 
totally different economically and politically. In these respects, policy influence on an 
economy is unavoidable and necessary in economic shocks, as argued by some but not 
all economists.  
For these economists who support government intervention (especially 
Keynesian), their notion is linked to Adam Smith and David Ricardo’s belief of 
self-interest and competition. This invisible hand in the market would strongly lead to 
proper pricing playing a large role and more efficiently guide the market place in their 
economic policy recommendations. However, Smith did not condemn government 
intervention completely. In fact, he suggested regulation creates a playing field upon 
which the market can operate the most efficiently. For example, the Wealth of Nations 
devotes regulation into the banking system. This group of these economists expects 
that policy could modify individuals’ economic behaviour (at least some) and lead to 
satisfying economic results.  
For these economists who advocate a free market, their fundamental theoretical 
basis is no doubt rooted in Adam Smith’s beliefs that a free market is more effective 
than government intervention. Economists such as Milton Friedman (1962) from the 
Chicago School and others from the Public Choice School, argue that market failure 
does not necessarily imply that government should attempt to solve market failures 
because the costs of government failure might be worse than those of the market 
failure it attempts to fix. Beyond philosophical objections, a further issue is the 
practical difficulty that any single decision-maker may face in trying to understand 
(and perhaps predict) the numerous interactions that occur between producers and 
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consumers in any market. Mitchell (2005) uses standard theories to discuss the costs 
and benefits of government spending and provides its evidence, and also points out 
that scholars have found a clear negative relationship between government spending 
and economic performance with a list of recent academic research.  
Nothing is new; modern economics began with the fight for market freedom by 
Adam Smith, and present-day economics still keeps the battle of market freedom. Over 
the period of time, these controversies surely have yielded many insights on the 
structure of economies. However, the debates of whether smaller government size or 
bigger government size will keep carrying. Furthermore, almost every economist 
would agree that there are circumstances in which lower levels of government 
spending would enhance economic growth and other circumstances in which higher 
levels of government spending would be desirable (Mitchell, 2005). In this sense, 
exclusion of government intervention is impossible and there is always a role for 
government in regulating the market to achieve a more optimal distribution of 
resources. Nevertheless, one belief that has never changed between these 
macroeconomists is that government policies have powerful impacts on self-interests 
either positively or negatively. In other words, the underlying message is that 
self-interest is not impervious so that policy and any other social influence always play 
a role in any economy.  
One may argue that government policy and social interrelatedness are 
understood as instruments of self-interest, and only affect the appeal of self-interest. 
This view certainly is not egregious, and it has long been the dominant view in 
psychology and in much of Western thought. Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679),10 the 
seventeenth century philosopher, long believed that human beings always acted from 
                                                        
10 See his book Leviathan (1651).  
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self-interest. Additionally, this very core of economic values has made significant 
contributions.  
Yet, the exclusive emphasis of self-interest in mainstream economics is 
incomplete, given more rigorous consideration in the present-day study. Likewise, 
possibly market failure is an important consideration for government intervention, but 
it is also insufficient to justify policy and government action. In this sense, we argue 
that any economic judgment and planning lies on two fundamentals of self-interest and 
social influence (for example, policy, social norms and environment), including the 
field of income inequality.  
2.4 Theoretical background of income inequality 
2.4.1 Preference for self-interest and social-influence 
High levels of income inequality are one of the areas that emphasizes social influence 
over self-interest. Its philosophical consideration regards social influence as the main 
driving focus to handle such issue, which reflects on the debate over inequality as the 
matter of what government can or should do about it. The common actions taken by 
government for the reduction of income inequality are redistribution by taxes, 
regulations or targeting assets, sales and price with releasing constraints and accessing 
economic opportunities. As in the Chinese saying, “the more you work, the more 
mistakes you make”, it is not surprising that the central problem of the high level of 
income inequality is often attributed to a failure in the development of political 
economy.     
Preferences for government actions are generally viewed to be influenced by 
values and beliefs about distributive justice, including both self-preference and 
social-preference in the literature (Cruces et al., 2012; Alesina and Giuliano, 2009; 
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Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Edlund, 1999). The former preference emphasizes 
individual efforts to determine income and so that all have a right to enjoy the fruits of 
their efforts, it will choose low redistribution, low taxes and fewer policies in a target 
area. In equilibrium, efforts will be high, the role of luck is limited, market outcomes 
will be quite fair, and social beliefs will be self-fulﬁlled. In this way of thinking, if 
individuals put forth different levels of efforts, they will wind up in very different 
economic places so that the return on such efforts are high, and inequality is a natural 
(if sometimes unfortunate) outcome. In such a society, social competition and fairness 
are generally high. Eventually, government assistance is out of favour. Contrariwise, 
the latter believes that luck, birth, connections and/or corruption determine wealth and 
poverty is caused by circumstances beyond individual control so that people may 
prefer more government action regarding the poor, distorting allocations and making 
these beliefs self-sustaining. In this mind-set, inequality is seen as improper. In a 
society with such circumstances, social competition and fairness are low and influence 
from government actions is relatively high. In short, beliefs about the causes of income 
inequality determine government actions.  
Perceivably, these beliefs are developed based on external and internal factors 
(Alesina and Giuliano, 2009). The external factors are the influence from other people 
and society, including surrounding information and circumstances that one is in. In 
contrast, the internal factor refers to one’s self efforts, research, attitude and experience 
concerning a particular interest. These factors suggest that people do not immediately 
(if ever) associate with what seems best particularly with regards to imperfect 
information for their self-interest or social-interest. In this respect, neither 
self-preference nor social-preference constantly secures and guarantees optimization of 
the best for oneself and/or society. The expectation of one or other preferences for the 
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reduction of high levels of income inequality is not effective and substantial to meet 
the ultimate purpose of well-being. Thus, the overemphasis of the role of government 
on inequality may lead to inappropriate policies and actions that worsen inequality 
further as well as discourage motivation for individuals to lift up their well-being by 
self efforts.   
2.4.2 The role of social comparison 
One may argue that a decision made in the pursuit of self-interest also promotes social 
interest when the decision that was originally made to benefit oneself, as a result 
benefits society as a whole. However, what appear to be an individual’s own efforts in 
response to his self-interest require the help, participation or cooperation of others. 
People come to know themselves by evaluating their own attitudes, abilities and beliefs 
in comparison with others. This evaluation process is called social comparison in 
social psychological study and that was initially proposed by Leon Festinger in 1954. 
Its concept concentrates on comparisons between the self and others and is a 
fundamental psychological mechanism influencing people's judgments, experiences, 
and behaviour. Social comparison is believed to be natural existence in human 
behaviour (Baumeister and Bushman, 2012). That is, people all compare themselves to 
others.  
The benefits of these comparisons engage individuals to gain accurate 
self-evaluation, self-esteem and self-enhancement since these enable people to 
evaluate their own opinions and abilities by comparing themselves to others to reduce 
uncertainty in these domains, and learn how to define the self (Goethals and Darley, 
1977; Wills, 1981; Tesser and Campbell, 1982; Kruglanski and Mayseless, 1990; Suls 
et al., 2002; Buunk et al., 2013). Conversely, the costs of the comparisons reflect 
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destructive emotion and behaviours, including envy, guilt, regret, and defensiveness, 
and to lie, blame others, and to have unmet cravings with frequent comparison (White 
et al., 2006). Similarly, Luttmer (2005) also demonstrates that individuals’ 
self-reported happiness is negatively affected by the earnings of others in their area.  
The topics of happiness and life satisfaction have attracted unprecedented 
attention in contemporary well-being study as well as public interest. The two factors 
for well-being are highly associated with psychological status such as moods, emotions 
and self-evaluations. Social comparison is the channel that can deliver such desire. In 
other words, the subject of well-being is a cross-disciplinary study. The arguments for 
cross-disciplinary research have been applied recently in the research area of poverty, 
inequality and well-being. Hulme and Toye (2006) believe that the study of well-being 
and inequality and poverty is a particularly appropriate subject for cross-discipline 
research, and conclude that cross-discipline working should be promoted and that both 
interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary approaches can benefit research on poverty and 
well-being. 
Income and well-being are highly related (Alderson, 2013; Alesina et al. 2004; 
Knell, 1999). It is worth mentioning that the ultimate goal of income equality is to 
promote individual well-being. This pursuance is difficult to achieve without 
addressing the component of social comparison since it is common that people judge 
their well-being such as happiness and life satisfaction partially by looking at others’ 
income levels. As studies demonstrate, the close relationship between income and 
well-being is attributable to the social comparisons that income engenders (Alderson, 
2013; Hagerty, 2000).  
Furthermore, the notion of social comparison has been long indirectly embraced 
in the scope of income inequality study in relation to the consumption theories of 
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absolute income and relative income. The absolute income only reflects the total 
amount of earnings one has received in a given period. Keynes (1936) creates a theory 
of consumption based on people's absolute income. According to Keynes, consumers 
would spend a smaller percentage of their income as their absolute income grew larger, 
simultaneously increasing their savings rate. In contrast, the relative income takes into 
consideration others in a society and measures one’s income in relation to other 
members of society, weighing it against the standards of the day. Duesenberry (1949) 
challenges Keynes’s argument in the light of social and psychological dimensions and 
introduces the relative income hypothesis, which demonstrates that people make 
decisions based not on absolute income but on relative income. Duesenberry argues 
that consumers view their own position in relation to others, and behave accordingly.  
However, Duesenberry’s theory was not appealing and replaced by Modigliani 
and Brumberg’s (1954) lifecycle theory of consumption and Friedman’s (1957) 
permanent income hypothesis in the 1950s. Subsequent theories mainly focus on 
self-interest and emphasize utility maximization without regard for social concerns 
(Palley, 2008). Over the last decade, there has been a revival of interest in 
Duesenberry’s ideas on relative income and consumption (Palley, 2008). This research 
has been primarily sociological and microeconomic in focus.     
2.4.3 Economic opportunity at micro level 
Opportunity is regarded as the key for the pursuance of self-interest to lift up standards 
of living in the literature. The emphasis on the importance of opportunity has a long 
historical development in institutional economics. The development has experienced 
the shift from the functional distribution to the personal distribution and the question of 
why individuals get what they do to what they should get.  
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Income inequality starts from the context of the functional distribution and is 
hinted to be inevitable in an economy and not problematic under the condition of 
economic prosperity by the most influential economists such as Adam Smith and 
David Ricardo since the 18th century. However, it did not pass without prominent 
criticism, which began in the early 20th century (Goldfarb and Leonard, 2005), 
including economists Edwin Cannan (1905), and Hugh Dalton (1920). They all called 
for the requirement of personal income distributions since income inequality was 
believed to be a question of persons rather than categories. Later on, along with further 
theory development (for example, human capital theory), state activity and data 
collection, among other things (Goldfarb and Leonard, 2005), the functional 
distribution concept can shed any light on poverty issues as it had virtually nothing to 
say about the distribution of income by the individual, family or household at its lower 
end. Hence, the blossoming of research into personal income distribution took place in 
the 1970s. 
This change also shifts the question of the determinists of income distribution to 
why individuals get what they do. In the supply-demand models, the size distribution is 
based on the notion that an individuals’ income is determined by the sale of a variety of 
personal attributes. The vector of attributes includes race, gender, social status, 
geographic location, and aptitude; the demand for these attributes is generated by the 
production profile of the economy. The price associated with each attribute is thus 
determined by the interaction of supply and demand forces. In the one-sided supply 
models, personal income is defined as the market value of sales of services from 
human and non-human capital, assuming rates are given; changes in the size 
distribution of income are due to inheritance, modified by thrift, ability, industry, luck 
and fraud and also marriage. Pryor (1973) demonstrates that no more than 50% of 
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household income changes can be explained by systematic forces. In effect, according 
to these models, the poor are poor because they are born of poor parents, marry other 
poor folks, and/or are unlucky. In terms of Human capital theory, this explains that 
individuals could affect their income levels based on individual capital (Mincer, 1958; 
Becker, 1975; Checchi, 2006; Galor, 2011); therefore, their locations in the income 
distribution are determined by the investment choices they made with respect to 
schooling, training and so forth (Goldfarb and Leonard, 2005).  
Furthermore, the question of “what should they get” is always the interest behind 
in general distribution study (Goldfarb and Leonard, 2005). Political philosophy has 
shifted sharply away from utilitarianism as a theory of justice or as a measure of social 
welfare over the past forty years (Roemer, 2006). The shift may be marked most easily 
by the publication of Rawls’s (1971) magnum opus. Rawls proposed to adopt the 
availability of “primary goods” to its worst-off member to measure the welfare of a 
society since it does no harm to interpret this as income, or consumption, of its worst 
off member.  
Rawls’s proposal was challenged from two different directions in brief order. 
Firstly, Sen (1981) argued that Rawls was inappropriate to be concerned with the 
goods people received: better, he stated, to be concerned with how well people could 
function with those goods. Thus, shortly, Sen’s proposal was that social welfare should 
be measured by the capacity to function off its worst-off members. The second 
challenge was from Dworkin (1981) who argued that Rawls had slighted the issue of 
personal responsibility. The goods a person receives (think of these being income, for 
short) are a consequence in part of personal choices for which, ethically, it is 
appropriate to hold the individual responsible. Inequalities which result from such 
well-informed choices are not morally unacceptable. Dworkin advocated ‘equality of 
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resources’, in his own words, which is a doctrine in which individuals are compensated 
for the paucity of resources assigned by the natural lottery (including, importantly, the 
resources supplied by the individual’s family), but not for the consequences of choices 
that flow from the individual’s well-considered, adult preferences. Precisely to define 
the criterion of distributions of income and wealth satisfactorily is a tricky business, 
about which much has been written in the last 25 years, as Roemer (1998) stated (for a 
partial summary, see Roemer, 1998). In 1989, Richard Arneson and G.A. Cohen 
responded to Dworkin’s proposal and proposed that although Rawls’ criticism was 
cogent, his remedy was not quite right. Arneson suggested that the right approach was 
to equalize opportunities for welfare with the respect of human nature of self-interest. 
Roemer (2006) empirically demonstrates Arneson’s proposal and claims economic 
opportunity is the key to inequality. If there is no opportunity, self-interest is not able 
to bring an effect on prices, sales and assets.  
According to the review above, an understanding of income inequality is related 
to differences of personal attributes or individual capital that lead to differences in 
price, sales and assets from the micro perspective. From the macro perspective, 
opportunity is established as an efficient channel to deal with income inequality, which 
suggests political economy ought to provide sufficiently and distribute equally.  
However, the understanding of the determinants of income inequality from 
micro perspective may be fairly superficial. Variations in individual capital certainly 
affect income return but the insight is the variation of the sensitivity to opportunity.  
Opportunity is regarded as originating as perception in microeconomics. In other 
words, the perception of opportunity depends on the agent’s discovery (Alvarez and 
Barney, 2007) and creation (Venkataraman et al., 2012). There have been many 
debates on the issue of opportunity identification in the economics of entrepreneurship 
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(see Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; Ardichvili et al., 2003; Klein, 2008; Vaghely and 
Julien, 2010; and Hayton et al., 2011). Likewise, such issue also appears across 
individual and household levels; for instance, opportunity is identified or recognized 
by some individuals but not others as result of income difference. This difference is 
likely due to the heterogeneity in individuals’ sensitivity to opportunities (Ardichvili et 
al., 2003). Additionally, the heterogeneity is highly associated with variations in 
individuals’ genetic makeup, family background, work experience, education, and/or in 
the amount and type of information they possess about a particular opportunity. Becker 
(1976) notices that differences across individuals generate different incomes over time 
and inequality is produced by differences in the demand and supply functions facing 
different people. However, source of knowledge about opportunity tells the insight into 
the different incomes, or inequality is the sensitivity to opportunity, according to the 
differences across individuals.        
There are diverse views about the perception of the existence of opportunities 
among the public. For some, what they are concerned about is whether specific people 
with specific resources can exploit it. This belief is reasonable. Opportunities are 
neither real nor false in the abstract. They are simply hypothetical or potential. If one 
fails to extract “an opportunity”, it does not necessarily imply that the opportunity did 
not exist. It may merely imply that one in particular was ill-suited to exploit it. 
However, if such cases are not small scale, social efforts need to participate more in 
giving information and helping individuals to identify opportunity.    
Finally, action in pursuit of the perceived opportunity is motivated from two 
aspects of self-referential observation and/or social comparison. Perceptions may turn 
out to be right or wrong so that opportunity needs to be evaluated by individuals 
through themselves and comparisons with others. A combination of the two sources 
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can choose the most advantageous options, which can result in improving income 
status. Hence, there is a need to look into these two factors simultaneously when 
income inequality is observed at micro level.  
Shortly, the literature sheds light on opportunity being the best path to face the 
problem of income inequality, and it particularly emphasizes what government should 
supply and how much opportunity people have. Our discussion of income inequality 
with respect to the sensitivity of opportunity provides more insight of the problems at 
micro level. At the same time, we emphasize the interaction between individual and 
social efforts.     
2.4.4 Theoretical change of income inequality in China 
Since the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949 by the Chinese Communist 
Party, the view of income inequality has changed alone with its economic development 
from a centrally planned economy to a market-orientated economy, especially the 
economic turning year of 1978. Clearly, the former economic system is grounded in 
socialism (Marxist regime) while the latter system is associated with capitalism 
(democratic regime).  
Socialism and capitalism differ in the way that socialism theoretically advocates 
economic equality of income and wealth across individuals for its own sake – as an 
end or as partly constitutive of some end. In other words, socialism stands by 
horizontal equality. To achieve this goal, socialism urges the desirability of eliminating 
some of the inequalities associated with the institutions of a capitalist market economy 
(Arneson, 2013). By doing so, it generally has to enforcedly equalise output across 
individuals economically and politically in a society. In this sense, there ought to be no 
inequality in a socialistic society. This horizontal equality ideally provides a good 
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picture in a society. However, this ideology is not favoured by economic development. 
Past experiences (i.e. People Commune 11) have shown that socialism has been 
excluded because of its impractical ideas. One fundamental defect is that socialism is 
implicitly unwelcome to inherent human nature such as in the differences among 
individuals and their corresponding unequal assets. Certainly, individuals have 
immeasurable intrinsic worth and should be treated with the same respect, regardless 
of their race, religion, gender or socioeconomic condition, but that does not imply that 
one should strive towards eliminating differences between individuals in terms of their 
tastes, abilities and interests (Rohac, 2011). 
Conversely, the pivotal brief of modern mainstream economic theories (or 
capitalism) is that these differences among individuals determine economic outcomes 
and lead to economic prosperity. People have different innate abilities, different human 
capital and different wealth. These differences mean that individuals earn different 
incomes in a market economy because the amount of one’s labour contribution varies. 
However, socialism is not in favour of this belief and consequently, economic 
development is inefficient, in spite of the fact that it can control inequality well. Hence, 
the slogan of abandoning the practice of having everyone “eat from the same big pot” 
is the herald for economic reform and opening-up. Deng (1983) put forward the 
principle of “distribution according to work” (p.101) and The Sixteenth Congress 
(2004) clearly emphasized guarding against an excessive disparity in income while 
opposing equalitarianism.  
This reform has brought an unprecedented increase in economic freedom for 
hundreds of millions of people. As a result, China’s economic growth has been 
                                                        
11 The People Commune is from 1958 to 1983 in China. It is commonly known as The 
Big Rice Bowl which is a Chinese term used to refer to egalitarian distribution. In the 
commune, everything was equally shared regardless of the work done (see Meisner, 
1999; Zhou, 1959) 
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remarkable since 1978. During this transition economy, however, some contemporary 
Chinese people believed that their lives became worse compared with the 
pre-transition economy.12 The main reasons are likely to be that: 1) an increase in 
inequality is expected due to the size of the expanding economy; 2) competition in the 
labour market increases because “eat from the same big pot” has broken down; 3) 
these people may not realize that there is a great hidden inequality in a pre-transition 
economy.13 Such inequality was caused by the uncontrolled socialistic political power 
(Henderson et al., 2005).  
Tt is really easy to understand how traditional socialism works and why it cannot 
work in China, as well as its worldwide collapse in the 1990s. Government takes 
everything from these who have and give it to those who have not. In return, such 
extreme artificial equality destroys the human nature of self-interest which is the 
foundation for economic development.  
Over the years, although China officially has kept its emphasis on the 
development of socialist modernization, it has become capitalist (Coase and Wang, 
2014; Huang, 2008). The most distinctive feature is that capitalism in China operates 
under the one-party system, while capitalism in the West is under democratic regimes. 
The market in the former is regarded as the greatest economic transformation by 
scholars (Coase and Wang, 2014) and the markets in the latter are still the most 
advanced and leading economies in the world. However, large incomes and wealth 
inequality have arisen in both economies.         
This partially explains why Marxism is on the rise again in the West, especially in 
the USA and Europe (Gregory, 2012). A form of modern socialism has also emerged in 
the 21st Century alongside the economic contradictions (e.g., a fevered topic of 
                                                        
12 This reflects on commemorative events of Chairman Mao (see Wang, 2013).  
13 See Henderson et al. (2005).  
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inequality) and recessions (e.g., the Global Financial crisis 2008) that inherently exist 
in capitalism (Piketty, 2014; The Economist, 2013; Wolff, 2013; Jeffries, 2012; 
McMillan, 2011). The form is featured by a focus on taking money from the rich14 
(Piketty, 2014), on developing the welfare state (Gregory, 2012) and on expending 
large coordinated banks (McMillan, 2011). These features are expected to reduce the 
disparity.   
Compared to China, the emphasis of socialism is more on paper rather than on the 
ground. According to Huang (2008), the economic theory is not ‘socialism with 
Chinese characteristics’, but the opposite: capitalism with Chinese characteristics. This 
capitalism with Chinese characteristics is considered the key issue, resulting in a weak 
financial sector, income disparity, rising illiteracy, productivity slowdown, and reduced 
personal income growth in the 1990s and beyond. The reason is that such capitalism 
emerges with two enormous characteristics: a more entrepreneurial and market-driven 
version of capitalism in the 1980s and a state-led urban capitalism since then according 
to Huang (2008).  
China also creates and introduces to construct a socialist harmonious society.15 
This construction serves as the ultimate goal for the ruling Communist Party of 
China along with a Xiaokang society, which aims for a "basically well-off" 
middle-class oriented society (The Sixteenth Congress, 2004) and bringing about 
                                                        
14 Piketty (2014) finds that, over the long run, the return on capital is higher than the 
growth rate of the overall economy. In other words, accumulated and inherited wealth 
becomes a larger fraction of the economic pie over time. Therefore, he prescribes a 
progressive global tax on capital (an annual levy that could start at 0.1% and hits a 
maximum of perhaps 10% on the greatest fortunes). He also suggests a punitive 80% 
tax rate on incomes above $500,000 or so.   
15 The phrase Socialist Harmonious Society is a socio-economic vision that is said to 
be the result of Chinese leader Hu Jintao's signature ideology of the Scientific 
Development Concept (The Sixteenth Congress, 2004). In addition, the phrase can 
relate back to the time of Confucius when music could bring about harmony by 
maintaining balance in the society (Li, 2006). 
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harmony by maintaining balance in society (Li, 2006). Under the umbrella of this new 
development strategy, China continuously focuses on economic growth but with a 
direction of sustainable and equitable growth (Li, 2013) and the improvement of the 
welfare system (Ringen and Ngok, 2013). A new plan for income inequality reform 
was also issued in 2013 (State Council, 2013, No.6).  
In practice, however, the “harmonious society” paradigm has come under 
criticism as corruption and income inequality have actually worsened over the past 
decade. The pursuit of “harmonious society” is also often used by the government to 
justify the suppression of dissent, and information control in China. For example, 
“harmonized” has become a byword for “censored” in Chinese online jargon. This 
phenomenon indicates that some ordinary Chinese people do not regard the prospects 
for the construction of a harmonious society favourably. The society is highly 
imbalanced (i.e. huge social injustice and inequality) and lacks fairness and equality 
which are elementary issues for providing equal economic opportunity.  
2.4.5 Economic opportunity in China 
 
As previously discussed, under the western philosophical ideas of “equality of 
opportunity” and “equality of outcome”, a branch of scholars argue that equal 
economic opportunity is superior in diminishing inequality 16  (Gosepath, 2011; 
Roemer, 1998, 2006). The underlying messages of the ideas are that: i) the 
consequence of rising inequality by economic growth does not necessarily have 
negative implications and equal opportunity would achieve a distributive efficiency 
without constraining economic growth; ii) equivalent economic opportunity across 
three classes of the community and within the community in a society is an effective 
                                                        
16 This ideology lies in one of the most prominent conceptions of distributive equality, 
equality of opportunity. 
 
 51 
 
approach to be “better off”, since it enables every individual to live a life of economic 
opportunity and allows them to improve their standards of living through their own 
efforts. In other words, this does not discriminate against citizens or hinder 
opportunities for them to prosper and/or there is no state of economic affairs in which 
the government promotes equal prosperity for all citizens.  
The definition of equal opportunity is clear, but it is not easy to measure. It also 
seems to be inappropriate to observe the relationship between the equality of economic 
opportunity and income inequality in China directly. It is generally accepted that the 
increase in Chinese income levels is the outcome of the combination of trade liberty 
and the improvement and expansion of productivity. Higher trade liberty likely 
indicates more degrees of equality of opportunities. In contrast, the higher the 
productivity suggests there are more job opportunities in a society, but this does not 
necessarily mean more equal opportunities. The year 1978 is always viewed as a 
turning point in Chinese market liberalisation. More than three decades of 
development and it is still comparatively an imperfect and uneven market. Such 
economic circumstances make it much more difficult for some individuals either to 
take advantage of newly emerging opportunities, or to smooth a variety of shocks to 
their incomes that now are part and parcel of living in a market economy (Benjamin et 
al., 2001).  
Furthermore, under the same definition of equal opportunity, it is clear that the 
condition of economic opportunity in the case of China is worse than in the advanced 
economies, typical example labour and household restriction by Hukou policy as well 
as regional discrimination (urban with rural, and inland with coastal) and so on. Yet, 
compared to China itself, the situation in China now has substantial improvement in 
equal opportunity compared with decades before, which reflects trade liberalisation. 
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Bearing in mind that equality is highly associated with political systems, it is clear that 
the central government of China is likely to be unwilling fundamentally to change its 
political institutions which will primarily affect further degrees of openness in the 
market and equal opportunities. An alternative is needed to handle income inequality. 
The literature suggests that the concept of mobility (briefly, Friedman, 1962; Atkinson 
et al., 1978; Markandya, 1984; Jarvis and Jenkins, 1996; Björklund and Jäntti, 2009) 
could discover economic opportunity, openness and its functionality in inequality. This 
suggestion motivates Chapter 4 for the investigation of income mobility. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter begins by descriptively looking at the rising income inequality in China 
with macro, micro and energy data, discussing its causes, and the motivations for 
paying attention in the case of China. The chapter then turns to review the appreciation 
of self-interest along with historical thoughts of economics, followed by discussing the 
encompassment of social influence (i.e. government action and social interaction) in 
economic behaviour, further to extending the underlying co-actions of self-interest and 
social-interest to the issue of income inequality, the role of social comparison and the 
importance of opportunity in the income inequality literature.  
What we learn from the literature discussions can be summarized in the 
following points. First, the human nature of self-interest is the unique key theoretical 
fundamental in modern economics. However, this importance has become rather 
controversial from a theory perspective in contemporary economics since people’s 
action may be derived from an external source other than perception of economic 
self-interest. The external source includes environment, culture, religion, social norms 
and policies and so on. This could explain the reason why social influence such as 
government action always plays an inevitable role in economic development. Second, 
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income inequality is one of typical areas that greatly rely on government actions by 
redistribution or releasing constraints and accessing economic opportunities. The 
literature does not miss the fact that the role of government depends on the preferential 
concerns of self-interest or social interest. For the belief of self-interest, the latent 
assumption is that an individual’s wealth is gained by his internal factor such as efforts. 
Meanwhile, for the belief of social-interest, the individual’s wealth is received through 
his external factor such as luck and unequal opportunity. Nevertheless, the literature 
rarely stresses the point that one’s preference is affected by social influence, and 
well-being embraces income comparison with other members of a society from the 
theoretical perspective. Third, the literature clarifies that opportunity is the crux of the 
matter in the problem of income inequality but rarely concerns the source of 
opportunity knowledge at micro level. Hence, the claim we repeatedly hear is that the 
variations of individual capital engender income inequality from the microeconomic 
perspective. However, the discussion in the present study discovers that the insight of 
the issue is the sensitivity of opportunity according to individual capital. Such 
sensitivity or identification needs not only individuals’ efforts to discover, but also the 
help of social efforts. Finally, the literature suggests that economic opportunity is an 
efficient path to look at inequality, and mobility can be a good indicator for equal 
opportunity. In respect to the three lessons, the following three empirical chapters will 
examine the issues directly or indirectly in the case of China.  
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CHAPTER 3 New Ways of Looking at Income Inequality Related to 
Living Standards 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter theoretically discussed the combination of self-interest and social 
influence to address income inequality which would be effective and sustainable for the 
promotion of well-being. This chapter embraces such an idea into an empirical analysis of 
the returns on social efforts and individual efforts related to income inequality in living 
standards.   
This chapter begins with a review of the measurements of income inequality in the 
literature and the most popular measurements are classed by three categories: Gini 
coefficient, Generalized Entropy and the Atkinson measure (Cowell, 2000, 2011). These 
measures, especially the first two, focus on a concept of measuring paired income distance, 
1) between each income and reference income (i.e. population mean) and, 2) between 
individuals income pairs at a point in time or across time (or space) (Jenkins and van 
Kerm, 2008; Cowell, 2011). This concept embeds a belief that social comparison is a drive 
of individuals’ well-being from a social psychological perspective, and the corresponding 
index (traditional index) is generally used to examine the effect of income inequality on 
well-being and judge the efficiency of government policies and actions as a whole. We 
argue that this judgement is insufficient since i), an individual’s well-being depends on 
self efforts as well as social efforts and ii), relevant income differences among people are a 
result of the two efforts derived from self-interests and social influence.  
This study aims first to provide two-sided information on income inequality with 
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the Theil statistics to examine their effects on living standards in the case of China. This 
examination applies individual survey data from the China Nutrition Health Survey 
(CNHS) between 1989 and 2009, using a statistical model of the system generalised 
moment of method technique. The main finding is that the returns on social efforts and 
self efforts related to income inequality in living standards do not function properly, which 
reflects on a positive coefficient of social inequality in the short run and a U-shaped 
individual inequality in the long run. This implies that income inequality caused by social 
efforts such as the excessive focus on economic growth leads to an improvement in the 
means of living standards. However, income difference from individual efforts suggests 
that individual income inequality does not widen in low income class but high income, 
and convergence does not occur. Hence, the return on social efforts is not substantial.  
Whereas many theoretical models investigate the effect of income inequality, the 
cross country empirical evidence that uses income inequality measures is not conclusive in 
this matter; different specifications and different econometric techniques reveal different 
results. This study proposes the idea of the importance of the combination of self efforts 
and social efforts to living standards and explores how insightful this idea is. By so doing, 
the study firstly looks at income inequality through the concept of social efforts and self 
efforts. Furthermore, given the importance of the time horizon effect, there are very few 
studies that have considered the short run and long run relationship in one uniﬁed 
framework. Hence, the study incorporates different time interval effect into the models. In 
all respects, our results are intended to contribute extra new understanding about 
inequality and well-being.              
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 is a review of the traditional 
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measurements of income inequality, followed by our measures of income inequality index 
at micro level. Section 3.3 discusses the related relationship between inequality and 
income growth in the literature. Section 3.4 concerns statistical models for qualifying the 
proposed claim and examines the two income indices, followed by the results in Section 
3.5. The final Section 3.6 is a discussion and conclusion.  
3.2 Measures of income inequality 
3.2.1 Traditional measure  
There is a vast literature on the methods of measuring income inequality. These methods 
focus on the simplest context of the evaluation of income status of agents. However, the 
underlying two notions of these approaches and their corresponding applications seem to 
be insufficient for the quality of life at micro level.  
First, most assessments of inequality follow the philosophical consideration that the 
social-economic process and development are a drive of individuals’ well-being since 
traditional framework assumes that every agent makes the same efforts and acts rationally 
for their living. Apparently, this closely links to the fundamental assumption of the 
economics approach, to law and everything else in that people are rational. Second, 
another relevant underlying belief for the traditional framework is the focus on social 
comparison as a way of self-enhancement and self-evaluation. This reflects on most 
theories of equality dealing exclusively with distributive equality among different people 
through the purpose of making assessments of inequality being to promote the well-being 
of individuals (Gosepath, 2011).  
Under these guidelines, scholars have designed a great number of analytical tools to 
summarize inequality in terms of a single number (index) and compare corresponding 
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sub-distributions among different groups. The index is generally obtained by calculating 
the distances between two income statuses. Most previous studies follow this routine to 
provide descriptive information, for example, Chen et al. (2010), Hills (2010) and Wu and 
Li (2013). However, this conventional framework has two shortcomings to measure 
income inequality when the ultimate goal is to improve the quality of life at micro level.  
The first shortcoming relates to measuring the distance between each income and 
the population average income. This distance-measure is certainly needed to provide a 
snapshot of the whole inequality, and it is rational to evaluate descriptively economic 
process and policies by adopting the mean income of population as a reference, since 
economic prosperity or growth raise the means of standards of living.  
The weaknesses of the distance-measure are two. i) Aggregate information is not 
comparatively important for individual decision-making since individuals generally react 
optimally to their own income process but ignore economy-wide information, as Pischke 
(1995) demonstrates. Pischke (1995) also states that individuals make little efforts to 
gather information on the behaviour of the economy, but rather watch their own 
prospective fortunes. Similarly, Piketty (1995) concludes that agents are naturally exposed 
to a different piece of information depending on their position. Additionally, Wu and Li 
(2013) find that aggregate economic development has no significant effect for individual 
well-being in China. ii) Policymakers always look at a specific target group to establish an 
approach to handle income inequality issues. In this sense, many non-target individuals 
will not have a reaction to these changes. Even for those targeted people, their desired and 
basic income level is still superior for their actions.  
With reference to these reasons, the message for the context of inequality is that 
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agents (particularly in individuals and households) mainly respond to their own income 
status (or distribution) to adjust their efforts rather than population average income and the 
whole disparity of inequality is little incorporated. Thus, the traditional index for 
inequality only counts the effect of economic process as likely to be insufficient, and there 
is a need to provide extra information about individual income inequality.  
The second shortcoming is the concept of measuring distance between individuals’ 
income pairs, which embraces a cross theory of social comparison in social psychological 
study. Whether social-interest is or not of central importance for understanding economic 
behaviour, it is certain that social comparison plays a part in individuals’ well-being. This 
social comparison surely has many benefits such as helping individuals’ decision-making 
process. That is, individuals generally evaluate their own opinions and abilities by 
comparing themselves to others and to reduce uncertainty and gain related efficient 
information, and then make a choice to yield higher expected payoffs or expected utility. 
In this sense, individuals’ choices are affected by social influence. Yet, social influence 
should be not the whole; otherwise, individuals’ well-being is difficult to achieve. As the 
saying goes, “comparisons are odious”. Academically, Abou-Zeid and Moshe (2011) 
clarify that there are negative effects of social comparison on well-being behaviour. White 
et al. (2006) demonstrate that frequent social comparisons have a dark side. Conversely, 
individual well-being is mainly affected by social-comparisons (Wu and Li, 2013). This 
controversy cannot deny the fact that to some degree, one’s self-interest and efforts after 
the decision is made play another pivotal role. Hence, one’s well-being is developed based 
on both self-interest and social influence and could be extended to efforts and choices in 
the literature.  
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The efforts and the choices are viewed differently from Roemer’s work (1998, 2003, 
and 2006) in our study. Roemer considers efforts and choices are equivalent, and belong to 
internal factors within the individual’s control. In contrast, policy and natural environment 
are as an external factor for one’s outcome while he seminally clarifies these ethical 
related issues empirically. The reasons are three aspects as below.  
Essentially, we view one’s well-being as depending upon two factors: efforts and 
choices. Effort is parallel to the definition by Roemer (2003); that is, the actions under the 
control of agents which, if expended in greater amounts, ought to increase the degree to 
which the individual acquires the interested objective. In the income inequality area, it 
refers to agents reacting to their income status, working more or less for a desired income 
level and the harder they work the more opportunities they seem to identify. In contrast, 
choice is defined to be beyond the control of agents (Roemer, 2003). It is true that the 
agent is the ultimate man to make a choice among two or more economic opportunities, or 
the power to change his behaviour in Roemer’s language (2003). Roemer (2006) also 
believes to some extent that choice is influenced by circumstances and so he excludes that 
aspect of choice that is attributable to circumstance.  
However, we view that the choice is equivalent to opportunity which is largely 
influenced by the social-economic circumstances. Firstly, the sources of these options and 
opportunities are from other groups of people, social-economic development, economic 
process and/or natural environment. Secondly, generally rational decisions involve a 
social-economic comparison process where agents evaluate their own presumptions, 
judgments and perceptions by comparing themselves to others to prevent perceptual 
illusions and draw a dependable conclusion from a social psychology perspective. Thirdly, 
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other reasons for individual choice in the economic decision theory are preferences. This 
aspect is also influenced by external factors to some degree. Plus, they could be either 
rational or irrational and are generally treated as a shadow notion in economics. Arguably, 
we consider preferences within the scope of circumstance. For these reasons, choice is 
distinct from effort and belongs to circumstances.  
To sum up, the above discussion leads us to conclude that every agent’s well-being 
process is based on self-interest and social comparison through making efforts and choices 
that result in a meaningful life for an objective and subjective perspective. This suggests 
that diminishing inequality requires two channels at micro level. That is, efficiency policy 
and a good environment provide more choices and opportunities to individuals in general 
as well as individuals’ own efforts and capabilities (as Sen’s suggestion, 1981). These 
choices and opportunities need to be assessed fairly and equally for all residents regardless 
of their gender, age, location and so on. An inequality index should take both elements 
into account; otherwise, it is incomplete. Such incompleteness will, in turn, affect 
policymakers to frame an effective programme. Furthermore, explicitly to show 
individuals’ efforts allows economists and policymakers to connect to ethics issue and 
focus on appropriate target groups easily.  
There are very few studies on index of income inequality at an individual level to 
look at variations from each of the two channels. Many scholars have developed 
decomposable formulas based on the Theil’s statistics, as the well-known work by 
Shorrocks (1980 and 1984) and Kolenikov and Shorrocks (2004), but this work is still 
under the traditional notion. Therefore, we propose the following measure of individual 
income inequality which explicitly captures the effect of self-development and 
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social-economic development. This idea represents a different aspect of "a good life" into 
the measures of income inequality at individual or household levels. That is, one’s good 
life depends on help from others, but most importantly it depends on one’s motivation and 
efforts.    
3.2.2 New measure 
The argument of this study will be applied to the Generalized Entropy class of inequality 
index to exhibit how the proposed framework will manage to produce desirable results. 
Accordingly, two types of indices will be calculated by the prominent members of the 
Theil index: one index for measuring inequality from social efforts and another for 
capturing self efforts. The reason for using the method from Theil (1967) is that it is 
relatively more sensitive than other indices for both tails, top and bottom, and what makes 
its application popular is its decomposability into groups.17  
The basic form of Theil index (Theil, 1967), T, is E.q 3.1 below:  
𝑇 = 1
𝑁
�
𝑦𝑖
𝜇𝑌
𝑁
𝑖
𝑙𝑙
𝑦𝑖
𝜇𝑌
  ,         (3.1) 
where T is the single total index for the whole income inequality; N is the total number of 
individuals; 𝑦𝑖 refers to the income of individual 𝑖; 𝜇𝑌 is the average income of all 
individuals and also the reference income level for perfect equality. Theil (1967) describes 
that this method is to consider the issue of how strong a signal population shares provide 
                                                        
17 Although the Gini coefficient is the best known measure, it has its disadvantages which 
are not superior for the purpose of this study. For example, The Gini coefficient is 
sensitive to middle income classes than to the extremes, and it does not contain 
information about personal incomes (Deltas, 2003). As a result of this criticism, 
additionally to or in competition with the Gini coefficient entropy measures are frequently 
used (e.g. Theil indices) (Cowell, 2000).  
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in describing the observed distribution of well-being. If the distribution of well-being is 
unequal relative to population weights, this is entropy in the system. It looks like the 
Shannon entropy (or disorder) but was invented to consider the event values themselves, 
particularly the income 𝑦𝑖 of agent i in a population of N agents, rather than their 
probability of occurrence. In other words, entropy in the Theil index has the meaning of 
deviations from perfect equality in the Theil’s T statistics for income distributions.   
The formula emphasizes several points: 1) the summation sign reinforces the idea 
that each person will make a contribution to the Theil index; 2) 𝑦𝑖
𝜇𝑌
 is the proportion of the 
individual’s income to average income 𝜇𝑌; 3) the natural logarithm of 
𝑦𝑖
𝜇𝑌
 determines 
whether the individual contribution will be positive (𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑦𝑖
𝜇𝑌
> 1), negative (𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑦𝑖
𝜇𝑌
< 1), or 
zero (𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑦𝑖
𝜇𝑌
 = 0).  
The suggestions of the formula is that if there is no distance between 𝑦𝑖and 𝜇𝑌, and 
then the Theil index is zero, perfect equality occurs. The index could be either negative or 
positive, but surely the higher the absolute index, the higher the income inequality. A 
negative index indicates that many individuals’ incomes are below the mean and the 
number of poor people is not small, while a positive index suggests that many individuals’ 
incomes are greater than the mean and the amount of the wealth may be large. 
Additionally, individuals in the middle of the distribution contribute little to Theil’s T 
Statistic because their incomes are equal to the average. In this respect, two ways could 
diminish inequality. One is to reduce the income of the rich by more tax and/or a 
restriction of their economic opportunities; the second is to increase income of the poor by 
less tax and/or provide more opportunities. The denominator is also considered as a 
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reference value for equality. Many applications use this equation to produce an income 
index for a descriptive evaluation of social welfare and social-economic development. 
In recalling the arguments: 1) the measure of individual income inequality by 
looking at a single aspect of social influence is incomplete especially at micro level, and 
overall individuals’ income differences need to look at the two dimensions of individuals’ 
efforts and social-economic development; 2) efforts should measure one’s own income 
status which is relative to his average income; and opportunities refer to the result of 
social-economic comparison and circumstance effects which are embedded in the 
traditional framework.  
Under these arguments, two Theil indices are produced, namely, self effort index (IT) 
and social effort index (ST). The only difference between IT and ST is the reference 
income at denominator. The former is calculated based on the population average income 
and the latter is computed according to the average income of the 𝑖th individual across 
waves. ST is a deviation from a given benchmark for the distribution of income based on 
social economic development, while IT interprets a deviation from a given benchmark for 
the distribution of income based on self-development through efforts. Social income 
inequality equations in panel framework are E.q 3.2 and E.q 3.3:  
𝑆𝑇𝑊 = 1𝑙� 𝑦𝑖𝑖𝜇𝑦𝑤𝑛𝑖∈𝑖 𝑙𝑙 𝑦𝑖𝑖𝜇𝑦𝑤 ,              (3.2) 
where 𝑆𝑇𝑊 is the Theil index of social development at wave w. n is the total number of 
individuals in each wave. 𝑦𝑖𝑖 is the income of the 𝑖th individual at a specific wave, 𝑤. 
𝜇𝑦𝑤is the mean income for the population at a particular wave. In this setting, ST measures 
the short run of income inequality effect. Perfect equality suggests that there is no 
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disparity between an individual’s income level and a society income standard. In Equation 
3.3, 𝐼𝑇 is the Theil index of self-development for the 𝑖th individual across all waves. 𝑘 
denotes the number of waves that individuals beings observe. 𝜇𝑦𝑖𝑤 is the average income 
of the 𝑖th individual across all waves. IT indicates the long run of income inequality effect. 
Perfect equality of self-development indicates that there is no difference across years. 
𝐼𝑇 = 1
𝑘
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𝑦𝑖𝑖
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,             (3.3) 
The distinction of the proposed measurements is able to describe how a theoretical 
individual’s well-being is translated into numerical information in an income differences 
context. In other words, it allows maintaining consistency between theoretical guidance 
and practical measurements. The next section will examine the two indices through their 
effects on an individual’s living standards.  
3.3 Income inequality and living standards 
Prior to presenting an econometric framework for investigating the effects of the two 
indices, the related relationship between income inequality and income growth in the 
literature is discussed. In general, the focus of the modern egalitarian effort to realize 
equality is on the possibility of a good life, i.e. on equality of life prospects and life 
circumstances (Gosepath, 2011). In developing countries, a good life commonly depends 
on the quality of living standards, which is highly associated with economic growth: the 
wealthier the economy, the better off the individuals and the higher the living standards. It is 
true that China has significantly achieved a boom in its economy. Consequently, it has lifted 
up the means of living standards and reduced massive poverty. In other words, the 
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improvement in living standards is a result of economic growth. It is also true that abundant 
studies demonstrate that the living standards are not sufficient to explain the quality of life. 
Yet, income is the perception of quality of life to contemporary Chinese. Therefore, to 
understand the relationship between income inequality and living conditions is close to the 
literature of income inequality and income growth.  
The relationship between growth and income inequality has been inconclusive. In the 
inequality-economic growth literature, a famous postulate on income inequality and growth 
was put forward in 1955 by Kuznets. Since then it has attracted abundant research in this 
area. However, the existing theory is ambiguous about this effect, as Fields summarizes: 
While there are numerous theories in which economic inequality has a 
positive effect on the growth, there also are numerous others in which the 
effect is negative…The results are conclusively inconclusive. 
 
(Fields, 2007, p.579) 
Apart from positive and negative relationships (Barro, 2000), reverse and no 
relationship (Barro, 200018) also exist in the literature. For example, Clarke (1995) and 
Deininger and Squire (1996) find evidence that inequality is harmful for growth, while 
Forbes (2000) finds that inequality has a positive effect on growth. Although Banerjee and 
Duflo (2003) find an inverted U relationship, the authors provide theoretical and empirical 
reasons to believe the existence of a U-shaped relationship between changes in inequality 
and changes in the growth rate that depends on model parameters. Gallup (2012), Huang et 
al. (2012), Calì (2008), and Banerjee and Piketty (2005) reveal a U-shaped pattern. In 2011, 
there is evidence that income inequality is a more important significant signal for an end 
                                                        
18 Barro (2000) ﬁnds no relationship between inequality and growth in the whole of the 
data. However, he breaks up his sample into poor and rich countries and ﬁnds a negative 
relationship between inequality and growth in the sample of poor countries and a positive 
relationship in the sample of rich countries. 
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to long periods of growth than other macroeconomic factors, according to IMF analysis 
(Berg and Ostry, 2011a, 2011b).  
In the case of China, studies on the inequality-growth nexus also appear with mixed 
results. For instance, Deininger and Squire (1996) do not find a systematic link between 
growth and changes in aggregate inequality, but a strong positive relationship between 
growth and poverty reduction. Similarly, Wan et al. (2007) indicate that this relationship is 
nonlinear and is negative irrespective of time horizons. Many conclude a negative 
relationship (i.e. Ravallion, 1998; Benjamin et al., 2006; Ravallion and Chen, 2007). 
Conversely, Gravier-Rymaszewska et al. (2013) find a positive association. Yang and 
Zhou (1999), Xue (1997) and Tsui (1996) conclude a U-shaped curve. 
Apart from these direct examinations of the link, there are also some indirect 
investigations. Kuijs and Wang (2005), Jones et al. (2003), Wan et al. (2007), Zhu and Wan 
(2012) and Kamal et al. (2012) have focused on examining the causes of income growth in 
an inequality context with macro economic factors such as capital, endowment, labour, 
institutional and policy factors, market accessibility, trade and globalization, education 
inequality, human capital gaps, spatial divisions and urbanization. However, aggregate 
analysis has its shortcomings such as Ravallion (1998) and Deaton (2003) pointing out that 
the aggregate-level results may confound the true direct effects of inequality with those that 
are an artefact of aggregation. In this respect, some micro studies look at factors of 
household or individual characteristics such as age, income type, education, marital status 
and others (Zhu et al., 2008; Sicular et al., 2007; Yao, 1999). In short, despite the vast 
studies, these theories indicate that the overall impact of inequality on growth cannot be 
set a priori; Forbes (2000) and Wan et al. (2007) all support this view. 
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In the literature, the time horizon also plays an important role to determine the 
findings. A typical example is the different results in magnitudes as well as in signs 
generated between cross-section and panel data. The representative study by Forbes (2000) 
demonstrates that in the long run, the relationship is negative, while it is positive in the 
short or medium run. Despite its importance of time interval, few studies consider 
incorporating different periods into one unified framework, as Wang et al. (2007) point 
out; thus, the authors conduct a regression analysis for such purpose.19 
The distinction between the present study and previous research has two aspects. 
The first is the fundamental belief that is embraced in the current study. The present study 
believes that both social and individual make efforts to reduce inequality and improve 
living standards so that we explore the return on social efforts and individual efforts in the 
inequality context. To the best of our knowledge, there is no study that looks at inequality 
from this angle. Secondly, we take not only the variance among individuals into account 
but also across communities (there are only international, national, providence, city to 
household levels in previous studies). Thirdly, we also incorporate different time horizons 
in one uniﬁed dynamic model framework but in addition to short run and long run income 
inequality indices first. In this way, the present study provides new estimates of inequality.   
                                                        
19 The conventional approach to discovering the long run versus short run relationship is 
by averaging relevant variables over different time horizons, and then estimating a 
regression model. For example, Forbes (2000) uses data averaged over a ﬁve-year interval 
in a growth regression and claims that this is a medium or short-run relationship, which is 
found to be positive. Subsequently, she also reports results using ten-year averages, which 
indicate an insigniﬁcant relationship. Meanwhile, Barro (2000) relies on averages over a 
ten-year interval to estimate long-run relationships. 
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3.4 Statistical analysis procedure  
3.4.1 The model 
We notice that China’s income inequality has attracted much attention in studies since it is 
at warning level. However, what the literature does not know is the question of whether it 
is essential to observe individual efforts with respect to income inequality on living 
conditions. This study pioneers filling this gap. If so, is there any significant difference 
between the two income inequalities from difference efforts? Additionally, how do the 
uncertain changes affect the living condition when the index changes? 
In this mind-set, this study estimates living standards as a function of inequalities, 
initial income, human capital and age. This specification is inspired from the parsimonious 
model of inequality and growth (see Forbes, 2000 and Perotti, 1996). It is possible to 
contain more additional variables. However, this study concentrates on this fairly 
simplified specification for three reasons. First, the primary interest of this study is 
typically one of initiating an examination of the contribution of individual efforts with 
respect to inequality on living standards. The second is data constraint, but more 
independent variables do not necessarily ameliorate omitted variable bias by the inclusion 
of additional control variables (Clarke, 2005). At the same time, Banerjee and Duflo 
(2003)20 demonstrate a consistent result that does not regard the number of control 
variables, but rather the estimation methods. To summarize, the proposed model central to 
this study is as Equation 3.4.    
                                                        
20 Banerjee and Duflo (2003) present two sets of control variables from the specification 
by Perotti (1996) and by Barro (2000) with the same estimation techniques. The former 
adopts 4 control variables and the latter applies 13.  
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𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑖,𝑖−𝑠 + 𝜷𝟑𝑺𝑺𝒋,𝒘−𝒔 + 𝜷𝟒𝑰𝑺𝒊 + 𝜷𝟓𝑰𝑺𝒊𝟐 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑖 ,(3.4) 
where i and j denotes individual {1,2, ... , N} and group {1,2, ... , K} while w and s is wave 
period {1989,1991, ... , W} and lagged period {0, 1,2, ... , s} in Eq.3.4. 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛿𝑡 are the 
unobserved individual and time effects, respectively, while 𝑢𝑖𝑖  is the well-behaved 
disturbance term in the sense of independent, zero mean and constant variance. 𝑌𝑖𝑖 is 
individual disposable real income as the indicator of the living conditions for the individual 
i during period w. Meanwhile, 𝑌𝑖𝑖−𝑠 indicates the dependence of living standards on the 
accumulation of previous income level. The highlighted variables are the primary 
regressors of interest. 𝑺𝑺𝒋,𝒘−𝒔 stands for social Theil index or social income inequality 
for group j during the period w–s. If s=1, indicating initial inequality is associated with 
sequence income growth in the short or medium term. Meanwhile, individual Theil index 
(IT) or individual income difference is a proxy for individual efforts of individual i during 
all period w and its square term, indicating that the linear relationship between individual 
efforts in relation to inequality and living standards may not hold in the long run. In 
addition, C is a vector for variables of age and education attainment. 
3.4.2 Data 
The present study applies the longitudinal data taken from the China Health and Nutrition 
Survey (CHNS). The data provide information on individual behaviour both across time 
and across individuals. This type of data not only reduce measurement error and omitted 
variable bias, but also increase precision in estimation, is more effective for dealing with 
heterogeneity and multicollinearity (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Baltagi, 2005).  
It is worth noting that the provinces in the data are unlikely to be randomly sampled 
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from all provinces (see Figure 3.1) and the data may embody a broad spectrum of 
inequality in China but the results are properly under the general heading of China. These 
provinces vary by geographical location and economic development. The variation across 
provinces can be considered as regional and income-level representative because these 
chosen areas cover poor (Guizhou and Guangxi in the Southwest) and rich provinces 
(Jiangsu in the east). However, the CHNS include neither the most developed places such 
as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, nor the least developed regions such as Yunnan, 
Xinjiang and Xizang. Apart from this weakness for the chosen provinces, some selected 
cities and counties share a similar situation since the survey contains all capital cities and 
capital counties in a selected province.  
Figure 3.1: Survey Regions 
 
Source: CHNS (2012). The green (or highlighted) colour denotes the survey provinces.   
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The analysis mainly uses the sub-sample of the CHNS individual data which still 
maintains nine provinces and eight waves but particularly limits to positive income 
observations. The reason is that the full data do not contain observations of multiple 
phenomena obtained over multiple time periods for a few of the same individuals. These 
observations are unable to detect changes in individuals’ income over time, which is not in 
line with the interests of this study. Therefore, the present study adopts its sub-sample of 
59711 repeated observations with total 14667 adults, and its percentage is 88.26% of total 
the CHNS individual data. The sub-sample also excludes negative and zero values of 
income because these values have a small number of observations and they have some 
difficulties for estimations and calculation. This exclusion is common in income inequality 
studies. Variables in the selected sample are real individual disposable income, provinces, 
urban and rural, education, gender and age. Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 show clear 
information about the number and the percentage of different income values of data in the 
CHNS and the number of observations in each wave and province in the selected sample.  
Table 3.1: Number of Sub-samples based on Income Observations 
 
Income types Number Percentage 
Total sample 67653 100% 
Positive 65913 97.43% 
Zero 214 0.32% 
Negative 1526 2.26% 
Panel positive 59711 88.26% 
Single 6202 9.17% 
Source: Author’s calculation.
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Table 3.2: Number of Observations in Each Wave and Province in Sub-sample 
 
Wave Guangxi Guizhou Heilongjiang Henan Hubei Hunan Jiangxu Liaoning Shandong Wave total 
1989 1182 1112 NA 946 1009 925 1025 913 882 7994 
1991 1214 1224 NA 1149 1109 943 1067 965 985 8656 
1993 1194 1158 NA 1028 1043 897 1045 834 917 8116 
1997 1193 1088 780 1039 1004 836 1054 NA 850 7844 
2000 1138 1057 863 890 945 745 1110 790 821 8359 
2004 809 804 683 590 747 580 899 782 699 6593 
2006 759 779 712 525 706 622 863 752 639 6357 
2009 709 679 649 555 685 515 740 641 619 5792 
Province total 8198 7901 3687 6722 7248 6063 7803 5677 6412 59711 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
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Table 3.3: Description of Variables 
Type Variable  Description Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. 
Numerical  Y Real individual disposable income for 
indicating living standards, RMB per 
capita 
1.3 2090.1 4315.6 7364.2 8830.4 623931.6 
 ST Tci Social Theil index across six levels of city 
of county 
0.252 0.341 0.399 0.409 0.442 0.650 
  Tp Social Theil index across eight levels of 
province  
0.214 0.330 0.379 0.402 0.475 0.631 
  Tn Social Theil index across fourteen levels of 
neighbourhood 
0.066 0.338 0.407 0.404 0.465 0.699 
  Tc Social Theil index across two hundred and 
thirteen levels of community 
0.000 0.185 0.286 0.325 0.411 1.499 
 IT Thiel index for income inequality relative 
to individual efforts on living  
0.000 0.086 0.195 0.237 0.336 1.565 
 Age Age is measured in years 2.21 32.23 42.29 43.41 53.85 100.83 
Categorical Urban  Urban and Rural       
 Gender Male and female  
 Provinces Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxu, Liaoning and Shandong 
 Coastal  Jiangxu 
 Inland Guangxi and Guizhou 
 Education Education degree: None degree, Primary school, Secondary school, High school, Technical school, 
University and college, Master’sand above, and other 
 Wave Survey waves: 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006 and 2009  
Source: Author’s calculation. 
Notes: ST denotes a set of Theil indexes based on different geographical division for income inequality relative to social efforts on 
social-economic development.
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Table 3.3 displays all interest variables and their basic statistical information. The 
main interested variables are income, a sect of social Theil inequality indices and one 
individual Theil inequality index. The social Theil index has four types which are based on 
different geographical divisions across provinces in China. The size of the divisions from 
largest to smallest is city of county, province, neighbourhood and community. Social 
inequality at city of county and province levels is similar, from acceptable income 
inequality level of under 0.30 to high level of above 0.60. Social inequality at 
neighbourhood level has greater range than the previous two from low 0.066 to high 0.699. 
The mean of these three levels of indices are close together: about 0.40. In contrast, the 
level of income inequality is smaller than these with more aggregate levels with the 
average value of 0.33 in social inequality at community level (tc) and 0.24 in individual 
Theil index (IT). This statistical information shows that income inequality gradually 
declines from aggregate level to individual level and individual index is expected to be 
smaller than social index since the effort made by many people’s earnings is progressive 
and stable compared to themselves.  
IT and Tc have the same issue of zero value at minimum indices and greater than 
one at maximum indices. These maximum values indicate measurement errors in the 
sample due to Theil index being between zero and one. Additionally, this sample is for 
adults and the variable of age appears as 2 years, suggesting recording mistakes. These 
measurement errors are excluded in the data analysis. 
The minimum value of income, 1.30 RMB, is extremely low while the maximum 
value of income, 623,932 RMB, is immensely large. This may suggest some extreme 
outliers on both tails in the sample. At micro level, extreme values are common in income 
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inequality analysis. There are two approaches of discriminate outliers of trimming and 
winsorising (Chernobai and Rachev, 2006). The difference between the two is that the 
former throws extreme values completely and comparatively, the latter pays more 
attention to the heavy tails of the distribution. Winsorising is a technique that replaces 
extreme data with less extreme value and puts more weight on the edges of the distribution. 
Many relevant papers only adopt a trimmed dataset. In the present study, both techniques 
are employed. That is, first to trim the data based on income with a proportion of 0.001%, 
followed by winsorising. The fraction of winsorising for income outliers is only 0.005 in 
the present study. This data manipulation leads us to use a robust M-estimator for the 
parameters as reference information for the other panel models.  
3.4.3 Estimation and testing endogeneity 
There are a variety of different techniques that can be used to estimate the equation (Eq. 
3.4). To evaluate which technique is the most appropriate, it is necessary to consider two 
factors: the nature of the data and the potential endogeneity. To simplify the following 
discussion, we rewrite Equation 3.4 in vector form: 
𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝑌𝑖,𝑖−1 + 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒘′ 𝐵1 + 𝑿𝟐𝒊′𝐵2 + 𝑒𝑖𝑖, (3.5) 
where the component error is 𝑒𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖+ 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑖.𝐵1 and 𝐵2 are vectors of coefficients 
associated with time variant and time invariant variables, respectively. The common 
standard method for such elimination is fixed effects (FE or within estimator) through 
transforming the data into deviation from individual means and ignoring individual effects. 
For the purpose of estimating Equation 3.4, the individuals in the CHNS data are based on 
geographical regions and cities, and these places are not randomly selected so that the 
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intercepts are more clearly “fixed”. In this respect, the RE framework is intuitively 
inappropriate, which suggests that the null will be rejected in the Hausman test. 
Unfortunately, FE has two important defects: i) all time-constant variables are removed 
from the transformation; ii) FE is not fully efficient since it merely takes within-unit 
changes into account but ignores between-unit variation. The first issue is more serious 
because we also interested in the unknown parameters of X2. To overcome this 
disadvantage of fixed effects, the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimator is 
comparatively appropriate. The two methods for time fixed effects estimation are the 
LSDV and within time estimator, identical in the sense that they give the same estimates, 
but they differ computationally. 
A problem with all the mentioned estimators above, however, is the endogeneity 
issue of correlation between regressors and error in observed data. In particular, the lagged 
income obviously indicates that these mentioned estimators are no longer consistent for 
the parameter of interest. To simplify the following discussion, we rewrite Equation 3.5 in 
vector form as E.q 3.6 (the level equation): 
𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝑌𝑖,𝑖−1 + 𝑿𝒊𝒘′ 𝐵1 + 𝑫𝒊′𝐵2 + 𝛼𝑖+ 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑖  , (3.6) 
where 𝐵1 and 𝐵2  are vectors of coefficients associated with time variant and time 
invariant variables, respectively. To address the issue of omitted variable bias and to 
account for endogeneity in the scope of dynamic panel models, the possible methods are 
introduced by Anderson and Hsiao (1982) and by Arellano and Bond (1991). Both 
methods eliminate 𝛼𝑖 based on the first difference model initially and then differ from the 
 77 
 
utility of information to generate instruments for endogenous variables in E.q 3.621 (the 
differenced equation). Unfortunately, Equation 3.7 clearly shows that time invariant 
variables are removed by the first difference transformation: 
𝑌𝑖𝑖 − 𝑌𝑖,𝑖−1 = 𝛾�𝑌𝑖,𝑖−1 − 𝑌𝑖,𝑖−2� + �𝑿𝒊𝒘′ − 𝑿𝒊,𝒘−𝑿′ �𝐵1 + �𝑫𝒊′ −𝑫𝒊′�𝐵2 + (𝛿𝑡 − 𝛿𝑡−1)+ �𝑢𝑖𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖,𝑖−1�,                                              (3.7) 
To overcome the shortcoming of the first differenced GMM estimator (Arellano and 
                                                        
21The former constructs an instrument for the lagged dependent variable from the second 
and third lags of Y (likewise for the other endogenous X variables if any the issue). It is 
also possible to include 𝑌𝑖,𝑖−3  as a second instrument. However, the example of 
instrument matrix of ZiAH for the lagged dependent variable shows that the higher the 
lagged order, the more information would be lost in the Anderson–Hsiao approach. In 
contrast, the latter uses all possible lagged values of each of the variables as instruments 
without losing any information based on a generalised moment of method (GMM) context. 
The example of instrument matrix of ZiAB clearly displays the Arellano-Bond estimator 
prevents loss of degree of freedom for the estimation.21 
ZiAH =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
∙ ∙yi,1 ∙yi,2 yi,1
⋮ ⋮yi,T−2 yi,T−3⎭⎪⎬
⎪
⎫
 
ZiAB =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
0 0 ⋯ 0yi,1 0 ⋯ 00 yi,2 ⋯ 00 0 ⋱ ⋮0 0 ⋯ yi,T−s⎭⎪⎬
⎪
⎫
 
In this way, the Arellano-Bond estimator is comparatively efficient and it corrects not only 
for the bias introduced by the lagged endogenous variable, but also permits a certain 
degree of endogeneity in the other repressors if there are any. More specifically, in the first 
differenced transformation (E.q 3.8), for period 3, Arellano and Bond use 𝑌𝑖,1(𝑌𝑖,3−2) as 
an instrument for (𝑌𝑖,2 − 𝑌𝑖,1); for period 4, they use 𝑌𝑖,1 and 𝑌𝑖,2 as instruments for 
(𝑌𝑖,3 − 𝑌𝑖,2), etc., and follow the same procedure to create instruments for each differenced 
variable. In short, the available instruments for the lagged dependent variable are 
𝑌𝑖,𝑖−2, 𝑌𝑖,𝑖−3, … , 𝑌𝑖,1 and for the other independent endogenous variable are 𝑋𝑖,𝑖−2,
𝑋𝑖,𝑖−3, … , 𝑋𝑖,1. 
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Bond, 1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) propose an 
alternative method. That is, in addition to differentiating the model and using lagged levels 
of 𝑌𝑖,𝑖−𝑠 as instruments of ∆𝑌𝑖,𝑖−𝑠 for E.q 3.7, they work with the level model (E.q 3.6) 
and use the difference ∆𝑌𝑖,𝑖−𝑠 as instruments of 𝑌𝑖,𝑖−𝑠. The estimators obtained in this 
way are labelled the system GMM estimators or the extended GMM (see Alonso-Borrego 
and Sánchez-Mangas, 2001). In this way, system GMM is comparatively efficient and the 
coefficients of the time-invariant variable and highly persistent variable can be identified 
in the level model.  
The critical assumption must be satisﬁed for this system GMM estimator to be 
consistent and efficient. That is, the error terms cannot be serially correlated: 
E(𝑢𝑖𝑖 ,𝑢𝑖,𝑖−𝑠)=0 for all 𝑠 ≥ 1. The common tests for this assumption are a test for second 
order serial correlation and Sargan’s test for overidentifying restrictions. The validity of 
the instruments used for the first differenced equations depends principally on the absence 
of serial correlation in the disturbances 𝑢𝑖𝑖. In that case, the first differenced residuals are 
expected to show negative first order serial correlation but should not display any second 
order serial correlation. The overall validity of the moment conditions is tested through the 
Sargan test22 with the null hypothesis of valid of exogenous instruments but this test 
requires that the error terms are independently and identically distributed.  
The advantage of the system GMM is not only able to avoid dynamic panel bias 
caused by the clear endogenous lag of Y, but also to identify more easily other potential 
                                                        
22 The test has been demonstrated to be weakened by large T (Roodman, 2009). In the 
present study, T is only eight so that the disadvantage of the Sargan test should not be an 
issue. See Roodman (2009). 
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endogenous variables than the standard IV approach23 if a priori is difficult to establish. 
The potential endogenous variable of ST faces the difficulty of obtaining external 
instruments (Forbes, 2000). Apart from ST, IT may also be potentially correlated with the 
errors. The reason is that both are derived from the dependent variable of Y which is 
generally subject to random measurement error. This problem reflects on spurious and 
extreme outliers in income which may cause endogeneity. Hence, trim data are commonly 
used to exclude these outliers and eliminate measurement error in income inequality 
analysis (for example, Figini, 1999; Cowell and Litchfield, 1999; Benjamin et al., 2005; 
van Kerm, 2007; and Nichols, 2010). Additionally, IT measures income inequality for an 
individual throughout consecutive waves, while ST measures income inequality at 
aggregate level. In this way, endogeneity should be reduced to some extent, although it 
may still be a potential issue. A Hausman speciﬁcation test can evaluate whether the two 
explanatory variables are exogenous within the system GMM. In this way, we can prevent 
finding external instruments for testing endogeneity from the two. 
3.4.4 Sensitively analysis  
Since the proposal of return on social efforts and individual efforts related to income 
inequality on living standards is rather new, and also since sample selection and the 
limitation of the data may influence the coefficient estimates, this section thoroughly tests 
the robustness of the estimations across different size and groups of sub-samples.  
One potential problem with the whole estimation is whether the chosen data fulfil 
the requirements of the GMM estimator about fix effects. First, the chosen CHNS data are 
                                                        
23 The standard instrumental variables approach needs instruments from outside the 
system, which involves more uncertainty. It has been suggested that many applications of 
the IV regressions suffer from weak instruments (Stock et al., 2002).  
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partially random in the sense that participants are randomly selected but the randomness of 
their cities and provinces is suspect. Although the Hausman test is expected to reject the 
null and detect fix effects rather than random effects, it is worthwhile re-examining 
carefully. Second, the major advantage of GMM is to utilize instruments within the system 
rather than external instrument variables which reduce uncertainty. However, the number 
of lagged instruments is sensitive (Bowsher, 2002). Despite the Sargan-Harsan test being 
commonly used to provide a statistical examination of the validity of instruments, it 
suffers from either a limited or a large amount of lagged instruments as well as when there 
are measurement errors in the dependent variable (Dahlberg et al., 2008). The T 
dimension of the imbalance data is considered between three and eight so that 
observations with T=3 may face weak instruments because their instruments are limited to 
the last level of lags. These second lagged values are regarded as weak instruments which 
may affect and influence the coefficient estimates. With these considerations, sensitivity 
analysis carries on across three random sizes of the data and variety of groups within the 
data.  
A t-test is applied to test the equality of ST and IT parameters whenever 
possible:𝐻0:𝛽𝑠𝑡 − 𝛽𝑖𝑡 = 0, and 𝐻1:𝛽𝑠𝑡 − 𝛽𝑖𝑡 ≠ 0. The equality would imply that there 
are sufficient opportunities in the circumstance to meet the demand of individuals. 
However, since self-interest is believed to be the very core of human motivation and social 
influence serves as instrument in conventional wisdom, the null hypothesis may be 
rejected: 
𝑡𝑏𝑠𝑠−𝑏𝑖𝑠 = 𝑏𝑠𝑠−𝑏𝑖𝑠𝑆𝑆(𝑏𝑠𝑠−𝑏𝑖𝑠) ,     (3.8) 
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The t-statistic is built using information about the covariance matrix of the 
estimators and the formula is as E.q 3.8. If t-statistic is greater than critical values, then the 
null is rejected. Therefore, there is empirical evidence that social income inequality has a 
higher incidence on living conditions in China than individual income inequality.   
3.5 Results  
Recalling the claim that this present study aims to make, the individual’s well-being with 
respect to living standards is associated with two factors of social efforts and self efforts 
related to income inequality. The empirical analysis provides evidence to substantiate this 
claim in the aspects of i), the significance of income inequality indices and ii), the 
significant differences between the two indices, according to the system GMM estimator 
and t test. Details are as follows.  
Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 report estimates of the basic interested Equation 3.6 using 
the robust M estimator, pooled OLS, fixed effects, random effects and the system GMM 
technique (Blundell and Bond, 1998). Living standards are explained by the past values of 
income (2 lags), current and initial social income inequality, individual income inequality 
and its square term, age and education. To decide which technique is utilized, it is 
necessary to test the validity of the assumptions underlying each method. First, it seems 
estimates do not have any extreme difference between robust M estimator and the standard 
panel methods, except that the initial social inequality is significant in the M estimator. 
Second, a poolability test suggests pooled OLS is not appropriate and a Hausman 
speciﬁcation test comparing the fixed effects estimates with random effects rejects the 
assumption of random effects. As discussed previously, however, these methods are 
inconsistent due to the presence of the lagged income terms. The system GMM corrects 
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this problem.  
Table 3.4: Model Comparison Between Standard Panel Models 
 M PO LSDV RE 
 Coef. 
(S.E) 
Coef. 
(S.E) 
Coef. 
(S.E) 
Coef. 
(S.E) 
(intercept) 4.379*** 
（0.088） 
4.658*** 
（0.095） 
 5.157*** 
（0.099） 
Y_1 0.288*** 
（0.088） 
0.274*** 
（0.008） 
0.274*** 
（0.008） 
0.218*** 
（0.008） 
Y_2 0.146*** 
（0.088） 
0.143*** 
（0.008） 
0.145*** 
（0.008） 
0.128*** 
（0.008） 
tc -0.562*** 
(0.046) 
-0.032*** 
(0.050) 
-0.646*** 
（0.050） 
-0.642*** 
（0.050） 
tc_1 0.072*** 
（0.048） 
0.059 
（0.052） 
0.059 
（0.052） 
0.077 
（0.052） 
it -0.997*** 
（0.124） 
-1.099*** 
（0.134） 
-1.145*** 
（0.134） 
-1.272*** 
（0.148） 
it^2 1.208*** 
（0.162） 
1.223*** 
（0.175） 
1.264*** 
（0.175） 
1.399*** 
（0.195） 
age 0.008*** 
（0.001） 
0.006*** 
（0.001） 
0.006*** 
（0.001） 
0.008*** 
（0.001） 
education 0.035*** 
（0.002） 
0.0352*** 
（0.002） 
0.0354*** 
（0.002） 
0.039*** 
（0.002） 
R^2  0.20 0.21 0.34 
F-statistics  478 482 1020 
Source: Author’s estimation. 
Notes: Poolability test between PO and LSDV is 736 with p-value < 2.2e-16; Hausman 
test between LSDV and RE is 479 with p-value < 2.2e-16. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, respectively. 
 
In Table 3.5, four sets of estimates are generated by the system GMM technique. 
SGMM-1 eliminates for the correlation between the lagged dependent variables and the 
error term, while the rest of SGMM controls for the lagged dependent terms and the index 
of social income inequality. The insignificant Sargan test suggests that the lagged 
dependent terms are not only endogenous variables, but also other endogenous variables 
likely exist in column 1. The significant Sargan tests in columns 2, 3 and 4 confirm the 
need for control of the correlation between the social index and the error and show that the 
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models have valid instrumentation. In addition, several other tests for the requirements 
underlying the system GMM are satisfied. AR(2) tests for second order serial correlation 
are satisfied since the test statistics are negative and not significant, while all Wald tests of 
joint significance reject the null hypothesis.  
As mentioned, GMM is sensitive to the number of lagged instruments and there is 
no formal test to examine this. Roodman (2009, 2007) suggests the need for reporting how 
to obtain the “optimal” number of instruments. In this case, the number of possible 
instruments for the lagged income comes from the second lagged values to the end of the 
period. The number of instruments for the social income inequality index is based on the 
first lagged value and the last available lag. We have estimated many other regressions by 
increasing or decreasing the number of instruments as well as using a special user written 
command ‘collapse’ for decreasing instruments, but any other limits worsen the 
diagnostics. In this respect, this chosen number of instruments in Table 3.5 is, say, 
“optimal”.  
Although there is still a possibility that endogeneity between individual inequality 
and the dependent variable of disposable income undermines the requirement of E(IT, 
u)=0, according to all the above evidence, we may conclude that the system GMM with 
the control of endogeneity from the lagged dependent variables and social inequality is 
consistent. For some reasons, the interested coefficients in column 4 are not consistent 
with other results from the system GMM and the standard panel regressions because of the 
changes of coefficients’ sign. Hence, we may conclude that the system GMM in columns 2 
and 3 is comparatively efficient, and the following discussion focuses on these estimates. 
The positive significant coefficients of age and education in the system GMM agree 
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with the majority of the literature. More importantly, the significant positive coefficient of 
initial social inequality is also in line with the representative study by Forbes (2000)24 and 
the domestic study by Gravier-Rymaszewska et al. (2013)25 at province level and Su 
(2001)26 at national level in the income-growth nexus literature. This result indicates the 
initial social inequality at community level is associated with the sequence of the 
improvement in living standards and implies that the return on social efforts on the focus 
of economic development in the means of living standards is valuable in the short run.     
Regarding the coefficients of the individual inequality that show a U-shaped pattern 
which is against the Kuznets curve, this U-shaped relationship agrees with recent studies 
by Gallup (2012),27 Huang et al. (2012),28 Calì (2008),29 Banerjee and Piketty (2005)30 
and the domestic studies by Yang and Zhou (1999),31 Xue (1997)32 and Tsui (1996).33 
The findings indicate that i), income disparity shrinks in low income individuals and 
expands in high income individuals and ii), living standards are associated with the 
                                                        
24 The study mainly focuses on an international study of 45 countries. The coefficient on 
the initial traditional inequality index is 0.0013 with the standard GMM method. 
25 The study measures inequality by Theil statistics and the data from NBSC between 
1989 and 2006, using the system GMM method for estimation. The coefficient on the 
initial traditional inequality index is 0.821. 
26 The paper finds the parameter of Gini coefficient is 0.064 for China with fixed effect 
model.   
27 The paper calculates its own aggregate data from each nation’s household surveys, 
including 87 countries and different time periods.   
28 The study applies US data over the period 1917 to 2007 and the result is in favour of a 
U-shaped linkage between income inequality and economic development. 
29 The results support the idea of a U-shaped relation between rural-urban disparities in 
socio-economic indicators and the level of economic development in India. 
30 The authors also find the same pattern for India between 1922 and 2000.   
31 The study observes that urban-rural income inequality and consumption experienced a 
U-shaped change after the economic reforms were launched in the late 1970s.   
32 The paper examines urban-rural income distribution between 1978 and 1995 and the 
data are taken from NBSC. 
33 The author finds a U-shaped evolution of regional inequality in the post reform period 
using real per capita GDP from 1978 to 1989. 
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beginning of a poor return on individual efforts and towards the end of positive in the long 
run. These indications are not an issue only if convergence occurs. However, the 
coefficients of the lagged income terms are significant and positive, suggesting the 
improvement in living standards from previous periods, but convergence does not occur at 
individual level. The following results by the sensitivity analysis show the estimates by 
the system GMM are robust.    
Regarding the sensitivity analysis, Gini coefficients for social income inequality and 
three pairs of data category have been investigated and reported in Table 3.6, using the 
SGMM technique with the same instruments for the basic model above. On the whole, the 
coefficients on the initial short run social inequality are always significant and positive, 
except one in the Inland regression. The U-shape of the long run individual inequality 
does not change. First, we re-examined Equation 3.6 with the Gini definition of inequality 
to look at the effect of social efforts. The coefficient estimates change slightly and the 
significances remain. The tests for the requirement for the SGMM are consistent with the 
equation for the Theil index. T-tests show significant differences between the two income 
inequality indices in the standard analysis models. This re-examination suggests the 
change in the measurement of inequality does not affect the main results. Second, when 
we exclude IT, although the coefficient estimates do not appear to have any unusual 
outcome, the Sargan test highly rejects the null. 
In addition, social or geographical factors may have an influence so that we 
re-examine the basic model with three common pairs of groups such as coastal-inland 
region, urban-rural area and gender. In any case, the relationship between the inequalities 
and living standards agrees with the standard analysis in most estimates. 
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Table 3.5: Model Comparison Between the System GMM 
 
 SGMM-1 SGMM-2 SGMM-3 SGMM-4 
 Coef. 
(S.E) 
Coef. 
(S.E) 
Coef. 
(S.E) 
Coef. 
(S.E) 
y_1 0.178*** 
（0.017） 
0.172*** 
（0.017） 
0.170*** 
（0.017） 
0.195*** 
（0.020） 
y_2 0.063*** 
（0.016） 
0.054*** 
（0.016） 
0.051** 
（0.016） 
0.061*** 
（0.019） 
tc -0.669*** 
（0.052） 
-0.059 
(0.107) 
-0.057 
(0.106) 
0.019*** 
（0.119） 
tc_1 -0.096* 
（0.017） 
0.272*** 
（0.070） 
0.300*** 
（0.067） 
0.315*** 
(0.075) 
it -1.398*** 
（0.156） 
-1.759*** 
（0.166） 
-1.783*** 
（0.165） 
-1.83*** 
（0.192） 
it^2 1.354*** 
（0.212） 
1.609*** 
（0.217） 
1.625*** 
（0.218） 
1.728*** 
（0.263） 
age 0.006*** 
（0.001） 
0.006*** 
（0.001） 
0.006*** 
（0.001） 
0.006*** 
（0.001） 
education 0.039*** 
（0.002） 
0.042*** 
（0.002） 
0.042*** 
（0.002） 
0.041*** 
（0.002） 
N.O.U 28768 28768 30010 30010 
N 41907 41907 41907 41907 
Sargan test 148 
(3.9587e-10) 
36 
(0.99) 
40 
(0.91) 
51 
(0.72) 
AR(1) -17 
(<2.22e-16) 
-17  
(< 2.22e-16) 
-17 
(< 2.22e-16) 
-17 
(< 2.22e-16) 
AR(2) -0.45  
(0.65) 
-0.03  
(0.97) 
-0.07 
 (0.95) 
-0.02  
(0.98) 
Wald test 
for 
coefficients 
2182 
(<2.22e-16) 
1808 
(< 2.22e-16) 
1797 
(< 2.22e-16) 
1596 
(< 2.22e-16) 
Wald test 
for time 
dummies 
53 
(2.23e-10) 
46 
(1.04e-08) 
46  
(1.04e-08) 
62 
(3.64e-12) 
Source: Author’s estimation. 
Notes: SGMM-1 is without control of the correlation between social inequality index and 
the error. The difference between SGMM_2 and SGMM_3 is that the former uses merely 
one lag as instrument for endogenous variables and the latter applies all possible lags. 
SGMM_4 uses a two-step estimator which is the standard procedure for estimating 
parameters using GMM, while previous SGMM models adopt one step procedure. ***, ** 
and * denote statistical significance at 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, respectively.   
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Table 3.6: Sensitivity Analysis of Group Effect 
 
 tc tc_1 it it^2 N.O.U N Sargan test AR(2) t test 
Estimates Coef.(S.E) Coef.(S.E) Coef.(S.E) Coef.(S.E)      
Standard 
analysis 
         
Thiel index -0.057 
（0.106） 
0.300*** 
（0.067） 
-1.783*** 
（0.165） 
1.625*** 
（0.219） 
28768 41907 40, 
0.91 
-0.07 
(0.95) 
95 
Gini -0.086 
（0.099） 
0.294*** 
（0.049） 
-1.781*** 
（0.160） 
1.626*** 
（0.215） 
28768 41907 39, 
0.91 
-0.07 
(0.91) 
90 
Without ‘it’ -0.078 
（0.106） 
0.289*** 
（0.067） 
  28768 41907 518 
(< 2.22e-16) 
0.10 
(0.92) 
 
Three 
categories 
         
Coastal 0.225 
（0.211） 
0.576*** 
（0.145） 
-1.912*** 
（0.335） 
1.797*** 
（0.449） 
7079 10053 21 
(1) 
-8.09 
(6.3e-16) 
 
Inland -0.041 
（0.182） 
0.121 
（0.125） 
-1.467*** 
（0.305） 
1.264*** 
（0.414） 
7531 10706 14 
 (1) 
-1.11 
(0.27) 
 
Urban 0.435* 
（0.186） 
0.306* 
（0.120） 
-1.517*** 
（0.280） 
1.335*** 
（0.450） 
8265 13223 19 
 (1) 
-1.79 
(0.07) 
 
Rural -0.197 
（0.122） 
0.306*** 
（0.080） 
-1.539*** 
（0.192） 
1.431*** 
（0.249） 
20503 28684 37  
(0.98) 
-0.58 
(0.56) 
 
Male 0.016 
（0.147） 
0.284*** 
（0.090） 
-1.556*** 
（0.223） 
1.284*** 
（0.289） 
15384 22070 33  
(1) 
0.44 
(0.66) 
 
Female -0.132 
（0.151） 
0.323*** 
（0.101） 
-2.11*** 
（0.249） 
2.089*** 
（0.334） 
13384 19837 51 
 (0.72) 
-0.34 
(0.73) 
 
Source: Author’s estimation.  
Notes: Wald tests are all significant. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, respectively.
 88 
 
Table 3.7: Sensitivity Analysis of Data Size Effect 
 
 n=2000 n=5000 n=10000 Full 
D.V. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
y_1 0.172*** 
（0.030） 
0.163*** 
（0.023） 
0.181*** 
（0.019） 
0.170*** 
（0.017） 
y_2 0.056* 
（0.029） 
0.033 
（0.022） 
0.047*** 
（0.018） 
0.051** 
（0.016） 
tc -0.074 
(0.216) 
-0.144 
(0.145) 
-0.132 
（0.119） 
-0.057 
(0.106) 
tc_1 0.347** 
（0.147） 
0.377*** 
（0.094） 
0.251*** 
（0.078） 
0.300*** 
（0.067） 
it -2.065*** 
（0.369） 
-1.821*** 
（0.243） 
-1.709*** 
（0.193） 
-1.783*** 
（0.165） 
it^2 1.944*** 
（0.472） 
1.607*** 
（0.303） 
1.481*** 
（0.253） 
1.625*** 
（0.218） 
age 0.007*** 
（0.002） 
0.006*** 
（0.001） 
0.007*** 
（0.023） 
0.006*** 
（0.001） 
education 0.044*** 
（0.004） 
0.038*** 
（0.033） 
0.040*** 
（0.002） 
0.042*** 
（0.002） 
Sargan test 37  
(0.98) 
58  
(0.49) 
49 
(0.80) 
40 
0.91 
AR(1) -9.53 
(< 2.22e-16) 
-13 
(< 2.22e-16) 
-15 
(< 2.22e-16) 
-17 
(< 2.22e-16) 
AR(2) -1.40 
(0.16) 
-0.06 
(0.95) 
-0.10 
(0.92) 
-0.07 
 (0.95) 
Wald test for 
coefficients 
431 
(< 2.22e-16) 
763 
(< 2.22e-16) 
1304 
(< 2.22e-16) 
1797 
(< 2.22e-16) 
Wald test for 
time dummies 
15 
(0.01) 
33 
(3.19e-06) 
35 
(1.59e-06) 
46  
(1.04e-08) 
Source: Author’s estimation. 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1% level, 5% level and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 
We notice that the Sargan test has a perfect p-value of 1. The existing 
explanation for such a p-value is the low power of the test if data have large N and 
large T (Dahlberg et al., 2008; Roodman, 2008; Bowsher, 2002). Previous studies 
obtain a similar p-value of the Sargan test (Castelló-Climent, 2005; Azizov, 2007). It 
seems the large T may not be the case in our study (T=3-8), and yet such a p-value is 
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still present. Hence, we restrict these models with gradually decreasing lagged 
instruments but the corresponding results are not effective, suggesting such a p-value 
likely has nothing to do with the number of instruments. Alternatively, we further 
re-estimate the basic model with three sets of different random size from the data to 
observe whether the size matters. The results are reported in Table 3.7. Fortunately, 
when the number of individuals increases from n=2000, n=5000, n=10000 to the full 
data, the Sargan tests do not show any unsatisfactory results. Additionally, the 
coefficient estimates across different size of data are the same in terms of the 
significance and the sign of parameters and the value of coefficients. According to all 
this evidence, we are confident to conclude that the system GMM is consistent and 
efficient and the empirical analysis substantiates our arguments with reliable 
evidence.  
3.6 Discussion and conclusion 
This study aims to examine the effects of income inequality on living standards in 
China, applying the CHNS individual data from 1989 to 2009. Differently, we looked 
at income inequality through the concepts of social efforts and self efforts. The main 
empirical techniques include the Theil (1967) statistics for the measures of two 
income inequality indices and the system GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998) for the 
procedures of parameter estimates. The findings have three aspects. The coefficient is 
positive on social income inequality (the traditional income inequality index), while 
the parameters of individual income inequality (new measure of index) show a 
U-shaped pattern on living standards. Additionally, the coefficient of initial income is 
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positive.  
These results reveal several important messages. In the short run, social efforts 
on economic development (represented by income inequality at community level) to 
improve living standards are consequential. However, this short run effect may not 
help achieve a long run sustainable improvement. Individual efforts (represented by 
income inequality at individual level) on enhanced living standards by augmenting 
income shows a completely different picture. That is, it is a non-monotonic trend 
along the process of improvement of living standards by individuals, but it is against 
the Kuznets curve of a U-shaped pattern. The Kuznets curve is a systematic evolution 
of income distribution along a country’s development path from wide income 
inequality to narrow. In contrast with the aggregate level, the present study shows that 
income difference starts to diminish with individuals making efforts to raise living 
standards and then remains similar when settling down in life for a while and widens 
as the return on the efforts becomes earlier than the beginning of the process. Briefly, 
it indicates that the improvement in living standards is limited in low income 
individuals but not in high income individuals. Although the improvement occurs 
across all individuals, the living standard for low income people does not converge 
towards a high income one since the initial income level has a positive sign of 
coefficient. 
This study starts from the argument that the traditional evaluation of the effect 
of income inequality on individual well-being is insufficient since the conventional 
measure of income inequality is based on the concept of social comparison from the 
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social psychological perspective. In addition, this unilateral evaluation is inconsistent 
with the goal of the reduction of income inequality for individuals’ well-being. 
Essentially, the well-being depends not only on social efforts such as government 
assistance but also self efforts. By doing so, self efforts is measured by an index 
which is calculated through income difference within a person over years, so called 
individual income inequality, indicating one’s balance of earning progress, followed 
by the present study investigating the joint effects of the new index and the traditional 
index to qualify the returns on social efforts and self efforts in living standards.  
The underlying consideration for looking at both sides, social and individual, of 
the information is also about the impressive improvement of living standards over the 
decades in China which may not be attributed entirely to the government economic 
institutions and policies, but also the efforts and desire of improving their living 
conditions by the population. Taking both sides’ information into account allows us to 
make an unprejudiced judgment of government assistance and actions. Previous 
studies have failed to take individual income inequality into account when 
determining the effect of income inequality on the living standards and therefore, 
yield biased results. 
This study firstly measures inequality through social efforts and individual 
efforts, going beyond economic factors. Generally, economic study focuses on the 
functional distribution (i.e. land, capital or labour) and the size of income distribution 
(or distribution of income among persons). Yet, it is not sufficient when policymakers 
and economists explicitly set the goal of promoting the well-being of individuals 
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through economic opportunities, especially in the research area of inequality. Without 
addressing any part, it is an incomplete account for the well-being of individuals and 
more importantly, the process made by traditional ideology may lead to some degree 
of negative meaning about the life of individuals.  
This study introduces different time horizons, short run and long run, in one 
unified framework. It has the benefit of looking at inequality from multiple 
dimensions. In this way, an unbiased judgment can be made. For example, the short 
run effect by initial social index implies the effective government action and policy 
but this is not correct when restricting to the long run effect by individual index. The 
issue with such a setting is the need for a set of longitudinal data with large N and 
reasonable length of T. The social inequality index and individual inequality index 
may not measure social inequality and individual inequality properly with a small N 
and short T, respectively. The present study may face such an issue that arises from 
the short T, especially some T=3 (minimum time length), but many individuals are 
repeatedly observed over more than three waves and the time span is long. Certainly, 
we desire to improve such measurement when more data are available.            
The results are robust and contribute additional evidence of the need for 
sustainable government assistance and action in China. Besides, the study works out 
how these social efforts and self efforts insights are. A limitation of this study is that 
of the data having the major drawback of representing the whole population in China 
since individuals are subjected to geographical selection. Further work is needed to 
develop this proposed idea of the joint collaborative of returns on social efforts and 
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individual efforts to evaluate government intervention and promote well-being.  
More urgently, due to the improvement in living standards in low income 
individuals being rather limited and more importantly, not converging to the high 
income group, these may imply insufficient economic opportunity and a lack of equal 
opportunity across income levels, particularly for the bottom income distribution. 
Hence, the next chapter is designed to link the analysis to economic opportunity in 
China. 
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CHAPTER 4 Mobility, Volatility and Individual Income Inequality 
4.1 Introduction 
The findings from the previous chapter imply that there may be a lack of economic 
opportunity among the poor. This chapter therefore further investigates opportunity 
through the concept of income mobility, regarded as an effective measurement for 
relieving the pressure of income inequality and for the well-being of the individual in 
the literature. Senik (2005) shows that perceived mobility is central to the link between 
other people's income and individual satisfaction as it determines individual 
opportunities and risks.  
Over recent years, it has become increasingly popular to study income mobility 
and income inequality. However, this research area is still in its early development, 
while limited studies incorporate income volatility in China, as concluded by Fields 
and Zhang (2007) and Chen and Zhang (2009) from their survey of previous domestic 
studies. Nichols (2010) points out that much existing evidence of the link is “vitiated” 
since there is a lack of volatility of income measurement taken into account at the same 
time; the author, hence, conducts such analysis.  
This present study further investigates how the uncertainty of income inequality 
can be explained by mobility and volatility in China. This research introduces the 
idea of individual income inequality (see Chapter 3 for detailed discussion) in this 
investigation. The measure considers an individual’s income inequality over a period 
of time rather than other people’s, group or population income levels at a point in time. 
In this way, the study attempts to observe the question of how one’s unequal income 
development can be affected by economic opportunity and security.   
The China Health and Nutrition Survey individual data are used for this 
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investigation with the quantile regression. The quantile regression estimates show that 
the parameter of absolute mobility is positive and significant across all observed 
quantiles (i.e. it is 0.130 at the 50 percentile); and conversely, the coefficient of 
volatility is negative across many observed quantiles (i.e. it is -0.063 at the 50 
percentile) from 1989 to 2009. Furthermore, the lower the income level, the lower the 
income security is. This result reflects on the coefficients of volatility. All these 
findings indicate that income mobility can offset income inequality, but economic 
security such as insurance, the welfare system, property rights and health care and so 
on is the most crucial and essential area to tackle income inequality in China. 
The following chapter is organised into five parts. Section 4.2 focuses on the 
literature review of international and domestic studies, followed by the measurements 
of inequality and mobility in Section 4.3. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 present the estimation 
process, results and discussion. Section 4.6 is the conclusion.  
4.2 Literature review 
4.2.1 Theory development 
The term “mobility” is within the contexts of social mobility in sociology and 
anthropology, the study of social movement and changes (see Miller, 1956). Income 
mobility is one branch of social mobility with the particular economic focus on the 
transition of income status. Miller brought the term of income mobility into the 
introduction of the concept of mobility in 1955.   
Initially, the emergence of income mobility in economics stands alone with the 
large shift from the functional income distribution to the size of income distribution in 
the 1960s-1970s (Goldfarb and Leonard, 2005). At the same time, economists and 
politicians are not content with “static” measures of income inequality since the 
limitation of “static inequality” is not satisfactory with a broad welfare theoretic 
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conception of economic justice. As a concept advanced by Friedman (1962), he brings 
attention to combining this importance of mobility with an understanding of inequality 
and clearly states that given that the same income inequality between two societies and 
higher income mobility in one than the other, the one is regarded as equality 
comparatively and its corresponding economy is more efficient and has more equal 
opportunity than the other. What is not clear in Friedman’s statement is the relationship 
between mobility and inequality. The well-known statement by Friedman states: 
Consider two societies that have the same distribution of annual income. In 
one there is great mobility and change so that the position of particular 
families in the income hierarchy varies widely from year to year. In the 
other, there is great rigidity so that each family stays in the same position 
year after year. Clearly, in any meaningful sense, the second would be the 
more unequal society. The one kind of inequality is a sign of dynamic 
change, social mobility, equality of opportunity; the other of a status society. 
(Friedman, 1962, p.171) 
Subsequently, many scholars make an effort to examine the effects of mobility 
on inequality. Paukert (1973) states that there is a clear long-term trend towards 
income equality in his survey of relevant literature, and the statement comes to light 
mainly by Soltow’s two studies (1965 and 1968) since they trace a long historical 
period. Soltow (1965) uses annual income with eight Norwegian cities in ten-year 
intervals between 1840 and 1960. The majority of Gini coefficients decreases during 
the period of time. Another study by Soltow (1968) traces the longest period in Great 
Britain that begins with 1436 and ends with 1962 and finds that there is no indication 
of increases in inequality. In contrast to shorter periods, there are some variances 
(Kravis, 1962) and supports (Kohen et al., 1975). For example, there are some 
contradictory findings in other developing countries of Puerto Rico, Argentina and 
Mexico (Weisskoff, 1970).  
Hart (1976) summarizes that the dynamic analysis of income distributions 
reveals important changes in income distribution, which are hidden by the usual 
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comparisons of the inequality of incomes at two or more points in time. For example, it 
reveals the movement of people between different income brackets over time. It also 
shows how the average income of the poorer-paid changes relatively to that of the 
better-paid, how the average length of stay in an income bracket changes, and how the 
time path of a person's income changes through his life cycle (Hart, 1976). Similarly, 
Shorrocks (1978a, 1978b) also observes previous studies and discovers that variations 
in income depend on the interval between observations, and on the length of the 
accounting period chosen for incomes. That is, the aggregate of incomes over time 
tends to improve the relative position of those temporarily found at the bottom of the 
distribution, and the situation of those at the top tends to deteriorate. In short, these 
studies above are mainly concerned about the effect of the long run (time interval) 
measure of mobility (or time trend) on the short run (one year) measure of income 
inequality.  
In recent decades, income inequality and income mobility receive abundant 
attention concerning the traditional question of whether the large rise in income 
inequality that has occurred over the years has been accompanied by a decline in 
mobility. This underlying assumption for such a question is that an increase in mobility 
can offset income inequality. Beenstock (2004) points out that income inequality and 
mobility are closely interwoven concepts even to the point of confusion. It is quite 
right that this assumption does not necessarily mean a negative relationship between 
the two. The notion for such interest is that for mobility to offset the increase in 
inequality, the rate of mobility has to accelerate. In other words, in providing that high 
level of income inequality and significant income mobility in an economy, the 
inequality is tolerable since income mobility is regarded as an equalizer of longer-term 
incomes (Krugman, 1992; Jarvis and Jenkins, 1998; Fields, 2010).  
 98 
 
Evidence to support such traditional hypotheses does not occur consistently and 
rather indicates the converse results of a positive relationship. Prieto-Rodríguez et al. 
(2010) find a positive relationship between income inequality and mobility in 
European Union regions. Lukiyanova and Oshchepkov (2012) conclude that the 
inequality-reducing effect is almost exactly offset by changes in the relative positions 
of individuals, and the overall reduction in cross-sectional inequality is merely modest 
in Russia. De Figueiredo and Ziegelmann (2010) suggest that Brazil has low income 
mobility, indicating that its social framework is relatively rigid. In other words, the 
income class in which an individual is inserted will determine his/her future social 
position. Beenstock (2004) discovers that there is high income mobility between 1983 
and 1995 in Israel, and horizontal measures of income overstate its inequality. Parker 
and Gardner (2002) find general support for the claim that world mobility increased 
between 1972 and 1992, counterpointing the increased inequality over this period. 
Quadrini (1999) finds that during periods of growth, society opts for less taxation and 
less redistribution, and growing economies are characterized by higher income 
inequality and by greater mobility of agents within income classes over time. 
In contrast, there is no empirical case that accelerated rates of mobility offset the 
increases in inequality that have been convincingly documented by extensive research 
(Mishel et al., 2008). For example, Aaronson and Mazumder (2008) report the 
mobility between the earnings of fathers and sons that has doubled from around 0.3 to 
around 0.6 since 1980 in the USA. However, Lee and Solon (2009) state that the 
estimates of mobility are widely divergent and discover no such acceleration in the 
USA. Gangl et al. (2007) conclude that high US inequality is not offset by greater 
mobility in the period of 1980s-1990s since an eight-year interval mobility of income 
does not alter the inequality. Aaberge et al. (2000) find no evidence of a positive 
 99 
 
relationship between inequality and mobility in the comparative study between 
Scandinavian countries and the USA. Hassler et al. (2007) demonstrate that the 
correlation across countries can be either positive or negative. 
From the review thus far, several aspects are clear. First, the concept of income 
mobility is derived from the length of accounting income period, describing changes in 
the income of an individual or a set of individuals in the overall income distribution of 
a defined group. Second, mobility represents the dynamics of income change, while 
inequality generally means for a static income status. There is a need to look at both 
components to understand income disparity. Third, the core theme for the investigation 
of the link between income inequality and income mobility is the question of whether 
inequality can be offset by significant mobility. If so, the inequality in a society is not 
necessarily a big issue to be concerned with. Finally, the theory is ambiguous on the 
relationship between mobility and inequality because the results are conclusively 
inconclusive, as Fields (2001, 2007) also points out. 
In contrast, the theory is elusive on the link between the two since the 
inequality-offset question is intuitively easily mistaken on the effect of mobility. 
Originally, Friedman’s (1962) statement34 does not indicate that the larger the income 
mobility, the smaller the income inequality and yet, the statement somehow is simply 
interpreted as such in the literature, which is not quite precise. In addition, high level 
inequality is considered a bad thing, and mobility is regarded as a good thing for 
enhancing equality and efficiency in an economy (Friedman, 1962; Atkinson et al., 
1978; Aaberge et al. 2000). Such an inverse position of the two is facilely thought a 
negative relationship.  
However, one thing is certain in that growth of mobility is desirable. Thus, high 
                                                        
34 See Friedman (1962, p.171). 
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mobility implies that individuals can improve their living condition by their own 
efforts. Conversely, if it is not, then it indicates that economic opportunity is restrained 
or/and productivity reduces. Apart from such a general indication, income mobility is 
far more capable than that because of the multidimensionality of this concept (Fields, 
2001, 2007). 
A significant positive correlation between inequality and mobility also suggests 
that redistribution is not otherwise essential. Lorente Prieto et al. (2008) point out that 
the social demand for redistribution has two main determinants in the literature: social 
mobility and beliefs regarding whether income differences are due to effort or luck. 
Piketty (1995) finds that stronger beliefs that income differences are a result of luck, 
together with lower social mobility, increases the level of support for income 
redistribution. Ravallion and Lokshin (2000), Corneo and Gruner (2002) and Fong 
(2001) confirm these results: greater mobility reduces the popular desire for 
redistribution, and a firm belief that individual efforts is the principal cause of income 
dispersion similarly produces a greater aversion to redistributive policies.  
Income mobility is also a notion that helps attenuate the unequal distribution of 
initial endowments. As Björklund and Jäntti describe: 
Consider two hypothetical types of societies. The first is characterized by 
strong associations in income among parents and children as well as among 
siblings. In such a society, knowing a person’s family background makes it 
easy to predict her income during adult life. The second society reveals the 
opposite pattern so that the correlation between family members’ income is 
weak or close to zero. In the former society, a person’s income is to a large 
extent predetermined by factors that she has not chosen herself. Arguably, 
there is less equality of opportunity in the first society.  
(Björklund and Jäntti, 2009, pp.491-492) 
With agreement, origin independence seems to capture intuitions about "equality of 
opportunity" which can be roughly defined as the extent to which personal 
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characteristics (such as talent) rather than parental background determine monetary 
rewards (cf. Loury, 1981; Benabou, 1996; Benabou and Ok, 1999).  
4.2.2 Volatility  
Given that mobility measures the dynamic of the income component, such movement 
likely comes with fluctuation. This fluctuation (or variability) is regarded as income 
volatility and often suggests income insecurity (or instability). Jenkins (2010) explains 
that high income mobility may be problematic because it increases the longitudinal 
instability of income flows and increases income risk so that observing income 
security is desired at the same time. Jarvis and Jenkins (1996) and Nichols (2008) view 
mobility that may also be a synonym for income fluctuations and hence, economic 
insecurity. Jarvis and Jenkins clearly state: 
On the one hand mobility is an indicator of how open society is and the 
degree of equality of opportunity, and hence a Good Thing. To some, greater 
inequality may be more tolerable if accompanied by significant mobility. On 
the other hand, mobility may also be a synonym for income fluctuations and 
hence economic insecurity, a Bad Thing. Whether income flux is more 
concentrated amongst the poorest or the richest is likely to influence the 
overall social verdict. 
(Jarvis and Jenkins, 1996, p.1)  
 
Thus, as Fields and Ok (1999a, 1999b) point out, by using measures of income 
movement, one can examine how unstable the incomes of individuals have been 
throughout a given time period and address questions related to economic insecurity. 
Apart from these reasons, economies have become more unstable along with more 
dynamic economies. These phenomena are in line with globalization and deregulation, 
and technological changes have increased the amount of creative destruction and thus, 
the competitive pressures and risks faced by disaggregate levels such as workers and 
firms over the years (Dynan et al., 2007). This is even particularly relevant if an 
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economy is under consideration of a lack of functioning credit market that could insure 
individuals against economic shocks and help them smooth their consumption patterns 
(Fields et al., 2007).  
Nevertheless, there is very little work that has been done in this respect (Nichols, 
2010), even though numerous authors (i.e. Gosselin, 2004; Mofﬁtt and Gottschalk, 
1995; Hacker, 2006; Gosselin and Zimmerman, 2007; Dynan et al., 2007; Dahl et al., 
2008; Shin and Solon, 2008; Nichols and Zimmerman, 2008; Whalley and Yue, 2009) 
have debated the degree to which income volatility has increased over time and what 
this means for individuals and household income security (see also Gosselin's, 2008 
book for further discussion). At the same time, these studies suggest that there is no 
universally preferred model of income dynamics or income dispersion on which to 
base a measure of volatility. Furthermore, this literature has been inconclusive in the 
reach area of income volatility, starting with the seminal work of Gottschalk and 
Moffitt (1994). Many studies have found that individual earnings and household 
income have become more volatile during the past few decades. These findings 
suggest that the higher the volatility, the higher the income inequality. In contrast, there 
are some notable exceptions which find no increase or decline in the volatility of 
earnings and total household income (such as CBO, 2008 and Dahl et al., 2011).  
4.2.3 Previous studies of China 
Fields and Zhang (2007) conclude from previous domestic studies that research on 
income mobility in China is still in its early development. Chen and Zhang (2009) also 
recognise that the impact of volatility on inequality has received limited attention in 
the literature based on their survey. The existing domestic studies in income mobility 
mainly focus on the measurement which can be divided into two groups: one focuses 
on descriptive analysis, and another applies regression examination based on 
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conditional or unconditional regression analysis to measure mobility. 
Nee (1996) shows that rapid and extensive rural household income mobility is 
due to economic reform in China in the 1980s. In a recent decade, Wang (2005) 
measured China's household income mobility in the 1990s using the CHNS data, 
which was for the first time implemented by a Chinese economist in this field. Khor 
and Pencavel (2006) declare that the degree of income mobility in urban China during 
the first half of the 1990s is much higher than in the USA and other advanced 
economies. Yin et al. (2006) find that income mobility between 1998 and 2002 is 
lower than from 1991 to 1995 after measuring the data from 1995 to 2002 in China. 
Ding and Wang (2007) examine household income mobility and find high levels of 
mobility which is due to an exchange process accompanied by high growth as well as 
historical macroeconomic policies. The measure of income mobility by Shi et al. (2010) 
is based on the combination of rank mobility and quantity mobility, and income 
inequality and income mobility. One of the findings is the poorest households were 
more mobile compared to the rich. That is, a large percentage (73%) of the households 
in the lowest quintile in 1989 was able to move up to a higher quintile by 2006. Chen 
and Cowell (2013) show high mobility as well as income inequality. Among these 
studies, several papers also apply regression analysis for the changes of income with or 
without conditional restriction (Khor and Pencavel, 2006; Zhang et al., 2007).  
The main finding of these studies is consistent with international literature. That 
is, the long run inequality is lower than short run inequality in China which means that 
income mobility offsets income differences. Yet, this statement is not particularly 
insightful to clarify the fact that the high levels of income inequality are ethically 
wrong. Certainly, this conclusion emphasizes the desire of mobility in Chinese society 
because the engine of mobility is economic opportunity. However, there is the need for 
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ensuring income security to prevent excessive mobility.  
Nichols (2010) claims the first study to address this issue in China and finds that 
income mobility in China is higher than in the USA, but volatility in the USA is lower 
than in China and the suggestion is to provide substantial insurance mechanisms and 
develop a welfare system by policymakers. Whalley and Yue (2009) and Zhao (2008) 
focus on the income volatility and income inequality in rural or urban areas since the 
study believes that previous inequality researchers do not consider volatility 
simultaneously.  
Another relevant study is that of Zhang and Eriksson (2010). They aim to 
measure the degree of inequality of opportunity associated with the distribution of 
income with the regression framework by Roemer (1998). The results indicate 
substantial degrees of inequality of opportunity which reflect on parental connections 
remaining an important transmission mechanism for the intergenerational persistence 
of economic advantage and disadvantage. Additionally, the increase in income 
inequality during the period largely mirrors the increase in inequality of opportunity. 
Similar studies briefly include Breen and Jonsson (2005) and Gong et al. (2012).  
Recalling the proposed argument of this thesis: an individual’s well-being 
depends on self efforts and social efforts and relevant income differences among 
people are a result of the two efforts derived from self-interest and social influence. 
Previous studies have followed traditional measures of income inequality to explore 
the link of inequality and mobility. The traditional inequality index focuses on cohort 
measurement such geographical divisions (for example, national and regional) and 
social characteristic divisions (for example, age and ethics). This present study 
advances the research area on income inequality and mobility by investigating how the 
overall income mobility can affect the balance of individual life time earnings. In this 
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way, we will provide more insights into the effect of economic opportunity and 
security on inequality. 
4.3 Measures of mobility and volatility 
4.3.1 The notions 
One issue in the mobility literature is that it does not provide a unified discourse of 
analysis since the notion of income mobility is not well-defined and different studies 
concentrate on different aspects of this multi-faceted concept (Fields and Ok, 1996a, 
1996b). Basically, mobility studies analyse how specific individuals move through the 
income distribution in terms of symmetric income movement, positional movement, 
directional income movement, time dependence, or some other measures (Fields et al., 
2007) (see Table 4.1). Different mobility notions adopt corresponding measures. This 
diversity of mobility notions and measures recall the variety of inequality indices. 
Hence, Fields and Ok (1999a, 1999b, p.561) suggest “a crucial preliminary step of any 
sort of mobility analysis is the clarification of the particular facet of the notion of 
‘income mobility’ that one is seeking”.  
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Table 4.1: Common Measurement of Income Mobility Index 
 
 
Source: Fields et al. (2007) 
Primarily, the present study focuses on the understanding of whether a high 
degree of the inequality is accompanied by economic opportunity and income security 
and whether redistribution is desired in China. In accordance, the absolute mobility 
index captures the overall income transmission 35  and is reasonable to indicate 
                                                        
35 Absolute income mobility simply measures the actual change in an individual’s real 
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economic opportunity and economic security. The reason is that the more opportunity 
there is in a society, the more income transmission. It is worth noting that the degree of 
mobility is not only the consequence of more opportunity, but also other factors such 
as productivity increases in China. In this sense, the high mobility cannot attribute to 
equal opportunity entirely in the case of China. It is more appropriate and logical to 
view economic opportunity conceptually as one of the elements of economic mobility 
in short and median term measurements.  
4.3.2 Methods 
In the present study, the framework of economic opportunity follows the concept of 
distance based on the absolute difference in log-incomes and belongs to a class of 
absolute mobility measures (Fields and Ok, 1999a, 1999b) (Eq. 4.1). The Fields and 
Ok (1999a, 1999b) approach is a commonly used measure for the overall income 
mobility. 
𝑀𝑀(𝑌𝑖𝑡,𝑌𝑖,𝑡+𝑠) = 1𝑙��ln�𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝑠� − ln (𝑦𝑖𝑡)�   ,                    (4.1)𝑛
𝑖∈𝑁
 
where MA is the total movement (mobility) of income, n is the number of individuals 
in the economy, and 𝑌𝑡 and 𝑌𝑡+𝑠 are the initial and final incomes of individuals, 
respectively. This index is the aggregate of the change in each individual’s income. 
Here, the income mobility is regarded as an absolute mobility, as any variation of an 
individual’s income is taken into account in the index.  
Firstly, the equation suggests that if 𝑌𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡+𝑠, and then 𝑀𝑀 = 0, this indicates 
that the incomes of all individuals stay the same through time and concludes no 
income movement in the society. When 𝑌𝑡 ≠ 𝑌𝑡+𝑠, and then 𝑀𝑀 > 0, this means that 
income movement occurs. In general, we expect that the final incomes are greater than 
                                                                                                                                                                
income. 
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the initial one. If this is the case, the higher the absolute mobility there is maybe: 1) the 
higher the means of the standards of living and 2) the higher the possibility to move 
from a poor to a rich state. Additionally, it maintains that the level of mobility 
associated in which a certain transformation would not be altered if the same dollar 
amount is added to everybody’s income in both the initial and final distributions of this 
transformation. In other words, absolute changes allow one to talk about income 
mobility in terms of total dollars, as Fields and Ok (1996a, 1999b) summarize. 
Secondly, the implicit assumption of this method is that a dollar gain or loss is the 
same regardless of the income level of the person experiencing it (Fields and Ok, 
1999a, 1999b). This assumption is relevant to economic opportunity.  
As we discussed, the fluctuation of income mobility is regarded as volatility, 
which is an indicator for income insecurity if the mobility fluctuates rapidly and 
suggest high income volatility. Conversely, if the income almost never changes, it has 
low volatility, which indicates the social welfare system needs to provide monetary 
assistance to people with an inadequate or no income. Standard deviation is the typical 
and simplified statistic used to measure volatility. There are three other popular 
approaches to estimating earnings volatility (Venn, 2011): time-series methods, 
cross-sectional methods and categorical methods, all of which are used for longitudinal 
data to calculate individuals’ income volatility. The present study is designed to look at 
the variability of mobility. By doing so, the volatility of mobility is measured as the 
cumulative standard deviation of relative mobility across individuals. By “relative 
mobility”, we mean the individuals’ share of the total income mobility and refer to it as 
the speed of change in an individual’s income from t to t+s. The formula is Eq. 4.2,  
𝑀𝑀�𝑌𝑖𝑡,𝑌𝑖,𝑡+𝑠� = 1𝑙� ln (𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝑠) − 𝑙𝑙(𝑦𝑖𝑡)ln(𝑦𝑖𝑡)𝑛
𝑖∈𝑁
   ,                   (4.2) 
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where 𝑀𝑀 is the relative mobility, and Equation 4.2 suggests that if 𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝑠 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡,then 𝑀𝑀 = 0, and there is no income growth in the final period; if𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝑠 < 𝑦𝑖𝑡 , 
then 𝑀𝑀 < 0, and negative speed of income movement; if𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝑠 > 𝑦𝑖𝑡, then 𝑀𝑀 > 0, 
and positive speed of income movement. The speed of the income movement is one of 
the factors that affect economic well-being in terms of security so that its standard 
deviation is used to measure income volatility (V) which is the measure of fluctuations 
of a process, where 𝑀𝑀𝑖 is the ith individual contribution of the relative movement. 
𝑉 = �𝑣𝑣𝑣( 𝑀𝑀𝑖 − 𝑀𝑀)                       (4.3) 
The individual inequality index, 𝐼𝑇 , is calculated according to the Theil’s 
statistics in equation 4.4 which is for the 𝑖th individual at an observed period of 
waves.𝜇𝑦𝑖𝑖 is the average income of the 𝑖th individual over particular waves; k is the 
number of waves appeared for an individual. IT=0 suggests perfect equality while 
IT=1 indicates perfect inequality across years (see detailed discussion in Chapter 3). 
𝐼𝑇 = 1
𝑘
�
𝑦𝑖𝑖
𝜇𝑦𝑖𝑤
𝑘
𝑖∈𝑛
𝑙𝑙
𝑦𝑖𝑖
𝜇𝑦𝑖𝑤
,             (4.4) 
Regarding alternative methods in the literature, there is a plentiful number of 
measurements of income mobility, including Shorrocks (1978a and 1978b), King 
(1983), Chakravarty et al. (1985), Cowell (1985), Dardanoni (1993) and Fields and Ok 
(1996, 1999). Fields and Ok (1999b) also show that their method of mobility index is 
superior in terms of measuring income flux. There are also various alternative methods 
to estimate volatility and changes therein are discussed by Nichols and Zimmerman 
(2008) and include both parametric and nonparametric methods (i.e. Gottschalk and 
Moffitt, 1994; Dahl et al., 2011; Dynan et al., 2007; Shin and Solon, 2008). However, 
the simplest methods also tend to produce fairly reliable results in large data, according 
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to Nichols (2010). At the same time, this essay is the first to explore the different 
effects of mobility and volatility between the two inequalities rather than dwelling on 
measurement methods.   
4.4 Variable description and estimation method 
4.4.1 Mobility and volatility 
The data are taken from the CHNS from 1989 to 2009. Figure 4.1 shows a clear 
income movement during the period and some negative and zero values. These 
negative and zero values are exclusive.36 
Figure 4.1: Income Movement Across Waves 
 
Source: Author’s calculations.  
  
                                                        
36 More detailed discussion is in Chapter 3. 
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Table 4.2: Summary of Mobility and Volatility 
 
    Income   Mobility    Volatility   
 Period 2009- 2009- 1997- 2009- 2009- 1997- 2009- 2009- 1997- 
1989 2000 1989 1989 2000 1989 1989 2000 1989 
Overall Min.    16  114  45  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
 10% 2608  4076  1964  0.30  0.27  0.29  0.12 0.11 0.08 
 1st Qu. 4857  7401  3217  0.75  0.58  0.60  0.22 0.17 0.17 
 Median  9239  12672  5137  1.51  1.12  1.14  0.44 0.31 0.31 
 Mean    13186  16840  6812  1.74  1.37  1.37  0.47 0.35 0.35 
 3rd Qu. 16570  21053  8106  2.50  1.93  1.90  0.69 0.50 0.50 
 90% 27404  32603  13124  3.39  2.87  2.76  0.89  0.76  0.70 
  Max.    161922  161922  88622  8.20  8.20  7.11  1.22 1.02 1.09 
Rural   Min.    18  114  45  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00  
 10% 2284  3487  1733  0.35  0.33  0.34  0.11 0.10 0.10 
 1st Qu. 4406  6444  2944  0.88  0.67  0.70  0.26 0.19 0.19 
 Median  8566  11377  4956  1.73  1.29  1.28  0.50 0.35 0.35 
 Mean    12132  6487  6487  1.87  1.51  1.48  0.51 0.39 0.39 
 3rd Qu. 15521  19171  7910  2.66  2.11  2.06  0.74 0.56 0.54 
 90% 25088  29515  12861  3.58  2.99  2.87  0.94 0.76 0.72 
  Max.    161922  161922  88622  8.20  8.20  7.11  1.22 1.06 1.02 
Urban  Min.    16  304  64  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00  
 10% 3378  6498  2613  0.23  0.19  0.22  0.08 0.05 0.06 
 1st Qu. 5730  10274  3771  0.57  0.44  0.46  0.17 0.12 0.13 
 Median  10825  15391  5601  1.40  0.84  0.87  0.34 0.23 0.23 
 Mean    15217  20500  7525  1.17  1.09  1.12  0.39 0.29 0.29 
 3rd Qu. 18951  24901  8523  1.95  1.47  1.48  0.56 0.40 0.40 
 90% 31463  38330  13760  2.93  2.29  2.45  0.81 0.60 0.63 
  Max.    147979  147979  81566  7.80  7.80  6.41  1.22 1.06 1.01 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Table 4.2 represents the overall basic summary of income, mobility and 
volatility and the differences between urban and rural areas at three periods of time: the 
whole sample period from 1989 to 2009 (1989-2009) and two separate periods of 1989 
and 1997 (1989-1997) and 2000 and 2009 (2000-2009).Table 4.2 shows that the longer 
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the period of time, there is higher mobility because the mobility index is larger in the 
full sample period than the other two short periods. Volatility has a similar situation 
with mobility. In addition, the higher the income level, the higher the mobility and 
volatility. The minimum and the maximum of the mobility and volatility indices have 
significant differences across three periods and three classed of individuals (“overall”, 
“rural” and “urban”). It is worth noting that all minimum income levels are extremely 
small and do not have any income movement. In other words, these individuals stay as 
the poor as they used to be when time passed. Such a minimum is far away from the 
poverty base line of 2300 RMB per year (Chinese Academy of Sciences, 2012) and it 
is not reasonable to observe these individuals’ life time earnings when they struggle 
with survival. Hence, this study excludes people in poverty but future research is 
needed to look at this group of individuals in-depth. In terms of urban and rural areas, 
although the average income in urban areas is higher than in rural areas, the income 
movement and volatility are not as much as in rural areas. This result is similar with 
the measurement of mobility by Chen and Cowell (2013) and Sun et al. (2007).   
Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 display clear pictures of the relationship between 
individual inequality and mobility and between the inequality and volatility at different 
quantiles. These two plots suggest quantile regression is superior because of a clear 
pattern of heteroscedasticity. OLS regression will, here, be misleading because it relies 
on the mean as a measure of centrality for the distribution. Instead of the mean, the 
median (which is the 50th percentile) or some other quantile could be a more 
appropriate reference for unknown parameters.  
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Figure 4.2: Plot of Inequality and Mobility by Quantile 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Notes: The black line is the fitted line from OLS; the rest are the 5 percentile, the 10 
percentile, the 25 percentile, the 75 percentile, the 90 percentile and the 95 percentile 
lines based on quantile regressions.  
Figure 4.3: Plot of Inequality and Volatility 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Notes: The black line is the fitted line from OLS; the rest are the 5 percentile, the 10 
percentile, the 25 percentile, the 75 percentile, the 90 percentile and the 95 percentile 
lines based on quantile regressions. 
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4.4.2 The quantile regression 
The general model for the interested relationship with respect to individual income 
inequality is expressed as follows: 
𝐼𝑇𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑀𝑀𝑖 ,𝑉𝑖),          (4.5) 
where i denotes individual {1,2, ... ,N}.Individual income inequality, IT, is the index of 
individual income inequality, MA is absolute mobility index and V is volatility. The 
unknown parameters will be estimated by quantile regression mainly based on the 
observation of descriptive analysis. We examine three periods of time: 1989-2009, 
1989-2000 and 2000-2009.  
Quantile regression is developed by Koenker and Bassett (1978) and is desired if 
conditional quantile functions are of interest. The general reason for such interest is 
that the ordinary least-squares regression models the relationship between one or more 
covariates X and the conditional mean of response variable Y given X=x. In contrast, 
quantile regression models the relationship between X and the conditional quantiles of 
Y given X=x. In this sense, one advantage of quantile regression is that the quantile 
regression estimates are more robust against outliers in the response measurements. 
This property is important in handling the data set due to no small amount of extreme 
values from the bottom and the top income distributions. In other words, the lower 
quantile and the upper quantile are always critical in income inequality analysis. 
Secondly, quantile regression has been proposed and used as a way to discover more 
useful predictive relationships between variables in cases where there is no relationship 
or only a weak relationship between the means of such variables. Thirdly, there is a 
significant difference between the mean of speed mobility and the median. 
Correspondingly, the conventional location shift model thus delivers a rather 
misleading impression of the speed mobility effect to inequality. Furthermore, quantile 
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regression is flexible in terms of allowing median regression when the quantile is 0.5. 
Finally, quantile regression is superior in dealing with unequal variations and handling 
data with heterogeneous conditional distribution. In these respects, this method is 
appropriate and will provide more complete and detailed information of the covariate 
effect. This approach follows Koenker and Bassett (1978) and Koenker and Hallock 
(2001). 
The base linear model is:  
𝐼𝑇𝑖 = 𝑿𝒊′𝛽𝜃 + 𝑒𝑖 with 𝑄𝑢𝑣𝑙𝑡𝜃(𝐼𝑇𝑖|𝑿𝒊) = 𝑿𝒊𝛽𝜃 ,      (4.6) 
where 𝐼𝑇𝑖  is a dependent variable and 𝑋𝑖  denotes a vector of repressors, 𝛽𝜃 
represents the vector of parameters to be estimated, and 𝑒𝑖  is a vector of 
residuals.𝑄𝑢𝑣𝑙𝑡𝜃(𝐼𝑇𝑖|𝑿𝒊)represents the 𝜃𝑡ℎ  conditional quantile of I𝑇𝑖  given 𝑿𝒊 . 
The 𝜃𝑡ℎ regression quantile solves the following problem: 
min
𝛽
 {�𝜃|𝐼𝑇𝑖 − 𝑿𝒊𝛽| + �(1 − 𝜃)𝑛
𝑖
𝑛
𝑖
|𝐼𝑇𝑖 − 𝑿𝒊𝛽|} ,           (4.7) 
This is generally written as: 
min
𝛽
�𝜌𝜃(𝑛
𝑖
𝐼𝑇𝑖 − 𝑿𝒊), 𝜃 ∈ (0,1)               (4.8) 
Eq. 4.8 can be solved by the linear programming technique where 𝜌𝜃(𝑒) is the check 
function defined as 𝜌𝜃(𝑒) = 𝜃𝑒  if 𝑒 ≥ 0 , or 𝜌𝜃(𝑒) = (𝜃 − 1)𝑒  if 𝑒 ≤ 0 . The 
median regression, which is a special case of the quantile regression, is obtained by 
setting 𝜃 = 0.5. Other quantiles of the conditional distribution can be obtained via 
variation. To convey a sense of the relationship of selected explanatory variables 
across the entire conditional room price distribution, the results for the 10th, 25th, 50th, 
75th and 90th quantiles are reported.  
In OLS, it allows estimating how, on average, mobility and volatility affect 
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income inequality and whether there is any significant relationship between mobility 
and inequality in the equation. In QR, it can go a further step forward; that is, it 
enables us to answer important questions of whether mobility influences inequality 
differently for individuals with a low income inequality than for those with a high one. 
In other words, it specifies changes in quantiles of the inequality. For example, a 
median regression (when quantile=0.5) of inequality on mobility specifies the changes 
in the median inequality as a function of the predictors. However, OLS is also used as 
supplementary information, aiming to see any difference in the effects between mean 
and median. The F-test is also used for testing the difference in parameters at different 
quantile regression, aiming to justify the use of quantile regression.  
There may be a potentially similar correlation between independent variables 
and the error term to Chapter 3, but the estimates do not show serious changes in the 
values of coefficient on endogenous variables when we control for the endogeneity 
between social inequality and income. Hence, the study concentrates on dealing with 
heteroscedasticity. For this purpose, the quantile regression is superior. Moreover, 
many studies on income inequality and income mobility draw conclusions merely 
according to descriptive analysis; Cunha et al. (2006) also support this view. 
4.5 Results and discussion 
Table 4.3 displays the estimates from OLS and quantile regression. There are three 
time periods in total: 1989-2009 covers all the examined waves; 2000-2009 concerns 
waves in the 2000s and includes four consecutive survey waves of 2000, 2004, 2006 
and 2009; and the last period of 1989-1997 focuses on the nineties, including waves of 
1989, 1991, 1993, 1997. The results display that the OLS estimates differ from QR 
estimates since the effects of mobility and volatility in OLS are very different from the 
estimates based on median (the 50th percentile). 
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Mobility is expected to have a positive and significant effect on income 
inequality across the three periods because it suggests income inequality can be offset 
by mobility. The estimates show that the coefficients of mobility between OLS and the 
quantile regressions agree with the expectation in Table 4.3. In addition, all coefficient 
estimates of mobility show an increasing positive trend from low percentile to high 
percentile across all three periods, suggesting that the higher the income inequality, the 
higher the mobility. In theory, higher mobility is expected in a longer income 
accounting period. Our results are also in agreement because the coefficients are larger 
in 2009-1989 than the other shorter periods of 2009-2000 and 1997-1989. Ding and 
Wang (2007) have the same demonstration with the CHNS data from 1989 to 2000. 
Shi et al. (2010) find the effect of mobility on inequality is 0.38 in the long term and 
0.48 in the short term. Additionally, our results show that the mobility in the 2000s is 
generally lower than in the 1990s. Liu et al. (2013) also show the mobility in the 2000s 
is lower than in the 1990s, while Yin et al. (2006) have opposite results with the CHIP 
data between 1991 and 2002 (see Table 4.4). Furthermore, mobility has increasing 
trends from the 5th percentile to 95th percentile across all three periods. The top of the 
income distribution has 8 times higher income movement than the bottom over the past 
two decades; meanwhile, the other two short periods have 3 times. At the same time, 
although the mean of mobility is higher with a longer income accounting time, the 
mobility does not emerge in the 5th percentile and the 10th percentile.   
Regarding volatility, this is expected to have a positive effect on income 
inequality because high income inequality is in the link with high variation of mobility. 
The results in Table 4.3 show that all coefficient estimates are significant and positive 
across the percentiles. Horizontally, the finding agrees with the expectation since all 
coefficient estimates of volatility have an upward trend from low percentile to high 
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percentile across three periods, suggesting that high income inequality is associated 
with high income volatility. Vertically, comparing all three periods of volatility, the 
mean of income volatility coefficients is greater in 2009-1989 than other two shorter 
periods. Nichols (2010) finds a simultaneous increase in trends between inequality and 
volatility with the CHNS data from 1989 to 2006.  
However, this message is not so clear in percentiles. High percentiles have lower 
coefficients in a longer income accounting time; for example, the coefficients in the 
95th percentile are 1.016 in 2009-1989, 2.285 in 2009-2000 and 3.093 in 1997-1989. 
Meanwhile, low percentiles have high coefficients in the longer period; for example, 
the coefficients in the 5th percentile are 1.012 in 2009-1989, 0.747 in 2009-2000 and 
0.745 in 1997-1989.  
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Table 4.3: Regression Results 
 
  OLS Q5% Q10% Q25% Q50% Q75% Q90% Q95% 
Period Variable Coef(S.E)  Coef(S.E) Coef(S.E) Coef(S.E) Coef(S.E) Coef(S.E) Coef(S.E) Coef(S.E) 
2009-1989 Intercept 0.051 
0.003 
7.802 
0.005 
7.866 
0.007 
8.067 
0.010 
8.482 
0.010 
9.057 
0.024 
9.594 
0.028 
9.898 
0.028 
 
Mobility 0.676 
0.040 
0.115 
0.047 
0.196 
0.059 
0.456 
0.077 
0.496 
0.077 
0.765 
0.012 
0.945 
0.052 
0.914 
0.050 
 
Volatility 1.038 
0.011 
1.012 
0.012 
1.017 
0.015 
1.034 
0.019 
1.050 
0.025 
1.124 
0.053 
1.072 
0.062 
1.016 
0.062 
2009-2000 Intercept -0.018 
0.001 
-0.013 
0.0002 
-0.012 
0.0004 
-0.011 
0.0003 
-0.010 
0.0006 
-0.009 
0.0005 
-0.005 
0.0004 
-0.002 
0.001 
 
Mobility 0.381 
0.003 
0.265 
0.012 
0.303 
0.167 
0.368 
0.013 
0.486 
0.015 
0.580 
0.015 
0.661 
0.011 
0.741 
0.027 
 
Volatility 0.990 
0.015 
0.747 
0.044 
0.836 
0.063 
1.045 
0.050 
1.435 
0.057 
1.720 
0.056 
1.988 
0.034 
2.285 
0.100 
1997-1989 Intercept -0.026 
0.001 
-0.012 
0.0002 
-0.012 
0.001 
-0.013 
0.001 
-0.016 
0.0005 
-0.017 
0.001 
-0.008 
0.001 
-0.004 
0.001 
 
Mobility 0.380 
0.004 
0.277 
0.014 
0.333 
0.016 
0.408 
0.012 
0.485 
0.017 
0.645 
0.027 
0.869 
0.026 
0.975 
0.036 
 
Volatility 0.926 
0.018 
0.745 
0.053 
0.926 
0.060 
1.162 
0.044 
1.137 
0.062 
01.186 
0.102 
1.702 
0.099 
3.093 
0.133 
Source: Author’s estimation.   
Notes: R^2 and F-statistics in OLS is 0.90 and 850, respectively. All coefficients are highly significant at 99% significance level.  
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Table 4.4: Summary of Previous Studies in China 
 
Author  Method  Data and Period Finding  
Shi et al. (2010) Transition matrices; 
Positional movement; 
Regression  
CHNS 
1989-2006 
Gini Mobility rank-based (S): 0.68(1989)-0.91(2006); 
Quantity mobility (β): 0.29(1989) – 0.15 (2006) 
Effect of mobility on inequality in 2006: 
Long-term income, 0.380; short-term income, 0.483. 
The poorest households were more mobile compared to the rich. 
Ding and Wang 
(2008) 
Movement measures CHNS 
1989-2000 
Mobility in the long-term is greater than that in the short term. 
 
Liu et al. (2013) Transition matrices; 
Positional movement 
Multiple survey 
resource 
1995-2008 
AQIR and AQMR: 
0.59– 1.39 (1995-2008); 0.54– 0.57 (1995-1999)-(2000-2003); 
0.39– 0.88 (1995-1999)-(2000-2008) 
The higher the rate of AQIR means the less the mobility. The higher the 
value of AQMR means the higher the mobility. 
Yin et al. (2006) Transition matrix; 
Positional movement 
and time independence 
CHIP:  
1991–1995 
1998–2002 
Income mobility in urban China is lower between 1998 and 2002 than that 
in the period from 1991 to1995.  
Khor and 
Pencavel (2006) 
Transition matrix and 
correlation coefficients 
CHIP,  
1990–1995 
The level of rank income mobility of individuals in urban China in the 
1990s was greater than that in the United States or other high-income 
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(time-independence) (The Chinese 
Household 
Income Project) 
countries, but the correlation coefficients between incomes in different years 
are lower in China than those in the United States, which suggests greater 
income mobility in China. 
China(1990-1995): 1.056 (AQMR); 0.334 (AQIR) and 0.541 (Correlation) 
USA (1993-1998): 0.624 (AQMR); 0.522 (AQIR) and 0.749 (Correlation)  
Wang (2007) Transition matrix; 
Positional movement 
CHNS 
1989–2000 
The degree of income mobility in rural China was found to be greater than 
that in urban, suburb, and town, but the rural households at the bottom 
would stay there during the next period with a slightly higher probability 
than average, while those at the top would remain there with an indeed 
lower probability. 
Sun et al. (2007) Transition matrix; 
Positional movement 
Ministry of 
Agriculture PR 
China 
1986–2001 
Income mobility among rural households increased initially during the study 
period and then maintained stability, meaning that dynamic inequality is 
signiﬁcantly smaller than static inequality; and that compared to the urban 
areas, income mobility in the rural area was higher during 1991–2001. 
Zhang et al. (2007) Transition matrix; 
Positional movement 
Ministry of 
Agriculture PR 
China 
1987–2002 
Income mobility increasingly contributed to income inequality, but the 
possibility of the poorest households climbing the higher income status 
increased, while the upward mobility of those of the middle-income has 
gradually become stagnant. 
Source: This table is based on Shi et al. (2010) and updated by the author. 
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Table 4.5 shows the F-test for coefficient difference across quantile. F-statistics 
are very large and p-values are close to zero at 1% significance level. This confirms 
that quantile regression is appropriate and there is heterogeneity among the levels of 
inequality.  
Table 4.5: Homogeneity Test for Parameters by Quantile 
 
Period  Tau  F-statistics p-value  
2009-1989 All  876.98 < 2.2e-16 *** 
 
0.95-0.05 2001.2 < 2.2e-16 *** 
 
0.90-0.10 3710.5 < 2.2e-16 *** 
 
0.75-0.25 2270.4 < 2.2e-16 *** 
2000-1989 All  2214.7 < 2.2e-16 *** 
 
0.95-0.05 2345.8 < 2.2e-16 *** 
 
0.90-0.10 11371.0 < 2.2e-16 *** 
 
0.75-0.25 1132.9 < 2.2e-16 *** 
1997-1989 All  573.89 < 2.2e-16 *** 
 
0.95-0.05 1173.4 < 2.2e-16 *** 
 
0.90-0.10 1205.3 < 2.2e-16 *** 
 
0.75-0.25 1502.8 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Source: author’s estimation using the CHNS data. 
Notes: “All” is the tau in { 0.05, 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.90, 0.95 } and *** denotes 
statistical significance at 1% level. 
 
Taking all the statistical evidence of mobility and volatility into account, two 
keys lead to the rising income inequality in China. One is income volatility and 
another is unequal opportunity over the years, especially, the mobility is low in low 
income individuals. In fact, the mobility has increased substantially across observed 
percentiles over time. The empirical evidence implies that it is true that the robust 
growing economy has been enhancing the economic opportunity over the period of 
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time. This opportunity liberates more economic freedom as well as offers more jobs to 
individuals and allows them to pursue more self-interest, and this ultimately leads to 
higher living standards. The problem is the coexistent volatility from the same 
economy that exposes the insecurity of the individual’s income position. This 
information demonstrates that: 1) China’s economy is experiencing high absolute 
mobility while high volatility so that the income gap keeps widening; 2) income 
insecurity and unequal opportunity are the crux of the matters to resolve the 
contradiction of income inequality.  
In fact, there has been increasing attention on economic security since the 
mid-1990s, followed by many policy instruments and mechanisms introduced to 
address the issue while maintaining robust economic growth (Zhengyi, 2004). 
However, our empirical evidence implicitly releases that these instruments and 
mechanisms are likely not efficient due to economic insecurity having been 
aggravated. Secondly, a new plan, entitled The Income Inequality Reform Plan,37 was 
issued by the State Council in February 2013. The plan lists 35 points for deepening 
the reform of the income distribution system. Salidjanova (2013) highlights the 
35-points into eight dimensions: Double Personal Income by 2020 and Raise 
Minimum Wage, Interest Rate Liberalization; State-Owned Enterprise Dividend 
Payments; Restrictions on Government Officials’ Income; Tax Reforms; Land Rights; 
Residence Permit System; Social Safety Net. The focal point of the plan is still 
                                                        
37 State Council, “关于深化收入分配制度改革的若干意见” (“Several Opinions on 
Deepening the Reform of the Income Distribution System”), February 3, 2013. 
Available: [http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-02/05/content_2327531.htm]. Accessed on 
10 September 2013.   
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grounded heavily in the pursuit of economic growth through increasing household 
consumption but also a substantial amount of attention on ensuring economic security. 
This is in accordance with the suggestive evidence in our study. Yet, considering the 
history of policy implementation, relieving the exasperated high level of income 
inequality may not be optimistic in the short- and median- terms.  
4.6 Conclusion 
The present chapter was designed to explore the effects of income mobility and 
volatility on the uncertainty of income inequality. By doing so, this study has 
reviewed the concept of mobility and its related aspect of volatility, previous studies 
on the link between mobility and inequality, and further discussed the importance of 
incorporation with mobility and volatility. We should note the limited studies in this 
research area in the case of China, and that the CHNS data from 1989 to 2009 is used 
for the investigation with quantile regression.   
The literature review suggests that economic opportunity is the key to income 
inequality and mobility is an appropriate concept to measure opportunity. The 
traditional postulation between mobility and inequality is a positive relation. In this 
way, mobility can offset inequality. In addition, simultaneously looking at the related 
concept of volatility is desired because the fluctuation of income movement may 
affect well-being. This volatility is used to present income security. The research area 
of these three dimensions is rather limited in China, according to Zhang (2007), Chen 
and Zhang (2009) and Nichols (2010). 
The findings show that income mobility and volatility have a significant 
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positive effect on income inequality. The empirical evidence agrees with theoretical 
expectation that mobility offsets income inequality, and contributes additional 
information that China is experiencing high mobility and high volatility. In particular, 
income insecurity and unequal opportunity are the crucial drivers for the rising 
income inequality, and should be treated as vital factors. Hence, progressive policies 
are needed to assuage inequality pressures to assist low income individual for more 
opportunity and ameliorate income instability through, for example, job security, 
social security and the uneven labour markets, but implementation remains crucial.  
The current examination was limited by the data, which has the major drawback 
of a lack of representation of the whole population in China since individuals are not 
randomly sampled from all provinces.  
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CHAPTER 5 Implications of Residential Electricity Pricing: 
 A Case Study of Social Efforts 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous two empirical chapters emphasize the importance of interaction between 
self-interest and social influence in income differences across individuals. That is, 
income return depends not only on self efforts, but also on sufficient and equal 
opportunity and help from society. However, in some circumstances such as the 
highlighted electricity usage among Chinese residential energy consumption in 
Chapter 2, even if households expend their efforts, they make little or no progress to 
save such energy to cope with life burdens by themselves. The reasons are that: 1) 
there is rare replacement for electrical appliances; 2) there are no other options for 
residential electricity suppliers under a monopoly; and 3) tight budget constraints 
already occur in low-income households. In other words, price plays the most vital 
role and the price of power has a perceptible effect. It is no surprise that electricity 
pricing has always been treated as a channel to lighten income inequality by the 
central government. Hence, this chapter evaluates the role of residential electricity 
pricing for living standards and whether the new residential electricity pricing system 
can achieve such a goal.              
The proposal for restructuring the electricity pricing system in the household 
sector has sparked ‘hot’ debates in the Chinese society since October 2010. These 
debates are mainly concerned with two questions. First, was the effect of the proposed 
rise in retail electricity price different across residents? Second, was the proposed 
pricing system fair for households with different income levels? The government 
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believed that the proposed rise in electricity prices was necessary, and the increase 
was reasonable. Hence, it would not have a negative impact on residents’ daily life. In 
contrast, many residents argued the pricing scheme did not appropriately address 
income inequality across regions and households and if carried out as planned, it 
would increase the burden on some households. After receiving a wide range of 
opinions and suggestions, the proposal was modified and announced by the 
government as ‘Multistep Electricity Price’ in July 2012. This study attempts to 
evaluate the reform in the pricing system by providing robust empirical evidence by 
investigating the pre-reform price and income elasticity of household demand for 
electricity across regions and income levels in China.  
Existing literature on the issue is limited and primarily focuses on the impact of 
electricity demand on economic growth at aggregate country level. Such information 
is inappropriate for judging the effect of the current residential pricing on the demand 
for electricity in China. One reason is that aggregate estimates are not suitable for 
explaining the consumption of electricity in different groups of households. From a 
social and economic perspective, the electricity sector provides for the daily necessity 
of 1.3 billion people in China. Financial returns should not be the only consideration 
for electricity pricing; the households’ ability to cope with the cost of living should 
also be considered. Even though Chinese economic growth has been impressive in the 
past three decades, the inequality of income distribution has also widened 
significantly. A second reason challenging previous results is that compared with 
developed countries, the supply of electricity is less reliable in developing countries, 
including China. This is due mainly to the problem of supply shortages, grid 
performance, wiring deficiencies and other technical issues. Previous studies on 
electricity pricing in China all assumed that supply of electricity was sufficient and 
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reliable, which is unrealistic, despite the improvements made in recent years. Hence, 
there is a need to control for supply reliability in the analysis. 
Given the debates in the society and lack of appropriate studies in the literature, 
this paper aims to investigate the price and income elasticity of household demand for 
electricity by multidimensional household average income levels in China. The paper 
assesses residents’ responsiveness to changes in electricity price and their income, 
while controlling for several other factors affecting demand commonly used in the 
literature. These are the price of residential pipeline natural gas, weather, and 
electricity supply reliability. The main contribution of the paper is two-fold. First, we 
provide robust empirical evidence for China by employing good quality panel data for 
29 provinces over a fourteen-year period from 1998 to 2011 and applying feasible 
generalized least squares estimator. Second, we explicitly incorporate the electricity 
supply reliability effect into the analysis.  
The results, on the whole, provide evidence of highly statistically significant 
residential electricity price elasticities of less than one, and income elasticities of 
demand larger than one. The empirical results reveal that disposable income 
substantially impacts on demand, and there is important heterogeneity in the 
responsiveness to electricity price changes according to household income levels. 
Poorer households are more sensitive to changes in electricity prices than richer urban 
households. We therefore argue that the current electricity pricing system might have 
underestimated the impact of changes in electricity price on some households, 
especially in low-income inland provinces.  
Next in the paper, the residential electricity market and its pricing system are 
discussed, followed by a review of the literature. We then discuss theoretical 
considerations, data and estimation methodology. Empirical results are reported and 
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policy implications of the findings are discussed, followed by a conclusion.  
5.2 Residential electricity pricing system in China 
5.2.1 Evolution of residential electricity prices 
In the 1950s, each electricity supply company in China had its own right to 
independent pricing. There were many different electricity pricing forms. Even the 
National Planning Commission (NPC) was not able to discover and control the whole 
situation. Some regions allowed using grain in exchange for electricity. For example, 
per unit residential electricity usage was measured by 1 kilogram of millet in Baotou 
region in 1950. In the following year, the usage of grain was replaced by currency, 
approximately equating to 0.22 RMB (Renminbi) per unit (kilowatt hour, kWh) (see 
Inner Mongolia Electric Power Company, 1998). 
In 1960, the central government introduced a unified management principle for 
electricity prices and the state started to regulate them. The NPC and the Ministry of 
Water Resources and Electric Power jointly issued the national electricity price 
catalogue (see Centre for Industrial Energy Efficiency, 2009). This is the first time 
that China had an electricity price catalogue (see Centre for Industrial Energy 
Efficiency, 2009) for different regions. Electricity enterprises had to implement these 
retail prices to residents and to the industrial and commercial sectors. For instance, 
the residential electricity price was approximately 0.29 RMB per unit in Guangxi 
province in 1960,38 while it was 0.22 RMB per unit39 in Hubei province. The retail 
electricity prices were highly centralized and fairly stable in many areas until the 
1990s. Most of the prices were between 0.20 RMB to 0.30 RMB per unit. 
                                                        
38 The Local Chronicles of Guangxi Province: Electricity Industry Volume, 1992, 
China Water Power Press. 
39 The Local Chronicles of Wuhan City from 1980 to 2000: Electricity Industry 
Volume, Wuhan University Press. 
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Table 5.1: Province Official Residential Electricity Prices and Retail Residential 
Prices of Pipeline Natural Gas in 2011 
 
Province  REP GP Province  REP GP 
Anhui 0.558 2.114 Jiangxi  0.600 4.048 
Beijing 0.481 1.830 Jilin 0.520 2.054 
Chongqing 0.515 1.536 Liaoning 0.495 2.083 
Fujian 0.518 3.404 Ningxia 0.449 1.280 
Gansu 0.510 1.295 Qinghai 0.443 1.161 
Guangdong 0.610 3.698 Shaanxi  0.498 1.786 
Guangxi 0.526 4.503 Shandong 0.493 2.003 
Guizhou 0.451 3.304 Shanghai 0.615 2.232 
Hainan 0.598 2.321 Shanxi 0.462 1.446 
Hebei 0.495 2.161 Sichuan 0.520 1.516 
Heilongjiang 0.505 1.682 Tianjin 0.485 1.964 
Henan 0.503 1.696 Xinjiang 0.474 1.390 
Hubei 0.567 2.088 Yunnan  0.421 4.563 
Hunan 0.581 2.304 Zhejiang 0.553 2.920 
Jiangsu  0.523 1.964 Average 0.516 2.288 
Source: Author’s selection based on local electricity supply agents.  
Notes: REP denotes residential electricity price taken from electricity supply 
enterprises at province level. RMB per unit (kWh). GP denotes the price of 
pipeline natural gas taken from the China Price Information network. RMB per 
cubic metre. 1 cubic metre of natural gas is approximately equivalent to 11 kWh.   
 
Residential electricity prices underwent numerous adjustments and increases 
from 1997 until 2005. Subsequently, the retail prices have not changed much. Table 
5.1 shows retail residential electricity prices in 2011. The highest price is 0.615 RMB 
per unit in Shanghai, while the lowest is in Yunnan, 0.421 RMB per unit. The average 
price in the country is 0.516 RMB per unit. Despite the massive investment in the 
electricity industry and the rapid increase in income, the level of the official 
residential electricity prices seems to have remained at a fairly low level. Considering 
pipeline natural gas as a substitute energy source, its prices at the provincial and 
national levels look higher than electricity prices, but 1.00 RMB per cubic metre of 
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natural gas is approximately equivalent to 0.091 RMB per kWh of electric power. 
Compared with other countries, the average residential electricity price in China also 
appears low, but as a proportion of income it is one of the highest (see Table 5.2).  
Table 5.2: Comparison of International Average Residential Electricity Prices in 
2011 
Country Price  
 
(cents per kWh) 
Income  
per capita 
(U.S dollar) 
Ratio  
of price and income  
(per 1000 kWh) 
China 8.3 5,417 1.534 
Germany 32.5 44,111 0.737 
France 17.7 44,007 0.402 
Italy 25.8 36,267 0.711 
Japan 17.6 45,870 0.383 
Poland 18.9 13,469 1.403 
Romania 13.9 8,875 1.566 
South Korea 8.9 22,424 0.397 
Turkey 15.7 10,363 1.515 
United Kingdom 18.4 38,811 0.474 
USA 11.9 48,387 0.245 
Source: Eurostat (2011), US Energy Information Administration (2011), 
International Monetary Fund (2010-2011).  
Notes: The prices for Japan and South Korea are for 2008. 
 
5.2.2 Urban and rural residential electricity prices 
According to the pricing policy in China, there has been no distinction between urban 
and rural residential prices, but one price for all residents. In practice, however, the 
price for rural residents was much higher than for those urban residents in the 1990s. 
This was mainly due to arbitrary charges to rural residents. It was common for the 
average price charged to rural end-users to be much higher than that to urban users. 
According to Dang (2000), the actual residential electricity price was 1.50 RMB per 
unit in most rural areas; in a few places it was even 5.00 RMB per unit. The average 
residential price in urban areas was approximately 0.40 RMB only per unit in 1998. 
To reduce the burden on farmers and rural end-users, the National Development 
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and Planning Commission (NDPC) and the State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC) 
issued two urgent telegrams to the electricity supply sector in 1998 (NDPC, document 
39 and SGCC, document 02). Since then, the arbitrary charges were gradually 
ameliorated. At the same time, arguably, the Asian financial crisis led to electricity 
surplus. This crisis opened up an opportunity to address the problems. In the same 
year, the State Council (document 134, 1998) formulated six large-scale infrastructure 
projects to expand domestic demand and stimulate economic growth. Rural electricity 
network development and improvement was one of these projects. The project aimed 
to reform the management system and standardize management to develop and 
improve the rural distribution network and to facilitate the power supply cost 
reduction and alleviate end-users’ burdens. The expected outcomes were ultimately to 
merge urban and rural distribution networks and to achieve a uniform residential 
electricity price for all urban and rural areas. This project was popularly called “Two 
Changes and One Price”. According to the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC),40 the majority of provinces had achieved one price for urban 
and rural areas by 2003.  
5.2.3 Residential electricity pricing system reform 
In recent decades, the electricity sector in China has been through several key stages 
of reform aimed at the creation of competitive power markets. One critical step was 
to dismantle the State Power Corporation in 2002 into five state-owned power groups 
(the Big Five) and the State Grid Corporation as the central government aimed to end 
the monopoly in the power generation industry. These six organizations and numerous 
                                                        
40 National Development and Reform Commission (n.d.) Most provinces achieved 
one price. Available: http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xwfb/t20000630_27822.htm, [Accessed 
01/2011].  
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province branch companies together manage the power supply market. The pricing is 
influenced by a bargaining process between the industry oligarchs and the 
administrative control represented by the NDPC.   
Along with the reform in 2002, the State Council also launched “Electricity 
Pricing System Reform Scheme” (document 62, 2003) in the following year, and the 
price reform was a key component of the power sector reform. The ultimate aim of 
the scheme was to allow end-users a free choice of electricity supplier and to enjoy an 
equilibrium price in the electricity market. 
Even though the price reform was meant to be a core issue of the whole power 
sector reform, there were complications and difficulties. The scheme had not in fact 
been fully implemented. The residential electricity pricing system remained largely 
unchanged up to then. However, fuel market prices increased rapidly from the early 
2000s and power enterprises strongly criticized the inadequate residential pricing 
system. The reason for the criticism was that the residential sector had been adopting 
a single electricity pricing policy. The single pricing policy means that a household is 
charged a single electricity price regardless of the total amount of electricity usage. In 
addition, the enterprises insisted on increasing residential electricity prices because 
they were much lower than the prices in the industrial sector and the average 
electricity price in the country. Furthermore, residential electricity prices had been 
lagging behind coal and gas prices. It was therefore not possible for the electricity 
industry to cover its costs. Hence, electricity pricing reform for the residential sector 
had been on the top of the agenda from the late 2000s.  
On the basis of the domestic and international situation, the NDRC announced a 
draft proposal for implementing a new pricing system to replace the single price 
system for residential customers on 9th October 2010. The draft proposal aimed at 
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introducing an increasing block tariff. The proposed increasing block tariff envisaged 
monthly electricity consumption to be divided into three categories and charges on 
electricity consumption to be progressively increasing based on the amount of 
electricity usage. The NDRC believed that the new tariff would improve the whole 
pricing system. It was also expected to address the problem of electricity shortage and 
high fuel prices. Furthermore, it was planned gradually to align the pre-reform (low) 
single residential electricity price to a rational and reasonable pricing system. The 
tariff was also expected to encourage reduction in electricity consumption and the 
associated pollution.  
However, the benefits of the new tariff had not been convincing for many 
households and had attracted widespread repercussion, criticism and fear amongst 
residential customers who are mainly subject to income disparity.41 Despite the 
public disapproval, according to the NDRC statistics, from a total of 21,794 
comments, 61% showed support, while only 34.5% showed opposition. It was also 
argued that the draft proposal did not envisage a significant increase in electricity 
price and for 70% to 80% of households, the electricity bill would remain unchanged. 
In July 2012, the NDRC modified the draft by increasing the rate of unaffected 
consumers from the initial 70%-80% to 80%-90% across provinces and regions.  
5.3 Literature review 
In the consumer behaviour theory, a measure of a household’s demand sensitivity is 
its responsiveness to changes in prices, holding other factors constant. Households 
react to changes in the electricity price by adjusting their electricity demand. As price 
hikes, households reduce the amount used, whereas when price falls the household 
                                                        
41 It is generally accepted that there is high level of income inequality in China. For 
example, a study by Song et al. (2009). 
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response is the opposite. This responsiveness of households to price changes is 
characterized by “price elasticity of demand” in the consumer behaviour theory. In the 
demand elasticity context, the theory not only suggests how sensitive the demand for 
electricity is to changes in the price of electricity, but also to changes in the price of 
related energy sources and to changes in income. A number of previous studies adopt 
this basic economic framework to conduct their analysis. 
5.3.1 The gap in the domestic studies  
Several early studies investigated the relationship between Chinese electricity 
consumption, prices and output within macroeconomic or regional frameworks. Lin 
(2003) discusses the variation of electricity prices across the country and concludes 
that the available electricity prices are not adequate to examine the relationship 
between electricity consumption and economic output at national level. Therefore, the 
study adopts time series data from 1978 to 2001 for the price of coal as a proxy for 
the electricity price. The estimated price elasticity is unusually low, only 0.016. A 
study by Lam (2004) concludes that the average electricity prices are below the 
average total costs and highly subsidized as the author investigated the determinants 
of the average electricity price for 26 provinces with cross-section data for 1998. Xu 
and Chen (2006) point out that one of the most serious problems with the electricity 
price is that it does not reflect the true relationship between supply and demand. 
Similarly, Zhang and Heller (2007) describe the electricity demand and supply 
relationship as based on planned allocation by the government, and conclude that 
tariffs have little relation with the real cost of supplying power or demand. 
He et al. (2011) examine the demand price elasticity for several sectors: 
residential, agricultural, industrial, and commercial. The study adopts a computable 
general equilibrium model with cross-section data for 2007. In terms of the residential 
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sector, the study concludes that the price elasticity is only -0.3, which indicates that 
residents are not sensitive to change in electricity prices across the nation. However, 
one underlying assumption of the He et al. (2011) study is that there are no 
constraints to the electricity power supply, which is the unlikely case in China. Zhao 
et al. (2012) conducted an investigation on the impact of electricity policies on 
electricity generation efficiency with regional data and pooled regressions. The study 
considers average price effect measured as the ratio of revenue and quantity of 
electricity sold over the period 1993-2007. 
There are two concerns regarding the previous studies. First, it may be true that 
the average electricity price is low given the massive and ongoing investment in the 
electricity industry. However, the existing studies are not adequate to reveal the effect 
of prices and the proposed alternative electricity pricing system on the demand for 
electricity in the household sector. The primary reason is that national-level 
information is not suitable for explaining consumption of electricity by different 
groups of households. Furthermore, from an econometric point of view, shortcomings 
stem from problems with data used for analysis, the specifications selected for the 
estimating equations, or sometimes from the variables used. Apart from these aspects, 
previous studies also do not focus on the consequences of varying household income 
levels even though it is generally accepted that there are large income disparities 
between regions and rural and urban areas. Therefore, the existing econometric 
estimates do not provide sufficient information about the pricing reform effects on 
households. Besides, although the generation and supply of electricity in China has 
significantly improved, the reliability of supply is still in doubt. According to the 
Electricity Power Reliability Management Centre (2011), the average interruption 
hours per customer (AIHC-1) was 7.01 hours per household across the nation. The 
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rural supply system performance is much poorer than the urban one; the AIHC-1 was 
18.43 hours per rural household in 2011. With this in mind, there is thus a need to 
control for the reliability factor when examining price elasticity of electricity demand.  
5.3.2 The international literature 
Many theoretical and empirical studies on the price and income elasticity of 
residential electricity demand have been carried out in an international context. Early 
studies were conducted by Houthakker (1951) and Fisher and Kaysen (1962).42 
These studies obtained varying results depending on the variables used. Houthakker 
(1951) carried out a pioneering cross-sectoral study of electricity demand in the UK. 
He assumed the presence of stable demand function and showed the demand for 
electricity as being quite sensitive to both changes in price and income. Fisher and 
Kaysen (1962) used time series data from 1946 to 1957 for 47 states in the USA. 
They added extra non-economic variables such as the utilization rates of appliance 
stocks. In the short run, the findings of Fisher and Kaysen (1962) agree with 
Houthakker’s (1951) study in that the demand of residential electricity mainly 
depends on price and income. In the long run, Fisher and Kaysen conclude that 
non-economic variables are the primary determinants of residential electricity 
demand, while electricity price has a lesser impact on demand.  
However, the measurement of appliance stocks is difficult; Fisher and Kaysen 
(1962) pointed out that the quality of their data ranged “…from somewhat below the 
sublime to a bit above the ridiculous…” and that “…no results can be better than the 
data on which they are based” (p.27). Wills (1977) stated that lack of adequate data 
for these stocks have usually precluded their use in empirical work while he 
                                                        
42 See Athukrala and Wilson (2010), Filippini and Pachauri (2004), Halicioglu (2007), 
Holtedahl and Joutz (2004), Nakajima and Hamori (2010), Sa’ad (2009), Narayan et 
al. (2007), Narayan and Smyth (2005), and Nakajima (2010). 
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examined a cross-section data of 77 cities in the USA. Subsequently, Wills (1977) 
revealed that a high quality of measurement on the stocks is necessary; otherwise, the 
long run analysis is hampered. Although the appliance stock is a determinant of the 
demand for electricity, to obtain a high quality data is still problematic to date. 
Therefore, recent studies exclude appliance stock from the analysis.43 Given data 
limitations, some studies use income as a proxy for appliance stock.  
Recently, the interest in empirical studies of residential electricity demand has 
increased. This is mainly due to the tendency of global electricity sectors becoming 
more competitive and deregulated. Furthermore, knowledge of the determinants of 
residential electricity demand and its accurate forecasting are relevant for assessing 
proposals to revise electricity rates and for predicting the residential electricity 
demand. Larsen and Nesbakken (2004) and Narayan and Smyth (2005) investigated 
the determinants of the demand for residential electricity. Their economic model 
states that residential electricity demand is a function of its own price, the price of 
substitute sources of energy, real income, prices of household appliances as well as 
other variables which might influence household preferences.  
 
                                                        
43 See the relevant summary of previous studies by Narayan and Smyth (2005). 
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Table 5.3: International Studies of Residential Electricity Demand 
 
Country  Author   Data period  Variables  Income elasticity  Own  price 
elasticity  
Estimation  
technique or framework 
India  Filippini and 
Pachauri 
(2004) 
Survey data: 
1993-1994 
3,000 
households  
REC; Electricity price; 
Kerosene price; LPG price; 
Personal income; Covered 
area of the welling square 
feet. 
0.60-0.64 across 
all three seasons 
-0.42 winter  
-0.29 summer  
Cross-section data 
techniques 
Turkey  Halicioglu 
(2007) 
Time-series:  
 
1968-2000 
Per capita REC; The real 
income; The real residential 
electricity price; The 
urbanization rate. 
Long run: 
0.70  
Long run: 
-0.52 
The bounds testing 
procedure to cointegration 
South 
Korea 
Sa’ad (2009) Time-series: 
 
1973-2007 
Household disposable 
income; The real electricity 
prices; Structural factors. 
Long run: 
1.33 
Long run: 
-0.23 
Structural time series model  
USA Nakajima and 
Hamori 
(2010) 
Panel data: 
48 states 
1993-2008 
REC; The real person 
income; The real price of 
electricity; HDD and CDD. 
48 states:  
0.38 (1993-2000) 
0.85 (2001-2008) 
Long run: 
-0.33 (1993-2000) 
-0.14 (2001-2008) 
Panel cointegration test  
Australia Narayan and 
Smyth 
(2005) 
Time-series:  
 
1969-2000 
Per capita REC; The real 
income; HDD+CDD; The 
real price of gas; The real 
electricity price. 
Long run: 
0.323-0.408 
Short run: 
0.0121-0.0415 
Long run: 
-0.541 
Short run: 
-0.263 
The bounds testing 
procedure to cointegration 
USA Dergiades 
and 
Tsoulfidis 
(2008) 
Time-series: 
 
1965-2006 
Per capita REC; The real 
capita income; The real 
average residential price of 
electricity; HDD+CDD; The 
average price of oil; The 
Long run: 
0.273 
Short run: 
0.101 
Long run: 
-1.0652 
Short run: 
-0.386 
The ARDL bounds testing 
procedure to cointegration 
 140 
 
stock of housing. 
Sri 
Lanka 
Athukorala 
and Wilson 
(2009) 
Time-series: 
 
1960-2007 
Per capita REC; The real per 
capita GDP; The average real 
price of electricity; The 
average real prices of 
kerosene oil; The average real 
prices of LP gas. 
Long run: 
0.78 
 
Short run: 
0.32 
Long run: 
-0.62 
 
Short run: 
-0.16 
Cointegration and 
error-models developed by  
Japan  Nakajima 
(2010) 
Panel data: 
46 
prefectures 
1975-2000 
The per household REC; The 
real disposable income per 
household; The real unit price 
of the residential electricity. 
Long run: 
0.602 
Long run: 
-1.127 
Panel unit root tests; Panel 
cointegration tests; 
Johansen-Fisher-type 
cointegration test 
Taiwan Holtedahl 
and Joutz 
(2004) 
Time-series: 
 
1955-1995 
Per capita REC; The real 
electricity price; The 
percentage of the population 
living in cities; The real 
disposable per capita income; 
The real world oil price; 
HDD and CDD. 
Long run: 
1.04 
 
Short run:  
0.23 
Long run: 
-0.16 
 
Short run: 
-0.15 
The general-to-specific 
modelling approach  
Engle and Granger method  
G7: Narayan, 
Smyth and 
Prasad 
(2007) 
Panel data: 
 
1978 -2003 
Per capita REC; The real 
income per capita; The real 
price of natural gas; The real 
residential electricity price. 
Long run: 
0.3119 
Short run: 
Insignificant  
Long run: 
-1.4502 
Short run: 
Insignificant   
Panel OLS; Panel DOLS 
Panel unit root test; Panel 
cointegration 
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Table 5.3 illustrates the most recent studies that have estimated the income and 
price effects on residential electricity demand with various econometric techniques in 
different countries. On the whole, the results for income and price elasticity are 
consistent with the theory. Income elasticities are positive, and own-price elasticities 
are negative. In terms of variables used, all studies use residential electricity 
consumption as an indicator for electricity demand. The most popular independent 
variables are mainly economic factors such as electricity price, substitute energy 
price(s) and household income. Features of dwellings appear in several studies such 
as the size of dwelling, stock of appliances and the outdoor temperature, among 
which the outdoor temperature is the most frequently used in recent studies.   
A study by Nakajima (2010) for Japan shows that own price elasticity is greater 
than 1; demand in Japan is price elastic. Similarly, Narayan et al. (2007) provide 
panel data results for G7 developed economies that indicate residential demand for 
electricity in the long run is price elastic, 1.45; and income inelastic, 0.31. Overall, 
existing studies demonstrate that in developed economies, electricity demand is 
generally price elastic in the long run as the estimates are above 1. In contrast, in 
developing countries such as India, Turkey, Sri Lanka, Taiwan and South Korea 
demand is own-price inelastic in the long run. These price elasticities of demand are 
from 0.15 to 0.39. In terms of income elasticity, only Taiwan and South Korea show 
elasticities greater than 1.  
Three issues arise in the literature based on the findings of the international 
empirical studies. First, the conventional wisdom is that those households with higher 
incomes are less sensitive to energy prices than households with medium to low 
incomes. Accordingly, households in developed economies should react less to the 
changes in electricity prices than households in developing countries. However, there 
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is opposing evidence in the literature for the long run. The reason is likely to be 
developing countries tightly regulate their markets, leading to artificially low price 
electricity in residential sectors. Second, regarding the stock of appliances, demand 
for electricity is derived from the flow of services provided by the household’s 
durable energy-using appliances. The use of these household appliances is related to 
the construction features of dwellings, for example, space heating and cooling, 
lighting, the number of people in the household as well as the outdoor temperature. 
However, it is likely that there is a high correlation between stock of appliances and 
income in developing countries since households will purchase more appliances when 
they have a higher income to improve the quality of living. The high correlation 
makes it difficult to estimate accurately the effect of each variable on the demand for 
residential electricity. Therefore, there is an argument that the stock of appliances 
should be omitted from specifications in developing countries or instrumented with 
appliance prices. Third, there has not been much work done on the effect of electricity 
supply reliability in developing countries where intermittent interruptions to supply 
are common place. Thus, capturing this effect in examining electricity pricing is 
indispensable. One of the contributions of this study is to extend the existing literature 
on the Chinese residential electricity issues by introducing a technical index of 
electricity supply reliability as a controlling factor. 
5.4 Theoretical considerations, data and estimation methodology 
5.4.1 The demand model 
As discussed in the literature review, the majority of previous empirical studies relies 
on the consumer behaviour theory and develops empirical demand models for 
analyzing residential electricity consumption. A standard model represents residential 
electricity demand as a function of own price, the prices of substitute sources of 
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energy, income, prices of household appliances, stock of housing and temperature.44 
In setting up our model, we point to the fact that electricity utilities are typically 
natural monopolies in all different contexts so that the standard residential electricity 
demand model developed for Western economies is largely applicable to developing 
countries as well (see also Table 3). Even if we accepted that the market structure 
differs in terms of the degree of competition between developed and developing 
countries, the relatively higher degree of competition in the West would permit 
end-customers to have more choice in electricity power suppliers. This in turn should 
means lower prices and better services from suppliers. Yet, the majority of 
end-customers have less/or no choice in developing countries, but they often benefit 
from monopoly or oligopoly in these countries due to the strict regulation and control 
of utilities by government. That is the reason why electricity retail prices are often 
artificially low despite the high generation and distribution costs in developing 
countries. In this respect, the role of market players may not be particularly 
significant, but rather common factors in the standard model. For example, Kirschen 
(2003) points out that the introduction of competition in the electricity retail market 
has not been very successful even in California. 
Many studies fall well short of the ideal empirical specification because of data 
constraints. Therefore, Narayan and Smyth (2005) suggest a parsimonious demand 
model including own price, prices of substitute energy, income, and temperature. This 
suggestion implicitly assumes a non-binding supply of electricity which is appropriate 
in developed economies. However, a sufficient and consistent supply of electricity is 
not the case in developing countries such as China. Therefore, we extend the general 
model in the panel setting as follows; 
                                                        
44 This view is also supported by Hartman and Werth (1981); Reiss and White (2002); 
Acton et al. (1976). 
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𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡,𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡,𝑌𝑖𝑡,𝑀𝑖𝑡,𝑊𝑖𝑡,𝑈𝑖𝑡), 𝑖 = 1 …𝑁, 𝑡 = 1 … 𝑇.  (5.1) 
where D denotes the residential electricity consumption per capita (kWh), i denotes 
cross-sectional unit and t stands for time period. EP represents the real retail 
residential electricity price (RMB per kWh). GP denotes the real price of natural gas 
(RMB per cubic metre). Y is the real annual household disposable income per capita 
(RMB) that is also used as a proxy for the household electric appliances and 
household characteristics. Income is calculated for three groups of households: 
average national income (YA), urban household income (YU) and rural household 
income (YR). R denotes electricity supply reliability and its corresponding indicator is 
the average interruption hours per customer (AIHC-1). W captures weather conditions 
and is calculated as a sum of the total number of heating degree days and cooling 
degree days. U depicts a set of unobservable factors in a panel data setting.  
Equation (1) can be further modified following Beenstock et al. (1999) by 
expressing it in a relative price form. This is the most common specification in the 
literature (Narayan and Smyth, 2005): 
𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡/𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡,𝑌𝑖𝑡,𝑀𝑖𝑡,𝑊𝑖𝑡,𝑈𝑖𝑡),  𝑖 = 1 …𝑁, 𝑡 = 1 …𝑇.            (5.2) 
5.4.2 Data and variables 
Residential electricity demand 
Residential electricity consumption (REC) has been sharply increasing in the past 
three decades in China. For instance, REC was 480.8 billion kWh in 1990, while total 
REC increased to 4,396.1 billion kWh in 2008 (China Statistical Yearbook, 2010), a 
nine times increase. The REC share of total electricity consumption was 
approximately 12%, which is much lower than industrial electricity consumption 
(80%) in 2008. Nevertheless, REC represents the second largest share of total 
electricity consumption and it directly affects more than a billion people’s living 
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standards in China. We use annual REC per capita as demand indicator. Data are 
mainly from the China Energy Statistical Yearbook from 1999 to 2012. Figure 5.1 
shows that the residential electricity consumption per capita increases over the period 
and that the spread of electricity consumption varies substantially across coastal and 
inland provinces. Richer provinces consistently consume more electric power than 
poorer provinces.  
Figure 5.1: Residential Electricity Consumption Per Capita, 1998-2011 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
Notes: straight lines are the fitted line from OLS.  
 
Household income  
Increase in income and its impact on living standards is an important driving force of 
electricity consumption in China. As household income increases, residents tend to 
buy a larger dwelling and use more electric appliances, resulting in a higher 
consumption of electricity for cooking, heating, lighting and entertaining. Figure 5.1 
and Figure 5.2 show that the trends of electricity consumption and income increase 
over a period of time. The majority of previous studies show that income is a 
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significant determinant of demand for electricity. We employ the real household 
disposable income per capita as an indicator for household income. It is taken from 
the Chinese Statistic Yearbook from 1999 to 2012. 
 
Figure 5.2: The Real Household Disposable Income Per Capita, 1998-2011 
 
Source: Author’s calculation.  
Notes: straight lines are the fitted line from OLS. 
 
Figure 5.2 displays the income differences across all 29 provinces, classified 
into coastal, inland and the bottom five (low-income) inland provinces. In 2011, the 
coastal province with the highest average income (22,491 RMB per capita) was 
Shanghai, in the east of China. In contrast, the lowest average income (7,396 RMB 
per capita) inland province was Gansu, in the northwest of China. The household 
incomes in both provinces have doubled over the fourteen-year period. Nevertheless, 
the growth in incomes has also led to the widening of income disparities. The coastal 
provinces (Shanghai, Beijing, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Tianjin, Shandong, 
Fujian and Hebei) grew the most and were far ahead of others. The bottom five inland 
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
1997 2002 2007 2012
H
ou
se
ho
ld
 d
is
po
ab
le
 in
co
m
e,
 k
 R
M
B
  
Year 
Coastal
Inland
Inland-low
 147 
 
provinces are Gansu, Shanxi, Guizhou, Xinjiang and Qinghai.  
Table 5.4 provides information about the disparity in incomes between urban 
and rural households. It is clear that urban household income is much higher than 
rural. On average, urban household income is approximately 10,468 RMB per capita 
while rural household income is around 3,756 RMB per capita. This level of the rural 
household income is similar to the income of households living in urban areas with 
minimum income of 2,815 RMB per capita. It is likely that these households will be 
more sensitive to changes in electricity price than rich urban households given the 
single pricing policy for residential electricity. 
Own-price effects 
As with the household income, real electricity price is another decisive factor 
affecting household demand. Generally, most residential electricity prices at province 
level have three classes according to capacity of power cables: less than 1 Kw; 
between 1 Kw and 10 Kw and greater than 10 Kw. The residential electricity price 
series represent, in general, average prices based on the first two classes, which are 
more common than the third class. The source of official retail price information is 
taken from each electricity supply enterprise at province level.  
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Table 5.4: Summary of Variables 
 
Variable Description Unit Min. Q1 Median  Mean   Q3 Max. 
EC Residential electricity consumption kWh per capita 46 124 201 238 313 797 
EP The real residential electricity prices RMB per thousand kWh 280 440 489 500 552 930 
GP The real price of the pipeline natural gas RMB per cubic metre 871 1683 2167 2433 2955 7310 
R The electricity supply reliability Minute per household 50 356 582 788 946 6492 
W The sum of heating degree day and 
cooling degree day 
Degree 2,512 4667 5543 5910 6844 11487 
YA The real average household disposable 
income 
Thousand RMB per capita 2815 4671 6304 7112 8582 22491 
YU The real average urban household 
disposable income 
Thousand RMB per capita 4196 7039 9505 10468 12645 31170 
YR The real average rural household 
disposable income 
Thousand RMB per capita 1399 2290 3141 3756 4493 13811 
Coastal  Coastal provinces  Thousand RMB per capita 3868 6675 9116 9882 12439 22491 
Inland  Inland provinces  Thousand RMB per capita 2815 4342 5685 6078 7698 11889 
Inland-low The bottom five low income inland 
provinces 
Thousand RMB per capita 2826 3982 5010 5228 6353 8837 
 
Notes:Coastal provinces (9): Beijing, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Tianjin, Shandong, Fujian and Hebei. The bottom five 
Inland-low provinces (5): Xinjiang, Guizhou, Gansu, Ningxia, and Qinghai. Inland provinces (15): the rest. Q1 and Q3 stand for the first and the 
third quantiles, respectively. 
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The expected reaction of households to high electricity prices is to reduce 
electricity demand. Households use more electricity with a low electricity price than 
with a high price. Accordingly, it is expected that there is a negative relationship 
between electricity price and households’ electricity consumption. Urban residents 
and high-income households, in general, may be less price-sensitive because the 
nominal electricity price has not changed very much over the period of analysis and 
the real electricity price has even decreased. In other words, urban and high-income 
households may be less responsive to own-price change. Meanwhile, residents in 
rural areas and low-income households are likely to be more sensitive to changes in 
electricity prices. 
Figure 5.3: The Real Residential Electricity Price in Different Areas, 1998-2011 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation  
Notes: straight lines are the fitted line from OLS. 
 
Figure 5.3 shows the differences of residential electricity prices across coastal, 
inland and low-income inland provinces. Straight lines indicate that the average 
residential electricity price corresponds to the order of regional income level. The 
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price distribution exhibits weak association with levels of income. Two high-income 
provinces have fairly low electricity prices (Beijing and Fujian). In contrast, some 
low-middle income provinces have relatively high electricity prices. Nevertheless, 
according to the amount of electricity consumed, the price distribution seems to be 
fairly reasonable across the three levels of provinces. Figure 5.4 indicates that coastal 
provinces use the most electric power and are charged higher prices, while it is the 
opposite for the low-income inland provinces. 
Figure 5.4: Residential Electricity Consumption and Real Retail Price, 1998-2011 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation  
Notes: straight lines are the fitted line from OLS. 
 
Cross-price effects 
Generally, in the short run, an increase in the price of electricity will increase the 
demand for substitute forms of energy such as natural gas, providing that appropriate 
appliances are already available. In the long run, an increase in the price of electricity 
will tend to increase the stock of appliances that use other fuels. This will cause an 
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outward shift in the demand curve for alternative fuels, with corresponding increases 
in the quantity consumed. However, traditionally, the shift can be limited (Acton et al., 
1976). The reason is that households do not have a stock of appliances that permits 
them to switch between types of energy, particularly in the short run. As a result, the 
shift is limited to the income effect until an adjustment in appliance stocks can occur. 
In the case of China, although the substitute energy equivalent price is lower 
than the electricity price (see Table 5.4), the shift from electricity to pipeline natural 
gas is restricted. Particularly, the infrastructure for pipeline natural gas is limited in 
some urban areas and most rural areas in China. Consequently, the effect of the 
substitute energy will have little or no impact on these households’ responsiveness to 
changes in electricity own-price.12 However, this shift may be more pronounced for 
some urban households, especially as the Chinese government has increased efforts to 
boost urban infrastructure development. Therefore, the cross-price effect might be 
significant for the demand of electricity in some urban areas.  
We use pipeline natural gas as a substitute fuel for electricity, because it has 
been a commonly used substitute fuel for electricity in urban areas in recent years. 
The natural gas price is taken from the China Price Information Network (2012) for 
the period 1999 to 2012. The price is mainly based on information for urban residents 
in every province. The price of natural gas for rural residents is not available. As a 
result, the estimations for the cross-price effect for rural households are likely to be 
much lower (and less reliable) than for urban residents. In general, the cross-price 
effect should be positive.  
Electricity supply reliability and weather  
To measure electricity supply reliability we employ the total annual average 
interruption hours per customer (AIHC-1) as an indicator controlling for the effect of 
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electricity supply. The source of this variable is the Electricity Power Reliability 
Management Centre which publishes a technical index annually based (only) on the 
10 Kw urban power supply system; other supply systems are not covered. Due to data 
availability, we can only use the AIHC-1 as a proxy for all households. The expected 
effect of the interruption in supply is negative.  
The information on weather conditions is obtained from the Weather 
Underground (2012).45 For every provincial capital city we use the sum of heating 
degree days (HDD) and cooling degree days (CDD) as a proxy for the weather 
conditions at province level because information is not available for every city and 
county within a province. Both HDD and CDD are indexes with reference to 
temperature of 650F. The higher the HDD and CDD, the more electricity households 
consume. Thus, the expected effect of temperature on demand is positive.  
Estimation methodology 
In the discussion on the main factors affecting electricity demand, we noted that there 
are differences across provinces and time. The estimation strategy contains two 
processes. First, we identify appropriate estimation techniques for the models which 
include pooled ordinary least squares (POLS), robust methods, and feasible 
generalised least squares (FGLS) estimators with fixed effects panels. Second, based 
on the verified estimator(s), we examine the differences of the price and income 
elasticity of demand given the regional income effects and the price of substitute 
energy. The general fixed effects specifications are46:  
                                                        
45 The Weather Underground provides the most localized weather condition available, 
and it is committed to delivering the most reliable, accurate weather information 
possible. It includes almost 19,000 weather stations in the USA and over 13,000 
weather stations across the rest of the world. 
46 See Equation 5.1 and 5.2 for the definition of each variable. 
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𝑙𝑙𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡+𝛽4𝑙𝑙𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑖𝑡+ 𝑒𝑖𝑡 ,                                                                                             (5.3) 
𝑙𝑙𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡+𝛽4𝑙𝑙𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑖𝑡+ 𝑒𝑖𝑡 ,                                                                                              (5.4) 
where  𝛼𝑖  and 𝛿𝑡  are the unobserved “individual” and time effects respectively, 
representing the joint impact of the unobserved variables on the dependent variable 
𝐷𝑖𝑡. Since energy consumption and the regressors are in logarithms, the coefficients 
are directly interpreted as demand elasticities. 
In the literature, previous studies correct for a bias associated with the 
endogeneity of electricity price in Equation (5.3) and Equation (5.4) (Blazquez et al., 
2012; Alberini and Filippini, 2011; Matsukawa, 2004). The reason is that many 
countries have been adopting increasing block pricing systems which are nonlinear in 
terms of price and quantity. As we discussed, the pre-reform pricing system was a 
single fixed price for each province in China; hence, we treat electricity price as 
exogenous in our estimation.  
However, the dependent variable and the random error are suspected of 
heteroskedasticity since the variance of the observations is clearly not the same. If 
this is the case, this problem could be overcome by first using robust estimators and 
further applying FGLS estimator if necessary. The tests for the estimations include 
poolability by a standard F-test, the comparison of fixed and random effects models 
by the Hausman (1978) test, serial correlation test by Wooldridge (2002) and 
cross-sectional dependence by Pesaran (2004).  
The next step is to test the null hypothesis to see if the electricity consumption 
behaviour is the same across regions. To achieve this objective, we apply both 
intercept dummy and slope dummy variables for each additional explanatory variable 
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in the verified equation, and then jointly test the significance of the dummy variable 
coefficients using the Chow test (Hill et al., 2008). Furthermore, we assume that 
regional income affects the parameters of prices and income. Supposing that time 
effect is detected in the first step, then the specified model for each region is as in 
Equation (5.5):  
𝑙𝑙𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡+𝛽4𝑙𝑙𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑀𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑙𝑙+ 𝜃1(𝑙𝑙𝑌𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑙𝑙) + 𝜃2(𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑙𝑙) + 𝜃3(𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑙𝑙)+ 𝜃4(𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑙𝑙) + 𝜃5(𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑙𝑙) + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 ,                 (5.5) 
where Region includes three levels: coastal, inland and the bottom five (low income) 
provinces, as “the bottom five” is the reference group. If the F-statistics for testing the 
joint null hypothesis of equal parametersis less than a critical value, we will reject the 
null in favour of the alternative that at least one 𝜃𝑖 ≠ 0.  
The final step of our estimation strategy is to model the relative price based on 
the price of electricity substitute as in Equation (5.2). Presuming a verified fixed time 
effects model with an appropriate estimator, the estimating equation is defined as 
follows: 
𝑙𝑙𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑙𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑙𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑙𝑙+ 𝜃1(𝑙𝑙𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑙𝑙) + 𝜃2(𝑙𝑙𝑌𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑙𝑙) + 𝜃4(𝑙𝑙𝑊𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑙𝑙)+ 𝜃5(𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑙𝑙) + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 ,                                                             (5.6) 
where lnRP is the log of the ratio of the real price of electricity to the real price of 
natural gas. The relative price variable is expected to be negatively related to 
electricity consumption, and urban areas should have a higher parameter than the one 
at national level.  
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5.5 Results 
5.5.1 Model selection 
The coefficients estimated with fixed effect models are reported in Table 5.5 and 
Table 5.6 which summarize estimation results for three groups of households: 
national, urban and rural. The models include pooled OLS, fixed time effects with 
robust standard errors, fixed individual effects with robust standard errors, and FGLS 
with time and individual effects.  
With regard to the national level and the urban sample (Table 5.5), poolability 
by F-statistics indicates that all time fixed effects models are significant at 10% and 
often at 1% level or better, which implies that the electricity consumption functions 
shift over time. The time effect may be due to factors such as the rapid acceleration of 
Chinese economic growth that results in fast household income increasing from one 
year to the next. Similarly, the individual fixed effects are highly significant, which 
reflects the substantial differences among provinces in terms of residential electricity 
consumption. Therefore, the POLS models are rejected. Second, the fixed effect 
model is expected according to the nature of the data, and the significant Hausman 
tests suggest that fixed time effects are more favourable than random effects, which is 
consistent with our expectation. Third, Wooldridge’s tests for serial correlation in 
fixed effects panels are only in favour of the FGLS model with time effects at 
national level and urban areas. Furthermore, the Pesaran tests for cross sectional 
dependence of the FGLS model with time effects are insignificant at 5% level. Hence, 
the evidence suggests that the FGLS with time fixed effects are valid models to assess 
residential electricity consumption for the national level and the urban samples.
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Table 5.5: National and Urban Income Models 
 
Income level National income Urban income 
Model Pooled FE t FE i FGLS t FGLS i Pooled FE t FE i FGLS t FGLSi 
Variable  Coef.(S.E) Coef.(S.E) Coef.(S.E) Coef.(S.E) Coef.(S.E) Coef.(S.E) Coef.(S.E) Coef.(S.E) Coef.(S.E) Coef.(S.E) 
Intercept  -8.034*** 
0.672     
-10.288*** 
0.769     
EP -0.231** 
0.071 
-0.413*** 
0.094 
-0.077 
0.101 
-0.412*** 
0.004 
-0.079 
0.047 
-0.111 
0.078 
-0.306** 
0.101 
-0.135 
0.106 
-0.300*** 
0.010 
-0.127** 
0.047 
GP 0.118*** 
0.033 
0.107** 
0.034 
0.092* 
0.046 
0.107*** 
0.002 
0.022 
0.031 
0.165*** 
0.036 
0.148*** 
0.036 
0.115* 
0.048 
0.142*** 
0.008 
0.033 
0.031 
YA 1.318*** 
0.028 
1.474*** 
0.048 
1.303*** 
0.042 
1.476*** 
0.006 
1.097 
0.052      
YU  
     
1.319*** 
0.031 
1.548*** 
0.057 
1.229*** 
0.043 
1.550*** 
0.010 
1.039*** 
0.049 
W  0.286*** 
0.038 
0.299*** 
0.039 
-0.0334 
0.096 
0.296*** 
0.002 
0.008 
0.027 
0.378*** 
0.042 
0.410*** 
0.042 
-0.005 
0.099 
0.401*** 
0.006 
0.020 
0.026 
R  -0.030* 
0.014 
-0.022 
0.016 
0.010 
0.011 
-0.022*** 
0.0002 
0.001 
0.005 
-0.057*** 
0.015 
-0.048** 
0.017 
0.004 
0.012 
-0.047*** 
0.001 
-0.001 
0.005 
SSE 18.645 17.745 8.811 17.745 10.171 22.083 20.425 9.363 20.429 10.625 
Adj.R^2 0.866 0.741 0.818 0.885 0.934 0.844 0.709 0.812 0.868 0.931 
Pooltest 
 
F=1.521 
P=0.109 
F=14.829 
P<-2.2e-16    
F=2.416 
P=0.004 
F=18.050 
P<-2.2e-16   
Hausmantest Chisq = 
48.30 
P = 
3.08e-09 
Chisq = 
11.68 
P=0.039 
   Chisq = 
50.10 
P = 1.3e-09 
Chisq= 
66.00  
P = 6.9e-13 
  
Wooldridge test Chisq = 
1650.3 
P < 2.2e-16 
Chisq = 
520.45 
P < 2.2e-16 
Chisq= 
0.056 
P=0.814 
Chisq= 
801.4 
P<2.2e-16 
 Chisq = 
1690  
P < 2.2e-16 
Chisq =  
655 
P < 2.2e-16 
Chisq= 
0.269 
P=0.604 
Chisq= 
812.9 
P<2.2e-16 
Pesaran CD test Z=-1.389 
P=0.165  
Z=1.220 
P=0.222 
Z=-1.930 
P=0.054 
Z=9.066 
P<2.2e-16 
 Z=-1.522 
P=0.128 
Z=4.205 
P=2.6e-05 
Z=-1.418 
P=0.156 
Z=10.351 
P<2.2e-16 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5.6: Rural Income Models 
 
Model Pooled FE t FE i FGLS t FGLS i 
Variable  Coef.(S.E) Coef.(S.E) Coef.(S.E) Coef.(S.E) Coef.(S.E) 
Intercept  -0.532 
0.621     
EP -0.623*** 
0.073 
-0.522*** 
0.098 
-0.024 
0.108 
-0.517*** 
0.005 
-0.033 
0.050 
GP -0.005 
0.035 
0.027 
0.035 
-0.047 
0.049 
0.024*** 
0.005 
-0.068** 
0.031 
YR  1.174*** 
0.026 
1.093*** 
0.037 
1.404*** 
0.049 
1.097*** 
0.007 
1.212*** 
0.048 
W  0.016 
0.040 
0.031 
0.041 
-0.071 
0.103 
0.034*** 
0.007 
-0.004 
0.030 
R  0.010 
0.015 
-0.006 
0.017 
0.024* 
0.012 
-0.006*** 
0.001 
0.007 
0.005 
SSE  20.57 19.106 10.09 19.108 11.14 
Adj.R^2 0.854 0.725 0.804 0.876 0.928 
Pool test  
 
F= 2.280 
P=0.007 
F= 13.80 
P<2.2e-16   
Hausman test 
 
Chisq=42.86 
P =3.9e-08 
Chisq=21.66 
P=6e-04   
Wooldridge’s test 
 
Chisq= 1966 
P<2.2e-16 
Chisq= 328 
P<2.2e-16 
Chisq=15.624 
P=7.7e-05 
Chisq=736.6 
P<2.2e-16 
Pesaran CD test 
 
Z=-1.327 
P=0.185  
Z=6.924 
P=4.4e-12 
Z=-2.357 
P=0.018 
Z=14.518 
P<2.2e-16 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1% level, 5% level and 10% level, respectively. 
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In terms of rural areas (Table 5.6), poolability tests suggest the need to control 
for either time or individual effects so that POLS is not appropriate. However, the 
remaining models have the problem of serial correlation since the Wooldridge’s tests 
are insignificant. Such issue may be caused by omitted variables of other energy 
prices capturing the effects of other conventional energy sources such as coal and 
wood in rural areas.47 Yet, the insignificant Pesaran test shows that there is no cross 
sectional dependence in fixed time effects regressions with robust standard errors, 
which may suggest that the estimates remain unbiased but inconsistent (Sarafidis and 
Wansbeek, 2012; Pesaran, 2004; Cerrato and Srantis, 2002).  
5.5.2 Price and income elasticities without regional effects 
The coefficients of main interests of income, own-price and cross-price effects are 
statistically significant and are in line with the expectations of the consumer 
behaviour theory (see Table 5.5 and Table 5.6).  
The electricity price shows a consistently negative effect on the quantity of 
electricity demanded when holding other factors constant. The elasticity is less than 1, 
suggesting that the electricity demand is price inelastic. National, urban and rural 
samples show different estimates for the response of households to changes in 
residential electricity prices, -0.412, -0.300 and -0.522, respectively. The results reveal 
that (poorer) rural income households are more sensitive to changes in electricity 
prices than (richer) urban households.  
The household income variable is also consistently, significantly and positively 
                                                        
47 See Yao et al. (2012). 
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related to electricity consumption for each income group, with elasticity above 1 
when holding other factors fixed. Income elasticities suggest that the higher the 
household income, the higher the electricity demand in China. In other words, urban 
households demand more electricity than average income and rural households in 
China as the income elasticity is 1.550 greater than 1.480 at national level and 1.093 
in rural areas. The results are consistent with the expectations of the consumer 
behaviour theory. 
The cross-price elasticities are also as expected, all positive and significant at 
the national level and for the urban households. Generally, the cross-price elasticity of 
urban households is higher than at national level. However, both elasticities are small, 
which suggests that there may not be a strong substitution relationship between the 
residential electricity and the alternative, residential natural gas during the period of 
analysis. Alternative specifications confirm that natural gas is a substitute source of 
energy for electricity at national level, and in the urban areas, the relative price 
variable has the expected negative sign and is significant.  
Our estimates of own-price elasticity are close to the He et al. (2011) estimate 
of -0.300 for household electricity demand with cross-section data in 2007; our results 
differ from the Lin study (2003) which finds an average electricity price elasticity of 
0.016 at national level. The latter paper uses time-series data, which does not take the 
province effect into account. The estimated elasticity close to zero seems 
unreasonable for the household sector. Considering previous international studies, our 
findings also agree with price inelastic estimates for the USA, Australia, Taiwan and 
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Sri Lanka (Table 5.3).  
5.5.3 Supply reliability and weather effects 
The electricity supply reliability significantly affects electricity consumption both for 
national and urban households, as demonstrated in Table 5.5. The findings indicate 
that the electricity reliability is a key factor affecting residential electricity 
consumption in spite of electricity supply enterprises having made efforts to improve 
the electricity supply reliability in China.   
The weather condition is also a highly significant factor influencing residential 
electricity consumption at national level and in the urban areas. These findings are 
consistent with previous studies on residential electricity consumption (Alberini and 
Filippini, 2011; Dergiades and Tsoulfidis, 2008; Holtedahl and Joutz, 2004; Nakajima 
and Hamori, 2010; Narayan and Smyth, 2005). 
5.5.4 Regional income effects 
The results reported in Table 7 represent tests of the regional income level impact on 
the price and income elasticities. Our findings are twofold. First, there are important 
differences across the three categories of regions since all the Chow tests are 
significant at 1% level (𝐹(0.99,   6,   437)= 2.834). We therefore reject the null hypothesis 
that the electricity consumption function is uniform and conclude that there are 
significant differences in consumption behaviour according to regional income levels.  
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Table 5.7: Testing for the Equivalence of Income Levels and Regional Income 
Effects 
 
 National  Urban  Rural  
Variable Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
EP 0.277*** 0.015 0.261*** 0.024 0.311*** 0.021 
GP -0.450*** 0.010 -0.441*** 0.015 -0.445*** 0.019 
YA 1.452*** 0.028     
YU   1.363*** 0.039   
YR     0.955*** 0.032 
W -0.451*** 0.012 -0.362*** 0.018 -0.614*** 0.016 
R 0.071*** 0.005 0.056*** 0.007 0.116*** 0.006 
Inland -3.569*** 0.463 -4.589*** 0.603 -1.277*** 0.366 
Coastal -5.703*** 0.390 -5.610*** 0.511 -11.262*** 0.408 
EP : Inland -1.138*** 0.030 -1.033*** 0.045 -1.350*** 0.038 
EP: Coastal -0.588*** 0.023 -0.407*** 0.034 -0.442*** 0.030 
GP: Inland 0.545*** 0.024 0.547*** 0.026 0.504*** 0.025 
GP: Coastal 0.722*** 0.019 0.616*** 0.022 0.861*** 0.021 
YA: Inland -0.111*** 0.025     
YA: Coastal -0.111*** 0.024     
YU: Inland   -0.104** 0.034   
YU: Coastal   -0.077*  0.032   
YR: Inland     -0.099*** 0.016 
YR: Coastal     0.134*** 0.025 
W: Inland 0.925*** 0.021 0.966*** 0.026 0.838*** 0.017 
W: Coastal 0.604*** 0.021 0.536*** 0.025 0.793*** 0.025 
R: Inland -0.085*** 0.006 -0.075*** 0.008 -0.114*** 0.007 
R: Coastal -0.059*** 0.005 -0.043*** 0.008 -0.095*** 0.006 
SSE 12.823  14.006  13.524  
Adj.R^2 0.917  0.909  0.912  
Wooldridge’s 
test 
chisq = 2.158, 
p-value = 0.142 
chisq = 1.373,  
p-value = 0.242 
chisq = 13.82,  
p-value =2.0e-04 
Pesaran CD 
test 
z = -0.711,  
p-value = 0.477 
z = -0.125,  
p-value = 0.900 
z = -1.898,  
p-value = 0.058 
The Chow test F=28.010 F=33.453 F=30.129 
Notes: Results are based on FGLS time effects estimators. The 1% critical value of 
the F distribution for the Chow test is 𝐹(0.99,6,437)= 2.834. ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Second, regional variation affects the price and income elasticities. The 
estimates for each of the three regional categories are as follows.   
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Coastal provinces: 
National: 𝐷�= –0.311 EP+0.272 GP+1.341 YA+0.153 W+0.012 R–5.703 Coastal 
Urban: 𝐷�= –0.146 EP+0.175 GP+1.286 YU+0.174 W+0.013 R–5.610 Coastal 
Rural: 𝐷�= –0.131 EP+0.416 GP+1.089 YR+0.179 W+0.021 R–11.262 Coastal 
Inland provinces: 
National: 𝐷�= –0.861 EP+0.095 GP+1.341 YA+0.474 W–0.014 R–3.569 Inland 
Urban: 𝐷�= –0.772 EP+0.106 GP+1.259 YU+0.604 W–0.019 R–4.489 Inland 
Rural: 𝐷�= –1.039 EP+0.059 GP+0.856 YR+0.224 W+0.002 R–1.277 Inland 
The majority of electricity price elasticities are less than 1 and show that the 
lower the income level, the higher the own price elasticity of demand. Particularly, 
households in inland provinces are much more sensitive to changes in electricity 
prices than households living in coastal provinces. In addition, their income 
elasticities of demand are consistently higher than 1. Interestingly, the own price 
elasticity is slightly greater than 1 for rural households in inland provinces, which also 
shows low income elasticity of demand. The high price elasticities may imply that 
although the proportion of electricity expenditure in total household consumption is 
not as substantial as food expenditure, the income effects are still large.  
5.5.6 Price elasticity of substitute energy 
The parameters of the relative price of electricity to pipeline natural gas are reported 
in Table 5.8. They have the expected negative sign (except for rural households in 
inland provinces) and are highly significant, at the 1% level. The coefficients are 
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-0.037, -0.056 and 0.007 for national, urban and rural income levels for the inland 
provinces and -0.244, -0.132 and -0.229, respectively, for the coastal provinces. 
Therefore, we conclude that overall pipeline natural gas is indeed a substitute for 
electricity in China, except in inland rural areas.  
Table 5.8: Testing for the Price of a Substitute 
 
 National  Urban  Rural  
Variable Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
RP 0.390*** 0.013 0.412*** 0.021 0.417*** 0.026 
YA 1.425*** 0.021     
YU   1.387*** 0.045   
YR     0.800*** 0.025 
W -0.455*** 0.011 -0.374*** 0.025 -0.572*** 0.028 
R 0.057*** 0.003 0.058*** 0.010 0.089*** 0.006 
Inland -8.224*** 0.197 -8.361*** 0.407 -6.857*** 0.358 
Coastal -4.387*** 0.210 -3.274*** 0.389 -5.472*** 0.353 
RP: Inland -0.427*** 0.014 -0.468*** 0.025 -0.410*** 0.027 
RP: Coastal -0.634*** 0.012 -0.544*** 0.021 -0.646*** 0.026 
YA: Inland 0.039* 0.018     
YA: Coastal -0.126*** 0.024     
YU: Inland   0.021 0.032   
YU: Coastal   -0.127** 0.041   
YR: Inland     0.086*** 0.012 
YR: Coastal     0.107*** 0.023 
W: Inland 0.909*** 0.013 0.948*** 0.035 0.730*** 0.035 
W: Coastal 0.570*** 0.011 0.483*** 0.025 0.487*** 0.030 
R: Inland -0.093*** 0.003 -0.095*** 0.009 -0.121*** 0.005 
R: Coastal -0.051*** 0.003 -0.050*** 0.010 -0.074*** 0.006 
SSE 14.901  15.680  17.668  
Adj.R^2 0.904  0.899  0.885  
Wooldridge’s 
test 
chisq = 0.345,  
p-value = 0.557 
chisq = 0.882,  
p-value = 0.348 
chisq = 1.173,  
p-value = 0.279 
Pesaran CD 
test 
z = -0.656,  
p-value = 0.5121 
z = -0.094,  
p-value = 0.925 
z = -1.813,  
p-value = 0.070 
Notes: Results are based on FGLS time effects estimators. ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at 1% level, 5% level, and 10% level, respectively. 
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5.6 Conclusion and policy implications 
A principal motivation for this paper is to evaluate the implications of the new 
residential electricity pricing system in China and to understand how households 
respond to changes in electricity prices across Chinese provinces, differentiating 
between urban and rural households as well as across income groups. The issue of 
Chinese electricity demand at household levels has received little attention in the 
academic literature despite its considerable policy relevance. We apply panel data 
models to investigate the demand responsiveness of households to change in 
electricity own-price and household income when controlling for other relevant 
factors such as substitute energy prices, electricity supply reliability and weather 
conditions using annual data from 29 provinces over the period 1998-2011.  
The main argument in the paper is that the perceived “low price” of domestic 
electricity in China may be true when referring to the economic development for the 
whole country. However, the “low price” is not true when different levels of average 
household income are considered. Our findings suggest that income is the prime 
driving force of residential electricity demand which mediates a variation in own price 
elasticity across three categories of provinces. The residential electricity price 
elasticity is fairly high for the urban households in inland provinces compared to the 
coastal urban households. The second argument is that study on residential electricity 
consumption should not ignore the effect of electricity supply reliability due to 
electricity shortages and less advanced technology in developing countries, including 
China; otherwise, estimates may be biased. 
 165 
 
The results suggest that the new residential electricity pricing system in China 
should take into account the variation in price responsiveness, particularly for urban 
households in inland provinces and for rural households. These households are more 
than five times as sensitive to changes in electricity prices as the households living in 
coastal urban areas which have average to high incomes. Furthermore, the electricity 
pricing system should take into account the variation in elasticity across the different 
tiers of the price schedule. In other words, important differences in the price elasticity 
in different blocks of the rate structure should be considered in the new electricity 
pricing system. For instance, for high-income households there is considerable room 
for price increase, which can be used to finance the development of the supply 
system.  
While our findings are robust, a limitation of the paper is that the conclusions 
are drawn from a relatively small dataset and fixed effects models. Future work 
should include prices of other conventional energy sources to investigate in more 
detail the effects in rural areas. Also, residential bill data could help to examine 
baseline quantities, to estimate price elasticity between the rich and the poor sectors as 
well as to distinguish between short run and long run effects.  
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CHAPTER 6 Conclusions 
In the introduction, we expressed the hope that the work on this thesis could provide a 
new way of unbiased evaluation for the effect of income inequality on quality of life. 
In this final chapter, we will conclude by describing the progress made towards this 
goal and its application to problems in a range of domains. The thesis will also 
suggest some future research directions that could provide the next steps along the 
path to a practical and wide applicability of the proposed two-effort framework. 
6.1 Introduction 
This research was designed to explore the concept of income inequality through the 
notion of self efforts and social efforts as well as to evaluate the impact of rising 
income inequality on the quality of life in respect of the contemporary Chinese 
people’s perception of it. This perception was identified as associated with living 
standards in the short and medium terms. The present research has reviewed the 
reasons and motivations for the specific case of China and pinpointed the essential 
and the limitation of self-interest in economics and in the subfield of income 
inequality. The reasons for the combination of self efforts and social efforts to reduce 
the gap have also been discussed.  
The research has understood that the macro literature has established sufficient 
and equal opportunity as the efficient pathway for income inequality since it allows 
one to pursue self-interest. In contrast, the reasons for the inequality are attributed to 
differences in personality traits across individuals from the micro perspective. 
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However, the present study has illustrated that the underlying insight into individual 
income difference was the sensitivity of opportunities.       
Moreover, in spite of the importance of self-interest through theoretical 
considerations, the structure of measuring income inequality in the literature has 
merely emphasized social efforts (which reflect on the calculation being based on 
social comparison, for example, Gini coefficient and Theil index). In other words, self 
efforts derived from self-interest have always been assumed as identical across 
individuals, and this assumption was generally without any explicit justification. In 
this disregard, it is biased to claim that an increasing concern for the government 
policies and actions was primarily responsible for the rise in income inequality that in 
turn aggravated the process of improving living standards. This is one of claims that 
has been repeatedly heard over recent years in China. 
Hence, the research sought to examine three objectives to provide unbiased 
judgment on the effect of income inequality on well-being. First was to investigate the 
impact of social influence and individual efforts in relation to income inequality on 
living standards. Second was through the concepts of absolute mobility and volatility 
to examine how they affect individual efforts related to income inequality. Third was a 
case study of social efforts with respect to policy analysis on the effect of residential 
electricity pricing on life burden. In other words, social efforts are measured by three 
angles of traditional index of income inequality, absolute mobility and volatility index, 
and a specific policy analysis. Meanwhile, self efforts are observed by the balance of 
an individual’s life time earnings. 
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The examination applied two different sets of secondary data. One was the 
adult survey from the CHNS between 1989 and 2009, while the other was average 
household electricity consumption data at province level from multiple resources 
between 1998 and 2011. The main statistical method for measuring income inequality 
was the Theil statistics for measuring inequality and the Field and Ok (1999) method 
for calculating absolute mobility and volatility. Meanwhile, econometric techniques 
included OLS, robust M estimator, pooled OLS, LSDV, RE, FGLS, the system GMM 
and quantile regression.            
6.2 Summary of key findings 
The main empirical findings are chapter specific and were summarized within the 
respective three empirical chapters: social and individual income inequality on living 
standards in Chapter 3; income mobility and volatility on individual income 
inequality in Chapter 4; and a case study of social efforts in relation to the role of 
residential electricity pricing in Chapter 5. These three analyses have shown solid 
evidence to demonstrate that the improper social efforts worsen the gap in the case of 
China. This section will synthesize the empirical findings to understand the research 
interest. 
First, social efforts such as government assistance and action has had an 
important positive impact on living standards in the short run but is not sustainable, as 
detailed in Chapter 3. This conclusion is drawn from the statistical evidence on the 
significant positive coefficient of social inequality index and a U-shaped pattern of the 
coefficients of individual income inequality index and its squared term. In addition, 
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the significant positive coefficient of initial income suggests that convergence does 
not occur. These results may imply that social efforts are unable to supply sufficient or 
unequal economic opportunity across individuals in the long run.       
Second, the implication of a lack of the opportunity in Chapter 3 was further 
confirmed by Chapter 4 within the context of income inequality and mobility. The 
conclusions were that although economic opportunity provided by social efforts offset 
the inequality, two problems exist simultaneously. First is that the opportunity 
appeared as unequal allocation across percentiles of individuals, which reflects on the 
significant F test for the equality of coefficients of mobility across percentiles. Second 
is that the development of income security was scarcity, which reflects on the effect of 
income volatility being negative to the inequality. Hence, the unequal economic 
opportunity and this income insecurity are the major issues for the raising individual 
income inequality. 
Third, even though there are many social efforts by the central government 
intended to smooth over income inequality through different departments, the 
particular policy of the residential electricity pricing schedule would further magnify 
the gap since low income households could not benefit from the current pricing 
system from the energy sector. The results in Chapter 5 indicate that poorer 
households are more sensitive to changes in electricity prices than richer urban 
households and there is important heterogeneity in the responsiveness to electricity 
price changes according to household income levels. 
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6.3 Theoretical and methodology implications  
The primary contribution of this thesis to the literature is to firstly introduce the 
notion of looking at social efforts and self-development simultaneously to evaluate 
the effect of income inequality on quality of life empirically. This is unlike the 
existing literature which merely addresses inequality according to a unilateral aspect 
of social influence which may provide biased information. The present analysis 
provides a novel insight in this respect.   
The present research has shown that this belief can achieve coherence in the 
income inequality discourse between theory and empirical structure with respect to 
individual well-being as well as enabling a more sustainable and comprehensive 
understanding. Essentially, the well-being of individuals comprises two aspects of 
social influence and self-development. Examining both dimensions of an issue can 
embrace and promote the philological belief that one’s good life is built on social 
efforts and self efforts. Furthermore, to show individuals’ efforts not only allow 
economists and policymakers to connect to the ethics issue easily and focus on the 
appropriate target groups, but also implicitly account for criticisms on the limitations 
of self-interest. To the best of our knowledge, there have not been any previous 
studies paying attention on these dimensions in the context of income inequality.    
The results of the empirical analysis have demonstrated the importance of 
taking social and self efforts into account for the evaluation of government assistance 
and action. With the two-sided statistical evidence, we acknowledge that the 
achievement by social efforts to enhance living standards is significant in China. Such 
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effort, however, is not sustainable in the long run and the corresponding benefit is not 
likely for some poorer individuals because of the shortage of equality and the 
appearance of rising volatility. This conclusion is not new in the literature, but our 
statistical evidence allows the achievement of unbiased and unprejudiced judgment. 
Although the research methods used in this research were not new, they were 
combined in ways that had been rarely done previously. First, the notion of self 
development allows measures of income inequality over time because income 
inequality not only occurs between people, but also within one’s life time of earning. 
Previous studies looking at inequality merely focus on social comparison at a time. 
Furthermore, different time horizons, the short run and long run, can be cooperated 
into one unified empirical framework with our consideration. This is because the 
traditional measure of inequality is a static calculation and our measure of inequality 
based on self development is a dynamic calculation.  
6.4 Policy recommendations  
This proposed notion has important practical implications in China. There are very 
different views among the government and the ordinary Chinese people, which may 
reflect the discontent in society. The finding from this study indicates that looking at 
either side likely leads to a biased analysis. Hence, it is particularly vital to 
policymakers for considering the information from both sides.     
The findings have also linked to one particular policy programme with 
extended theoretical underpinnings, that is, the mission to reduce income inequality 
which China has been making efforts on since the 1990s. However, evidence from 
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many studies and this thesis seems to point to the fact that government actions have 
not been sustainable in the long run; the income inequality reduction policy has not 
been efficiently making the anticipated impact in general; and the current residential 
electricity pricing is likely to be unable to implement its promise of lightening the life 
burden in particular.  
Therefore, policymakers should persist in the construction of the harmonious 
society and deliver its message of China’s future being dependent on balancing social, 
economic and environmental objectives when making decisions. As soon as such a 
message is given, equal opportunity is likely to occur across the nation. In this way, 
low income individuals can climb their income ladder and converge towards the rich 
effectively. In addition, policymakers should provide a wide range of programmes to 
help ensure all residents secure a lifetime income and maintain a good quality of life, 
for example, by continuously improving the welfare system and developing a mature 
insurance market. Besides the overall plans, sectoral schemes also require attention. 
This study indicates that policymakers should take variations in price responsiveness 
into account, particularly for urban households in inland provinces and for rural 
households. For instance, for high-income households there is considerable room for 
price increases, which can be used to finance the development of the supply system.    
We have to admit that the Chinese government has made significant efforts to 
administer substantive opportunities through trade liberalization and productivity 
improvement since 1978. Nevertheless, over the years, the Chinese government has 
fundamentally maintained the same strategy, hoping to keep up the amount of 
 173 
 
opportunity that can relieve the pressure from the high levels of income inequality. 
The theoretical arguments for this justification suggest the need for 
political-economical institutions and some relevant policy reviews in the direction of 
equality which can enable equal opportunity to work for the poor and the 
disadvantaged groups.     
In fact, China does not lack plans to accomplish rebalancing such as the new 
strategy of the construction of the harmonious society, the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011) 
and the Income Inequality Reform Plan; rather it lacks poor implementation. 
Historical evidence in particular has shown that policy implementation is rather 
inefficient under the current institutions (Chen and Zheng, 2008). Similarly, 
enhancing economic security has been emphasized since the mid-1990s (Zhengyi, 
2004), and yet other studies and the current research implies economic insecurity has 
been aggravated. Recently, despite the new ideal scheme of the income inequality 
reform, the foreground is still not very optimistic.  
6.5 Limitations 
The research employed the well-known survey data, the CNHS data, but they are 
based on selected provinces and cities through sampling thousands of adults in China. 
As a direct consequence of this careful investigation, the study also encountered a 
number of limitations which need to be considered.  
First, although the study has shown an evaluative perspective on the research 
interests of social efforts and self efforts through income inequality, to apply this 
notion into an empirical analysis requests a large set of longitudinal data with wide N 
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and long T. The available statistical information is likely nothing more than the CNHS. 
Second, the examination was limited by the CHNS data which has the major potential 
drawback of representing the whole population in China and the precise ability to 
look at the research interest, especially observing individual income inequality. In 
spite of the shortcoming in the CHNS data, they are one of the most popular 
longitudinal data to study income inequality in the literature and cover a relatively 
long period of time. Furthermore, this research is limited in the short and medium 
terms of quality of life since the focus of living standards as the indicator of quality of 
life is clearly a contemporary concern for ordinary Chinese. Thus, what is less clear is 
the long-term indication for the quality of life which should consider not just income, 
but also integrate other indicators such as life expectancy and education such as the 
human development index.  
6.6 Future research directions 
The two-effort framework in the present study is a new development in the field of 
income inequality, and has provided comprehension to the evaluation of the effect of 
social efforts in relation to income inequality on living standards, although there are 
several limitations. These limitations can in fact suggest future research directions to 
improve these issues and sustain this new developed two-effort framework. Exploring 
the following as future research strategies can facilitate the attainment of such a goal. 
First, to trace individual life time income inequality will be one of the important 
directions for future research and will attract more attention when more and extended 
longitudinal data are available. To apply longitudinal data analysis is the fashion for 
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empirical study because such data involve rich information on household and 
individual behaviours over time. The development of such a data set began in the 
mid-1960s in the USA (Hsiao, 2003). Since then, panel data have become 
increasingly accessible and yet, they are still in the early process. That may be the 
reason previous studies have rarely attempted to address individual income inequality. 
Second, this framework can be used in conducting an international study, for example, 
a comparative study between China and other developed and/or developing countries, 
especially the USA and the UK because both countries have a long advanced 
development of household survey data for example the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (2014) and the British Household Panel Survey (2014). Third, since this 
research merely considered living standards as the ordinary Chinese people perception 
of quality of life, the scope of the project is unlikely to go beyond the medium term. 
Hence, a future study should not just employ income as an indicator, but also others to 
explore the long-term effect. In addition, investigation on these who do not have 
income mobility is desired since the movement of the bottom of income distribution 
does not occur. Finally, in relation to the extension of achievable policy strategies and 
development targets with regards to income inequality, there is a need for more 
studies at the international, regional, urban-rural and sectoral levels to allow further 
analysis of diversified dimensions of the subject in China. 
6.7 Conclusion  
It is often reported that both self-interest and social efforts have a stake in income 
inequality in theoretical and policy debates. However, the high level of inequality is 
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always attributed to the failure of the social efforts such as government intervention 
without justifying the individual’s self efforts. The social efforts in practice have truly 
offered some successful solutions to the prevailing and persistent vulnerability and 
deprivation of individuals in China. The credit for this success, on the other hand, 
goes to the government without appreciating the hard work of the ordinary Chinese. 
The unilateral judgment has been shown to be neither comprehensive nor sustainable 
in promoting the goal of well-being among individuals in the context of income 
inequality. This scarcity is the primary theme that this research project aimed to work 
and develop in the literature. 
In the context of China, evidence from this research highlights the consistent 
claim made in many previous studies; that is, the high level of income inequality is 
the result of a lack of sustainable government actions such as unequal opportunity and 
high income volatility. More importantly, this methodology takes ordinary Chinese 
people’s hard work and attitudes for well-being into account to evaluate the claim. 
This is also vital to provide two-sided statistical evidence to give the different views 
of the government and society in China.  
Certainly, the central government is and will continually play an imperative role 
in economic development and social coverage. There is still, of course, a long way to 
go before it reaches the standards of living of the West. For the sake of one-fifth of the 
world’s population, our hope is that it will do so.    
 
 
 177 
 
References 
Aaberge, Rolf, Anders Björklund, Markus Jäntti, Mårten Palme, Peder J. Pedersen, 
Nina Smith, and Tom Wennemo. (2002). Income inequality and income mobility in 
the Scandinavian countries compared to the United States. Review of Income and 
Wealth 48, no. 4: 443-469. 
 
Aaberge, Rolf, Tom Wennemo, Anders Bjorklund, Markus Jantti, Peder J. Pedersen, 
and Nina Smith. (2000). Unemployment shocks and income distribution: how did 
the Nordic countries fare during their crises?. The Scandinavian Journal of 
Economics 102.1: 77-99. 
 
Aaronson, Daniel, and Bhashkar Mazumder. (2008). Intergenerational economic 
mobility in the United States, 1940 to 2000. Journal of Human Resources 43.1: 
139-172. 
 
Abou-Zeid, Maya and Ben-Akiva Moshe. (2011). The effect of social comparisons on 
commute well-being. Transportation Research Part A 45, 345–361. 
 
Aghion, Philippe, and Patrick Bolton. (1992). An incomplete contracts approach to 
financial contracting. The Review of Economic Studies 59.3: 473-494. 
 
Alberini, Anna, and Massimo Filippini. (2011). Response of residential electricity 
demand to price: The effect of measurement error. Energy Economics 33, pp. 
889-895. 
 
Alderson Arthur S. (2013). Compared to whom? Inequality, social comparison, and 
happiness in the U.S. Lecture notes, Indiana University, delivered 06 May 2013. 
 
Alesina, Alberto F., and Paola Giuliano. (2009). Preferences for redistribution. No. 
w14825. National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
 178 
 
Alesina, Alberto, and George-Marios Angeletos. (2005). Fairness and redistribution. 
American Economic Review: 960-980. 
 
Alesina, Alberto, Rafael Di Tella, and Robert MacCulloch. (2004). Inequality and 
happiness: are Europeans and Americans different? Journal of Public 
Economics 88.9: 2009-2042. 
 
Al-Khatib, Jamal A., Stacy M. Vollmers, and Yusin Liu. (2007). 
Business-to-business negotiating in China: the role of morality. Journal of Business 
& Industrial Marketing 22.2: 84-96. 
 
Alm, James, Gary H. McClelland, and William D. Schulze. (1992). Why do people 
pay taxes? Journal of Public Economics 48.1: 21-38. 
 
Alonso-Borrego, César, and Rocío Sánchez Mangas. (2001). GMM estimation of a 
production function with panel data: an application to Spanish manufacturing 
firms. Nº.:01-55 Working Papers; Statistics and Econometrics 2001-27. Available: 
[http://orff.uc3m.es/bitstream/handle/10016/173/ws015527.pdf?sequence=1] 
 
Alvarez, Sharon A., and Jay B. Barney. (2007). Discovery and creation: Alternative 
theories of entrepreneurial action. Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal 1.1‐2: 
11-26. 
 
Anderson, Theodore Wilbur, and Cheng Hsiao. (1982). Formulation and estimation 
of dynamic models using panel data. Journal of Econometrics 18.1: 47-82. 
 
Andreoni, J. (2002). The economics of philanthropy. In: Smelser, N.J., Baltes, P.B. 
(eds.), International Encyclopaedia of the Social and Behavioural Sciences, London: 
Elsevier, pp. 11369–11376. 
 
Andreoni, James, Brian Erard and Jonathan Feinstein. (1998). Tax compliance. 
Journal of Economic Literature 36(2). 818-60. 
 
 179 
 
Angrist, Johua and Jorn-Steffen Pischke. (2009). Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An 
Empiricist’s Companion. UK: Princeton University Press.  
 
Ardichvili, Alexander, Richard Cardozo, and Sourav Ray. (2003). A theory of 
entrepreneurial opportunity identification and development. Journal of Business 
Venturing 18.1: 105-123. 
 
Arellano, M., & Bond, S. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte 
Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. The Review of 
Economic Studies 58(2), 277-297. 
 
Arellano, Manuel, and Olympia Bover. (1995). Another look at the instrumental 
variable estimation of error-components models. Journal of Econometrics 68.1: 
29-51. 
 
Arneson, Richard. (1989). Equality and equal opportunity for welfare. Phil.Stud.56, 
77-93. 
 
Arneson, Richard. (2013). Egalitarianism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Summer Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Available: 
[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/egalitarianism]. 
 
Asian Development Bank. (2012). Asian Development Outlook 2012: Confronting 
Rising Inequality in Asia. 
 
Athukrala, P.P.A and Clevo Wilson. (2010). Estimating short and long-term 
residential demand for electricity: new evidence from Sri Lanka. Energy Economics 
32, pp. S34-S40.  
 
Atkinson, A.B., C.G. Trinder and A.K. Maynard. (1978). Evidence on 
intergenerational income mobility in Britain. Economics Letters I 383-388. 
 
Azizov, Abdulla. (2007). Determinants of FDI in CIS countries with Transition 
 180 
 
Economy. Discussion papers. Aarhus School of Business. 
 
Baddeley, Michelle. (2010). Herding social influence and economic 
decision-making: socio-psychological and neuroscientific analyses. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 365.1538: 281-290. 
 
Baltagi, B. H. (2005). Econometric Analysis of Panel Data. 3rd edition, New York: 
John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Banerjee, Abhijit V., and Esther Duflo. (2003). Inequality and growth: what can the 
data say? Journal of economic growth 8.3: 267-299. 
 
Banerjee, Abhijit, and Thomas Piketty. (2005). Top Indian incomes, 1922–2000. The 
World Bank Economic Review 19.1: 1-20. 
 
Barro, Robert J. (2000). Inequality and growth in a panel of countries. Journal of 
Economic Growth 5.1: 5-32. 
 
Baumeister, Roy F. and Brad J. Bushman. (2012). Social Psychology and Human 
nature, 3rd. US: Wadsworth Cengage Learning.  
 
Becker, Gary S. (1976). The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour. Chicago: 
Chicago University Press. 
 
Becker, Gary S. (1975). Human Capital: A theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with 
Special Reference to Education. 2nd edition, New York: National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
 
Becker, Gary S., and Nigel Tomes. (1979). An equilibrium theory of the distribution 
of income and intergenerational mobility. The Journal of Political Economy: 
1153-1189. 
 
Becker, Gary S., and Nigel Tomes. (1986). Human capital and the rise and fall of 
families. Journal of Labour Economics 4, no. 3, pt. 2: S1-S39. 
 181 
 
 
Beenstock, Michael, Ephraim Goldin, and Dan Nabot. (1999). The demand for 
electricity in Israel. Energy Economics 21, pp. 168-183.  
 
Beenstock, Michael. (2004). Rank and quantity mobility in the empirical dynamics of 
inequality. Review of Income and Wealth, Series 50.  
 
Benabou, Roland and Efe A. Ok. (1999). Mobility as progressivity: ranking income 
processes according to equality of opportunity. Mimeo, New York University. 
 
Benabou, Roland. (1996). Meritocracy, redistribution and the size of the pie. C.V. 
Star Center Working paper 96- 43, New York University. 
 
Benjamin, Dwayne, Loren Brandt, and John Giles. (2001). Income persistence and 
the evolution of inequality in rural China. NEUDC Meetings.  
 
Benjamin, Dwayne, Loren Brandt, and John Giles. (2005). The evolution of income 
inequality in rural China. Economic Development and Cultural Change 53.4: 
769-824. 
 
Benjamin, Dwayne, Loren Brandt, and John Giles. (2006). Inequality and growth in 
rural China: does higher inequality impede growth? No. 2344. IZA Discussion 
Papers. 
 
Berg, Andrew G., and Jonathan D. Ostry. (2011a). Equality and efficiency. Finance 
& Development 48.3: 12-15. 
 
Berg, Andrew G., and Jonathan D. Ostry. (2011b). Inequality and unsustainable 
growth: Two sides of the same coin? IMF Staff Discussion Note 11/08, Washington: 
International Monetary Fund. 
 
Bikhchandani, Sushil, David Hirshleifer, and Ivo Welch. (1998). Learning from the 
behaviour of others: Conformity, fads, and informational cascades. The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 12.3: 151-170. 
 182 
 
 
Björklund, Anders and Jäntti Markus. (2009). Intergenerational income mobility and 
the role of family background, Handbook of Economic Inequality. W Salverda, B 
Nolan and T Smeeding (editors), Oxford University Press. 
 
Blazquez, Leticia, Nina Boogen, and Massimo Filippini. (2012). Residential 
electricity demand in Spain: New empirical evidence using aggregate data. Energy 
Economics, doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2012.11.010. 
 
Blundell, Richard, and Stephen Bond. (1998). Initial conditions and moment 
restrictions in dynamic panel data models. Journal of Econometrics 87.1: 115-143. 
 
Boarini, Romina, and Christine Le Clainche. (2009). Social preferences for public 
intervention: An empirical investigation based on French data. Journal of 
Socio-Economics 38.1: 115-128. 
 
Bowsher, Clive G. (2002). On testing overidentifying restrictions in dynamic panel 
data models. Economics Letters 77.2: 211-220. 
 
Box, George EP, and David R. Cox. (1964). An analysis of transformations (with 
discussion). Journal of the Royal Statistical Society B, 26, 211–252. 
 
Brady, D. (1951). Research on the size distribution of income. In: Conference on 
research in income and wealth. Studies in Income and Wealth (Vol. 13, pp. 3–55). 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Breen, Richard, and Jan O. Jonsson. (2005). Inequality of opportunity in comparative 
perspective: Recent research on educational attainment and social mobility. Annual 
Review of Sociology: 223-243.  
 
British Household Panel Survey. (2014). Institute for Social and Economic 
Research. Available: [https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/bhps]  
 
Buunk, Bram P., Frederick X. Gibbons, and A. Buunk. (eds). (2013). Health, 
 183 
 
Coping, and Well-being: Perspectives from Social Comparison Theory. US: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associate. 
 
Calì, Massimiliano. (2008). Urbanisation, inequality and economic growth: 
Evidence from Indian states and towns. Background note for the World 
Development Report, London: Overseas Development Institute. 
 
Cameron, A. Colin, and Pravin K. Trivedi. (2005). Microeconometrics: Methods and 
Applications. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Cannan, Edwin. (1905). The division of income. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 
19.3: 341-369. 
 
Castelló-Climent, Amparo. (2004). A reassessment of the relationship between 
inequality and growth: what human capital inequality data say? Working papers= 
Documentos de trabajo: Serie EC (Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones 
Económicas) 15: 1-33. 
 
Centre for Industrial Energy Efficiency. (2009). The review of Chinese electricity 
pricing system reform. China 
 
Cerrato, Mario, and Nicholas Sarantis. (2002). The cross sectional dependence 
puzzle. London Guildhall University. 
 
Chakravarty, Satya R., Bhaskar Dutta and John A. Weymark. (1985). Ethical indices 
of income mobility. Social Choice and Welfare 2: 1-21. 
 
Checchi, Daniele, (ED) (2006). The Economics of Education: Human Capital, 
Family Background and Inequality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Chen, Jiandong, Dai Dai, Ming Pu, Wenxuan Hou, and Qiaobin Feng. (2010). The 
trend of the Gini coefficient of China. Brooks World Poverty Institute Working 
Paper 109.   
 184 
 
 
Chen, Minjia, and Yongnian Zheng. (2008). China’s regional disparity and its policy 
responses. China & World Economy 16.4: 16-32. 
 
Chen, Xi, and Xiaobo Zhang. (2009). The distribution of income and well-being in 
rural China: a survey of panel data sets, studies and new directions, MPRA paper 
20587.  
 
Chen, Yi, and Frank A. Cowell. (2013). Mobility in China. Suntory and Toyota 
International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE, No. 18. 
 
Chen, Yunsong. (2009). Network effects among rural-to-urban migrants in China. 
Sociology Working Papers Paper Number 2009-06, Department of Sociology, 
University of Oxford.  
 
Chernobai, Anna, and Svetlozar Rachev. (2006). Applying robust methods to 
operational risk modelling. Journal of Operational Risk 1(1), 27-41.  
 
China National Bureau of Statistics. (2011). China Statistical Yearbook.  
 
China Price Information Network. (2012). Public service charges. Available: 
[http://www.chinaprice.com.cn/fgw/chinaprice/free/index.htm], Accessed: 10 
October.  
 
Chinese Academy of Sciences. (2012). China sustainable development report.  
 
Clarke, George R. G. (1995). More evidence on income distribution and growth. 
Journal of Development Economics, 47, pp. 403–427. 
 
Clarke, Kevin A. (2005). The phantom menace: Omitted variable bias in 
econometric research. Conflict Management and Peace Science 22.4: 341-352. 
 
Coase. R. H. (1976). Adam Smith’s view of man. Journal of Law and Economics Vol. 
19, No. 3: The Revolution in Social Thought (Oct.), pp. 529-546. 
 185 
 
 
Cohen, G.A. (1989). On the currency of egalitarian justice. Ethics 99, 906-944.  
 
Corneo, Giacomo, and Hans P. Gruner. (2002) Individual preferences for political 
redistribution. Journal of Public Economics 83: 83-107. 
 
Cowell, Frank A. (1985). Measures of distributional change: An axiomatic approach. 
Review of Economic Studies 52: 135-51.  
 
Cowell, Frank A. (2000). Measurement of Inequality. In Atkinson A.B., Bourguignon 
F. (Eds.) Handbook of Income Distribution. Amsterdam, Elsevier, Vol. 1, pp. 87-166. 
 
Cowell, Frank A. (2007). Income distribution and inequality, STICERD, London 
School of Economics. 
 
Cowell, Frank A. (2011). Measuring Inequality, 3rd Edition, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Cowell, Frank, and Julie Litchfield. (1999). Income inequality comparisons with 
dirty data: The UK and Spain during the 1980s. LSE STICERD Research Paper 45. 
 
Cribb, Jonathan, Andrew Hood, Robert Joyce and David Phillips. (2013). Living 
standards, poverty and inequality in the UK: 2013. Institute for Fiscal Studies, 
doi: 10.1920/re.ifs.2013.0081. 
 
Crisp, Roger. (2013). Well-Being. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy  
(Summer Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Available:  
[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/well-being/].  
 
Cruces, Guillermo, Ricardo Pérez Truglia, and Martin Tetaz. (2012). Biased 
perceptions of income distribution and preferences for redistribution: Evidence from a 
survey experiment. Journal of Public Economics 98 (2013): 100-112.  
 
Cunha, Flavio, James J. Heckman, and Salvador Navarro. (2006). Counterfactual 
 186 
 
analysis of inequality and social mobility. Mobility and Inequality: Frontiers of 
Research in Sociology and Economics: 290-348. 
 
Dahl, Molly, Jonathan Schwabish, and Thomas DeLeire. (2008). Recent trends in the 
variability of individual earnings and household income. Congressional budget office 
paper. Available:  
[http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/95xx/doc9507/06-30-Variability.pdf]. 
 
Dahl, Molly, Thomas DeLeire, and Jonathan A. Schwabish. (2011).Estimates of 
year-to-year volatility in earnings and in household incomes from administrative, 
survey, and matched data. Journal of Human Resources 46.4: 750-774. 
 
Dahlberg, Matz, Eva Mörk and Per Tovmo. (2008). On the performance of the 
Sargan test in the presence of measurement errors in dynamic panels. Applied 
Economics Letters 15: 349-353. Available: 
[http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13504850500447414] 
 
Dalton, Hugh. (1920). The measurement of the inequality of incomes. The Economic 
Journal 30.119: 348-361. 
 
Dang, Guoying. (2000). The report of Chinese rural electricity pricing issues. Review 
of Economic Research (China) 14, pp. 24-32. 
 
Dardanoni, Valentino. (1993). Measuring income mobility. Journal of Economic 
Theory 71: 349-77.  
 
Davidson, Greg, and Paul Davidson. (1996). Economics for Civilized Society. New 
York: ME Sharpe Inc. 
 
Davidson, Paul. (1989). The economics of ignorance or ignorance of economics? 
Critical Review 3.3-4: 467-487. 
 
Davis, Douglas D. (1993). Experimental Economics. UK: Princeton University Press. 
 
 187 
 
De Figueiredo, Erik Alencar, and Flávio Augusto Ziegelmann. (2010). 
Estimating income mobility using census data. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and 
its Applications, Volume 389, Issue 21, 1 November, Pages 4897-4903.   
 
Deininger, Klaus, and Lyn Squire. (1996). A new data set measuring income 
inequality. The World Bank Economic Review 10.3: 565-591.  
 
Deininger, L. Squire. (1998). New ways of looking at old issues: Inequality and 
growth. Journal of Development Economics, 57, pp. 259–287. 
 
Deltas, George. (2003). The Small-Sample Bias of the Gini Coefficient: Results and 
Implications for Empirical Research. The Review of Economics and Statistics 85 (1): 
226–234. 
 
Demick, Barbara. (2011). Protests in China over local grievances surge, and get a 
hearing. Los Angeles Times, 08 October. Available:  
[http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/08/world/la-fg-china-protests-20111009] 
 
Deng, Xiaopeng. (2001). Selected Word of Deng Xiaopeng: 1975-1982. University 
Press of the Pacific.  
 
Dergiades, Theologos, and Lefteris Tsoulfidis. (2008). Estimating residential demand 
for electricity in the United States, 1965-2006. Energy Economics 30, pp. 2722-2730. 
 
Ding, Ning and Yougui Wang. (2008). Household income mobility in China and its 
decomposition. China Economic Review 19, Issue 3, Pages 373-380. 
 
Dloan, Paul and Lordan Grace, (2013). Moving up and sliding down: An empirical 
assessment of the effect of social mobility on subjective wellbeing. Centre of 
Economic Performance, Discussion paper No.1190, The London School of 
Economics. 
 
Duesenberry, J. S. (1949). Income, saving and the theory of consumer behaviour. 
 188 
 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Dworkin, R. (1981). What is equality? Part two: Equality of resources. Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 10, 283-345. 
 
Dynan, Karen E., Douglas W. Elmendorf, and Daniel E. Sichel. (2007). The 
evolution of household income volatility. Division of Research & Statistics and 
Monetary Affairs, Federal Reserve Board. 
 
Edgeworth, F.Y. (1881). Mathematical psychics. London: Routledge.  
 
Edlund, Jonas. (1999). Trust in government and welfare regimes: Attitudes to 
redistribution and financial cheating in the USA and Norway. European Journal of 
Political Research 35.3: 341-370. 
 
Elbers C., Lanjouw P., Mistiaen J.A., Ozler B. (2005). Re-Interpreting sub-group 
inequality decompositions. World Bank, World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper 3687, 42 p. 
 
Electricity Power Reliability Management Centre. (2011). National electricity power 
reliability index. Available: 
[http://www.chinaer.org/list.aspx?m=20100424125434250110] 
 
Eurostat. (2011). Energy Statistics.  
Available: [http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/energy/introduction], 
accessed 25 October. 
 
Fang, C., X. Zhang and S. Fan. (2002). Emergence of urban poverty and inequality in 
China: Evidence from household survey. China Economic Review 13, 430-443. 
 
Fehr, Ernst, and Klaus M. Schmidt. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and 
cooperation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114.3: 817-868. 
 
Fehr, Ernst, and M. Schmidt Klaus. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and 
 189 
 
cooperation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114.3: 817-868.  
 
Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human relations, 
7(2), 117-140. 
 
Fields, G. (2009). Income mobility within a generation: An Introduction to the state 
of the art in Latin America. Research for Public Policy, Human Development, 
HD-03-2009, RBLACUNDP, New York. 
 
Fields, Gary S. (2010). Does income mobility equalize longer-term incomes? New 
measures of an old concept. The Journal of Economic Inequality 8.4: 409-427. 
 
Fields, Gary S. and Efe A Ok. (1996a). The measurement of income mobility: An 
introduction of the literature. New York University.   
 
Fields, Gary S. and Efe A Ok. (1999a). Measuring movement of incomes. Economica 
66, 455-71. 
 
Fields, Gary S., and Efe A Ok. (1996b). The meaning and measurement of income 
mobility. Journal of Economic Theory 71: 349-77. 
 
Fields, Gary S., and Shuang Zhang. (2007). Income mobility in China: Main 
questions, existing evidence, and proposed studies. Available: 
[http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/workingpapers/70/]. 
 
Fields, Gary S., Robert Duval Hernández, Samuel Freije, María Laura Sánchez 
Puerta, Omar Arias, and Juliano Assunção. (2007) Intragenerational income mobility 
in Latin America [with Comments]. Economía 7, no. 2: 101-154. 
 
Fields, Gary, and Efe A Ok. (1999b). The measurement of income mobility: An 
introduction to the literature, in J. Silber, ed., Handbook on income inequality 
measurement, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 
 190 
 
Fields, Gary. S. (2001). Distribution and development: A new look at the developing 
world. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press and Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Fields, Gary.S. (2007). How much should we care about changing income inequality 
in the course of economic growth? Journal of Policy Modelling 29: 577-585. 
 
Figini, Paolo. (1999). Inequality and growth revisited. Department of Economics, 
Trinity College. 
 
Filippini, Massimo, and Shonali Pachauri. (2004). Elasticities of electricity demand in 
urban Indian households. Energy Policy 32, pp. 429-436. 
 
Fisher, Franklin M. and C. Kaysen. (1962). A study in econometrics: The demand for 
electricity in the United States. The American Economic Review Vol. 52, No. 4.  
 
Fong, Christina. (2001). Social preferences, self-interest and the demand for 
redistribution. Journal of Public Economics 82: 225-46. 
 
Forbes, Kristin J. (2000). A Reassessment of the Relationship between Inequality and 
Growth. American Economic Review: 869-887.  
 
Frey, B.S. (1999). Economics as A Science of Human Behaviour. Boston and 
Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
 
Frey, B.S. (2001). Inspiring Economics: Human Motivation in Political Economy. 
Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar. 
 
Friedman, M. (1953). Choice, chance and the personal distribution of income. Journal 
of Political Economy 61, 277–290. 
 
Friedman, Milton. (1957). The permanent income hypothesis: A theory of the 
consumption function. Princeton University Press 20-37. 
 
Friedman, Milton. (1962). Capitalism and Freedom. University of Chicago Press.  
 191 
 
Gabbatt, Adam. (2011). Occupy Wall Street: protests and reaction Thursday 6 
October. Guardian, London. October 6. Available: 
[http://www.theguardian.com/world/blog/2011/oct/06/occupy-wall-street-protests-liv
e] 
 
Galbraith, John Kenneth, and Alan Crook. (1958). The Affluent Society. New York: 
Houghton Mifflin. 
 
Gallup, John Luke. (2012). Is there a Kuznets curve? Working paper. Portland State 
University. 
 
Galor, Oded. (2011). Inequality, human capital formation and the process of 
development. No. w17058. National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
Gangl, Markus, Joakim Palme, and Lane Kenworthy. (2007). Is high inequality offset 
by mobility? University of Mannheim. 
 
Gelman, A. (2013). How do we choose our default methods? For the Committee of 
Presidents of Statistical Societies 50th anniversary volume. 
 
Giddens, Owen, Giddens, Sandra. (2005). Chinese Mythology. New York: The 
Rosen Publishing Group.  
 
Gini, C. (1912). Italian: Variabilità e mutabilità (Variability and Mutability’, C. 
Cuppini, Bologna, 156 pages. Reprinted inMemorie di metodologica statistica (Ed. 
Pizetti E, Salvemini, T.). Rome: Libreria Eredi Virgilio Veschi (1955). 
 
Goethals, G. R., and Darley, J. (1977). Social comparison theory: An attributional 
approach. In J. M. Suis and R. L. Miller (eds.), Social Comparison Processes: 
Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives. Washington, DC: Hemisphere. 
 
Goldfarb, Robert R. and Thomas C. Leonard. (2005). Inequality of what among 
whom? Rival Conceptions of distribution in the 20th century, The Elsevier Ltd.  
 
 192 
 
Gong, Honge, Andrew Leigh, and Xin Meng. (2012). Intergenerational income 
mobility in urban China. Review of Income and Wealth 58.3: 481-503. 
 
Gosepath, Stefan. (2011). Equality. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Spring Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Available:  
[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/equality/]. 
 
Gosselin, Peter G. (2004). The poor have more things today—Including wild income 
swings. December. Los Angeles Times, 12th edition. Available:  
[http://www.latimes.com/business/la-ﬁ-poor12dec12,1,5929236.story]. 
 
Gosselin, Peter G. (2008). High Wire: The Precarious Financial Lives of American 
Families. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Gosselin, Peter G., and Zimmerman, Seth D. (2007). Trends in Income Volatility and 
Risk, 1970–2004. Washington DC: Urban Institute. Available:  
[http://www.urban.org/publications/411672.html]. 
 
Gottschalk, Peter and Robert Moffitt. (1994). The growth of earnings instability in 
the U.S. labour market. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1, 217–254. 
 
Gottschalk, Ricardo and Patricia Justino. (2006). Overcoming Inequality in Latin 
America: Issues and Challenges for the Twenty-first Century. New York: Routledge. 
 
Gravier-Rymaszewska, Joanna, Joanna Tyrowicz and Jacek Kochanowicz. (2010). 
Intra-provincial inequalities and economic growth in China. Economic Systems, 
Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 237-258, September. 
 
Gravier-Rymaszewska, Joanna, Joanna Tyrowicz, and Jacek Kochanowicz. (2010). 
Intra-provincial inequalities and economic growth in China. Economic Systems 34.3: 
237-258. 
 
 193 
 
Gregory, P.R. (2012). Is President Obama Truly A Socialist? Forbes. 22 January. 
Gruder, Charles L. (1971). Determinants of social comparison choices. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology 7(5), 473-489. 
 
Hacker, Jacob. (2006). The Great Risk Shift. New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Hagerty, Michael R. (2000). Social comparisons of income in one’s community: 
evidence from national surveys of income and happiness. Journal of Personality and 
social Psychology 78.4:764. 
 
Haile Daniel T. (2005). Inequality, redistribution and growth: theory and evidence. 
PhD thesis. 
 
Halicioglu, Ferda. (2007). Residential electricity demand dynamics in Turkey. 
Energy Economics 29, pp. 199-210. 
 
Harper, Douglas. (2013). Online Etymology Dictionary – Economy. Available: 
[http://www.etymonline.com/] [Accessed: July 31, 2013]. 
 
Hart, Peter E. (1976). The dynamics of earnings, 1963-1973. The Economic Journal 
86.343: 551-565. 
 
Hartman, R.S. and A. Werth. 1981. “Short-Run Residential Demand for Fuels: A 
Disaggregated Approach.” Land Economics 57(2):197-212. 
 
Hassler, John, José V. Rodríguez Mora, and Joseph Zeira. (2007). Inequality and 
mobility. Journal of Economic Growth 12.3: 235-259. 
 
Hausman, Daniel M. (2013). Philosophy of economics. The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Available:  
[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/economics/]. 
 
Hausman, Jerry A. (1978). Specification tests in econometrics. Econometrica 46, 
 194 
 
pp.1251–1271. 
 
Hayton, James, Gaylen N. Chandler, and Dawn R. DeTienne. (2011). 
Entrepreneurial opportunity identification and new firm development processes: a 
comparison of family and non-family new ventures. International Journal of 
Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management 13.1: 12-31. 
 
He, Y.X, Yang, L.F, He, H.Y., Luo, T. and Wang, Y.J. (2011). Electricity demand 
price elasticity in China based on computable general equilibrium model analysis. 
Energy 36, pp.1115-1123. 
 
Henderson, David R., Robert M. McNab, and Tamas Rozsas. (2005). The hidden 
inequality in socialism. The independent review 9, no. 3: 389-412.  
 
Hill, R.Carter, William E. Griffiths, and Guay C. Lim. (2008). Principles of 
Econometrics. 3rd  Edition, UK: John Wiley & Son Inc. 
 
Hills, John. (2010). An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK: Report of the 
national equality panel. LSE STICERD Research Paper No. CASEREPORT60. 
 
Hirshleifer, Jack. (1985). The expanding domain of economics. American Economic 
Review: 75 (May): 53-68. 
 
Hobbes, Thomas. (1651). Leviathan. England.   
 
Hoechle, Daniel. (2007). Robust standard errors for panel regressions with 
cross-sectional dependence. Stata Journal 7.3: 281. 
 
Hofstede, Geert, and Gert Jan Hofstede. (2005). Cultures and organizations, software 
of the mind, intercultural cooperation and its importance for survival. Revised and 
expanded 2nd edition. 
 
Holtedahl, Pernille, and Frederick L. Joutz. (2004). Residential electricity in Taiwan. 
 195 
 
Energy Economics 26, pp. 201-224. 
 
Hong, Ying. (2001). The practice of business ethics in China: We need a parent. 
Business Ethics: A European Review 10.2: 87-91. 
 
Houthakker, Hendrik S. (1951). Some Calculations on electricity consumption in 
Great Britain. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Vol.114: No.3. 
 
Hsiao, Cheng. (2003). Analysis of panel data. 2nd Edition, Cambridge: Cambridge 
university press. 
 
Huang, Ho-Chuan, Yi-Chen Lin, and Chih-Chuan Yeh. (2012). An appropriate test 
of the Kuznets hypothesis. Applied Economics Letters, 19(1): 47-51. 
 
Huang, Yashen. (2008). Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship 
and the State. Cambridge University Press.  
 
Huang, Yukon, and Xubei Luo. (2008). Reshaping economic geography in China. 
Reshaping Economic Geography. 
 
Huber, Peter J. (1981). Robust Statistics. UK: John Wiley & Son Inc. 
 
Hulme, David, and John Toye. (2006). The case for cross-disciplinary social science 
research on poverty, inequality and well-being. The Journal of Development 
Studies 42.7: 1085-1107. 
 
Inner Mongolia Electric Power Company (1998) The history of Chinese electricity 
industry: Inner Mongolia electricity industry from 1903 to 1996. Beijing: Inner 
Mongolia People’s Publishing Press. 
 
International Monetary Fund. 2011. Primary Commodity Prices. Available: 
[http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/index.aspx], access at 18 October. 
 
International Monetary Fund. (2011). World Economic Outlook Database 2011, 
 196 
 
April Edition.  
 
Jan, Action, Mitchell Bridger, and Mowill Ragnhild. (1976). Residential demand for 
electricity in Los Angeles: an econometric study of disaggregated data. The Rand 
Corporation R-1899-NSF. 
 
Jarvis, Sarah and Stephen P. Jenkins. (1998). How much income mobility is there in 
Britain? The Economic Journal 108: 1-16. 
 
Jarvis, Sarah, and Stephen P. Jenkins. (1997). Low income dynamics in 1990s 
Britain. Fiscal Studies 18.2: 123-142. 
 
Jeffries, Stuart. (2012). Why Marxism is on the rise again?. The Guardian. 4 July. 
Available: [http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/04/the-return-of-marxism]    
 
Jenkins, Stephen P. (2010). Income inequality and poverty dynamics in Britain. 
Available:  
[http://www.socialsituation.eu/workshop-presentations/30-11-2010-social-mobility/
Sjenkins.pdf]  
 
Jenkins, Stephen P. and Philippe Van Kerm. (2008). The Measurement of Economic 
Inequality, Edited by Salverda Wiemer, Nolan Brian, Smeeding Timothy M., The 
Oxford Hand Book of Economic Inequality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Jianhua, Cao. (2005). On Human-orientation. Journal of Beijing Administrative 
College1 (China): 017. 
 
Jones, Derek C., Cheng Li, and Ann L. Owen. (2003). Growth and regional inequality 
in China during the reform era. China Economic Review 14.2: 186-200. 
 
Kamal, Fariha, Mary E. Lovely, and Puman Ouyang. (2012). Does deeper integration 
enhance spatial advantages? Market access and wage growth in China. International 
Review of Economics & Finance 23: 59-74. 
 
 197 
 
Kanbur, Ravi, and Xiaobo Zhang. (2005). Fifty years of regional inequality in China: 
a journey through central planning, reform, and openness. Review of Development 
Economics 9.1: 87-106. 
 
Keynes, John Maynard. (1936). The General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money. UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Khan, Azizur R, and Carl Riskin. (2001). Inequality and Poverty in China in the Age 
of Globalisation. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
 
Khor, N., and J. Pencavel. (2006), Income mobility of individuals in China and the 
United States. Economics of Transition 14(3), 417−458. 
 
King, Mervyn A. (1983), An index of inequality: with applications to horizontal 
equity and social mobility. Econometrica 51: 99-115. 
 
Kirschen, Daniel S. (2003). Demand-side view of electricity markets. IEEE 
Transactions On Power Systems 18, No.2. 
 
Klein, Peter G. (2008). Opportunity discovery, entrepreneurial action, and economic 
organization. Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal 2.3: 175-190. 
 
Knell, Markus. (1999).Social comparisons, inequality, and growth. Journal of  
Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 155, 1999, 6664-695. 
 
Koenker, Roger, and Gilbert Bassett Jr. (1978). Regression quantiles. Econometrica: 
Journal of the Econometric Society: 33-50. 
 
Koenker, Roger, and Kevin Hallock. (2001). Quantile regression: An introduction. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 15.4: 43-56. 
 
Kohen, Andrew I., Herbert S. Parnes, and John R. Shea. (1975). Income instability 
among young and middle-aged men. The personal distribution of income and 
 198 
 
wealth. NBER. 151-208. 
 
Kolenikov, Stanislav, and Anthony Shorrocks. (2005). A decomposition analysis of 
regional poverty in Russia. Review of Development Economics 9.1: 25-46. 
 
Kolm, Serge-Christophe. (2000). Introduction: The economics of reciprocity, giving 
and altruism. In: Gérard-Varet, Louis André, Serge-Christophe Kolm and Jean 
Mercier Ythier (eds.). The Economics of Reciprocity, Giving and Altruism. UK: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Kravis, Irving B. (1962). The structure of income: Some quantitative essays. 
University of Pennsylvania. 
 
Kruglanski, A. W., and O. Mayseless. (1990). Classic and current social comparison 
research: Expanding the perspective. Psychological bulletin 108(2), 195-208. 
 
Krugman, Paul. (1992). The rich, the right, and the facts. The American Prospect. 
11: Fall, 19-31. 
 
Krugman, Paul. (2008). Let’s get fiscal. The New York Times, October 16. Available:  
[http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/17/opinion/17krugman.html?_r=0]. 
 
Kuijs, Louis, and Tao Wang. (2005). China’s pattern of growth: Moving to 
sustainability and reducing inequality. World Bank policy research working 
paper 3767. 
 
Kuznets, Simon. (1955). Economic growth and income inequality. American 
Economic Review: 45, 1–28. 
 
Lam, Pun-Lee. (2004). Pricing of electricity in China. Energy 29, pp. 287-300. 
 
Larsen, Bodil Merethe, and Runa Nesbakken.  (2004). Household electricity end-use 
consumption: result from econometric and engineering models. Energy Economics 
 199 
 
26, pp. 179-200. 
 
Lazear, Edward P. (2000). Economic imperialism. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 115.1: 99-146. 
 
Ledyard, John O. (1995). Public Goods: A survey of experimental research. In: John 
H. Kagel und Alvin E. Roth (eds.). Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 111-194. 
 
Lee, Chul-In, and Gary Solon. (2009). Trends in intergenerational income mobility. 
Review of Economics and Statistics 91, 766−772. 
 
Lewis, W. Arthur. (1954). Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of 
Labour. Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies, Vol. 22, pp. 139-91.  
 
Li, Chenyang. (2006). The Confucian ideal of harmony. Philosophy East & West, 56, 
583-603. 
 
Li, Shi, Hiroshi Sato, and Terry Sicular (eds). (2013). Rising Inequality in China: 
Challenges to a Harmonious Society. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Lillard, Lee A., and Robert J. Willis. (1978). Dynamic aspects of earning mobility. 
Econometrica: 985-1012. 
 
Lin, Bo Q. (2003). Electricity demand in the people’s republic of China: Investment 
requirement and environmental impact. Asian Development Bank, Economics and 
research department working paper series: NO.37. 
 
Liu, Xiaming, Chengang Wang, and Yingqi Wei. (2001). Causal links between 
foreign direct investment and trade in China. China Economic Review 12.2: 190-202. 
 
Lorente Prieto, Laura, Marisa Salanova Soria, Isabel Martínez Martínez, and Wilmar 
Schaufeli. (2008). Extension of the job demands-Resources model in the prediction 
 200 
 
of burnout and engagement among teachers over time. Psicothema 20(3), 354-360. 
 
Loury, Glenn C. (1981). Intergenerational transfers and the distribution of earnings. 
Econometrica 49: 843-867.  
 
Lukiyanova, Anna, and Oshchepkov Aleksey. (2012). Income mobility in Russia 
(2000–2005). Economic Systems, Volume 36, Issue 1, March, Pages 46-64. 
 
Luo, Xubei, and Nong Zhu. (2008). Rising income inequality in China: a race to the 
top. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
Luttmer, Erzo FP. (2005). Neighbors as negatives: Relative earnings and well-being. 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 120.3: 963-1002. 
 
Manski, Charles F. (2000). Economic analysis of social interactions. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 115-136. 
 
Markandya, Anil. (1982). Intergenerational exchange mobility and economic welfare. 
European Economic Review 17: 97-102.  
 
Markandya, Anil. (1984). The welfare measurement of changes in economic mobility. 
Economica 51:457-471. 
 
Marshall, Alfred. (1890). Principles of Economics.1st Edition. London: Macmillan.  
 
Matsukawa, Isamu. (2004). The effects of information on residential demand for 
electricity. The Energy Journal Vol 25, No.1. 
 
McDonald, I. M., N. Nikiforakis, N. Olekalns, and H. Sibly. (2013). Social 
comparisons and reference group formation: Some experimental evidence. Games 
and Economic Behaviour 79, 75-89. 
 
McFadden, Daniel. (2001). Economic choices. The American Economic Review 91.3: 
351-378. 
 201 
 
 
McMillan, Graige. (2011). So that is how modern socialism works. WND 
Commentary. 30 November.  
 
Meisner, Maurice. (1999). Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s 
Republic. 3rd Edition. Free Press.  
 
Mill, John Stuart. (1863).Utilitarianism. London. 
 
Miller, S. M. (1956). The concept and measurement of mobility, in ISA. 
Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology, Vol. 3, pp.144–155.  
 
Mincer, Jacob. (1958). Investment in human capital and personal income 
distribution. The Journal of Political Economy 66.4: 281-302. 
 
Minsky, Hyman P. (2008). John Maynard Keynes. US: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Mishel, L., J. Bernstein, and H. Shierholz. (2008). The State of Working America 
2008–2009. Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute. 
 
Mitchell, Daniel J. (2005). The impact of government spending on economic growth. 
The Heritage Foundation, No. 1831.  
 
Modigliani, Franco, and Richard Brumberg. (1954). Utility analysis and the 
consumption function: An interpretation of cross-section data. FRANCO 
MODIGLIANI 1. 
 
Mofﬁtt, Robert A., and Peter Gottschalk. (1995). Trends in the autocovariance 
structure of earnings in the U.S.: 1969–1987.Working paper no. 355, Department of 
Economics. Johns Hopkins University. Available: 
[http://www.econ.jhu.edu/people/mofﬁtt/]. 
 
Morrison, Wayne M. (2012). China’s economic conditions. Library of Congress 
 202 
 
Washington DC Congressional Research Service. Available:  
[http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/194783.pdf ] 
 
Mueller, D.C. (2003). Public choice III. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Myerson, Roger B. (1999). Nash equilibrium and the history of economic theory. 
Journal of Economic Literature 37.3: 1067-1082. 
 
Nakajima, Tadahiro, and S. Hamori. (2010). Change in consumer sensitivity to 
electricity prices in response to retail deregulation: a panel empirical analysis of the 
residential demand for electricity in the United States. Energy Policy 23, pp. 
2470-2476. 
 
Nakajima, Tadahiro. (2010). The residential demand for electricity in Japan: an 
examination using empirical panel analysis techniques. Journal of Asian Economics 
21, pp. 412-420. 
 
Narayan, P.K., and R. Smyth. (2005). The residential demand for electricity in 
Australia: an application of the bounds testing approach to cointegration. Energy 
Policy 33, pp. 467-474. 
 
Narayan, Paresh Kumar, Russell Smyth, and Arti Prasad. (2007). Electricity 
consumption in G7 countries: a panel cointegration analysis of residential demand 
elasticities. Energy Policy 35, pp. 4485-4494. 
 
National Development and Planning Commission. (1998). “Strengthen the 
administration of electricity prices in rural area, and forbidden collecting fees, 
apportion and fine illegally to end-users”. Document No. 39. 
 
National Institute for Economic Experimentation. Report on Chinese City Life 
Quality 2011. Social Sciences Academic Press, China.  
 
Nee, V. (1996). The emergence of a market society: Changing mechanisms of 
 203 
 
stratification in China. American Journal of Sociology 100, 908−949.  
 
Nichols, Austin, and Seth Zimmerman. (2008). Measuring trends in income 
variability. Urban Institute discussion paper. Available: 
[http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=411688]. 
 
Nichols, Austin. (2008). Income Inequality, Volatility, and Mobility Risk. The Urban 
Institute, Washington, D.C. US. Available: 
[http://www.urban.org/Pressroom/firsttuesdays/upload/Nichols-iivmr.pdf ]  
 
Nichols, Austin. (2010). Income inequality, volatility, and mobility risk in China and 
the US. China Economic Review 21: S3-S11. 
 
Palley, Thomas. I. (2008). The Relative Income Theory of Consumption: A 
Synthetic Keynes-Duesenberry-Friedman Model. PERI Working Papers, 140. 
 
Parker, Simon C. and Sam Gardner. (2002). International income mobility.  
Economics Letters 76.2: 179-187.  
 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics. (2014). Institute of Social Research. Available: 
[http://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/]  
 
Paukert Felix. (1973). Income distribution at different levels of development: a 
survey of evidence. Heinonline 108 Int’l Lab. Rev.97.  
 
Pesaran, H. (2004). General Diagnostic Tests for Cross Section Dependence in 
Panels. CESIfo Working Paper 1229. 
 
Pew Research Center. (2012). Growing concerns in China about inequality, 
corruption. Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Project. 
 
Piketty, Thomas. (1995). Social mobility and redistributive politics. The Quarterly 
journal of economics 110.3: 551-584. 
 
 204 
 
Piketty, Tomas. (2014). Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Harvard University 
Press. 
 
Pischke, Jörn-Steffen. (1995). Individual income, incomplete information and 
aggregate consumption. Econometrica 63 No.4, 805-840. 
 
Prieto-Rodríguez, Juan, Juan Gabriel Rodríguez, and Rafael Salas. (2010). Income 
mobility and economic inequality from a regional perspective. Journal of Applied 
Economics, Volume 13, Issue 2, November, Pages 335-350. 
 
Pryor, Frederic L. (1973). Simulation of the impact of social and economic 
institutions on the size distribution of income and wealth. The American Economic 
Review 63.1: 50-72. 
Quadrini, Vincenzo. (1999). Growth, learning and redistributive policies. Journal of 
Public Economics, Volume 74, Issue 2, November, Pages 263-297. 
 
Ravallion, Martin, and Michael Lokshin. (2000). Who wants to redistribute? The 
tunnel effect in 1990 Russia. Journal of Public Economics 76: 87-104. 
 
Ravallion, Martin, and Shaohua Chen. (2007). China’s (uneven) progress against 
poverty. Journal of development economics 82.1: 1-42. 
 
Ravallion, Martin. (1998). Does aggregation hide the harmful effects of inequality  
on growth? Economics Letters 61.1: 73-77. 
 
Rawls, John. (1971). A Theory of Justice. US: Harvard University Press.  
 
Rawski, Thomas G. (2001). What is happening to China’s GDP statistics? China 
Economic Review 12.4: 347-354.  
 
Reiss, P.C. and M.W. White. 2003. “Demand and Pricing in Electricity Markets: 
Evidence from San Diego During California’s Energy Crisis.” National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper 9986, Cambridge: MA. 
 205 
 
 
Ricardo, David. (1817). On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. 
London: John Murray. 
 
Ringen, Stein and Kinglun Ngok. (2013). What kind of welfare state is emerging in 
China? The Social Security in China Project, Asian Studies Centre, ST. Antony’s 
college, University of Oxford. 
 
Roemer John E. (2006). Economic Development as Opportunity Equalization. 
Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No.1583.  
 
Roemer, John E. (1998). Equality of Opportunity. London: Harvard University Press.   
 
Roemer, John E. (2003). Defending Equality of Opportunity. The Monist, Vol.86, 
No.2, pp.261-282.  
Rohac, Dalibor. (2011). Does Inequality Matter? Adam Smith Institute.  
 
Roodman, David. (2007). A short note on the theme of too many instruments. Center 
for Global Development Working Paper 125. 
 
Roodman, David. (2009a). A note on the theme of too many instruments. Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 71.1: 135-158. 
 
Roodman, David. (2009b). How to do xtabond2: An introduction to difference and 
system GMM in Stata. Stata Journal 9.1: 86. 
 
Roudi, Farzaneh. (2011). Youth Population and Employment in the Middle East and 
North Africa: Opportunity or Challenge? Population Reference Bureau. Washington, 
DC 20009. US. 
 
Ruiz-Castillo, Javier (2004), The measurement of structural and exchange income 
mobility. Journal of Economic Inequality 2: 219-28. 
 
Sa’ad, S. (2009), Electricity Demand for South Korean Residential Sector. Energy 
Policy 37, 5469–5474. 
 206 
 
 
Salidjanova, Nargiza. (2013). China’s new income inequality reform plan and 
implications for rebalancing. US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. 
 
Samuelson, Paul A. (1992). Adam Smith’s legacy: his place in the development of 
modern economics. Page 1. In Fry, Michael, ed. Adam Smith’s legacy: His Place in 
the Development of Modern Economics. London and New York: Routledge. 
 
Sarafidis, Vasilis, and Tom Wansbeek. (2012). Cross-sectional dependence in panel 
data analysis. Econometric Reviews 31.5: 483-531. 
 
Sen, A. (1981). “Equality of what?” in S. McMurrin, ed. The Tanner Lectures in 
Human Values. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press. 
 
Senik, Claudia. (2005). Income distribution and well‐being: what can we learn from 
subjective data? Journal of Economic Surveys 19.1: 43-63.  
 
Shane, Scott, and Sankaran Venkataraman. (2000). The promise of entrepreneurship 
as a field of research. Academy of management review 25.1: 217-226. 
 
Shear, Boone and Stephen Healy. (2011). Occupy Wall Street: A Gift for the 
Economy. Ttruthout, 27 October. Available:  
[http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/4369:occupy-wall-street-a-gift-for-the-econom
y]  
 
Shi, Xuehua, J. Alexander Nuetah, and Xian Xin. (2010). Household income 
mobility in rural China: 1989–2006. Economic Modelling 27.5: 1090-1096. 
 
Shin, Donggyun, and Gary Solon. (2008). Trends in men’s earnings volatility: What 
does the panel study of income dynamics show? NBER Working Paper No. 14075. 
Available: [http://www.nber.org/papers/w14075]. 
 
Shorrocks, Anthony F. (1978a). Income Inequality and Income Mobility. Journal of 
 207 
 
Economic Theory 19.2, 376-393. 
 
Shorrocks, Anthony F. (1978b). The measurement of mobility. Econometrica 46: 
1013-24. 
 
Shorrocks, Anthony F. (1980). The Class of Additively Decomposable Inequality 
Measures. Econometrica 48: 613-625. 
 
Shorrocks, Anthony F. (1984). Inequality Decomposition by Population Subgroups. 
Econometrica 52: 1369-85. 
 
Sicular, Terry, Yue Ximing, Björn Gustafsson, and Li Shi. (2007). The urban–rural 
income gap and inequality in China. Review of Income and Wealth 53, no. 1: 93-126. 
 
Sloman, Aaron. (2010). An alternative to working on machine consciousness. 
International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2.01: 1-18. 
 
Smith, Adam. (1759). The theory of moral sentiments. A. London: Millar.    
 
Smith, Adam. (1776). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations. London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell. 
 
Smith, Adam. (1909). Wealth of Nations, edited by C. J. Bullock. Vol. X. The  
Harvard Classics. New York: P.F. Collier & Son, 1909–14; Bartleby.com, 
2001. Available: [www.bartleby.com/10/]. 
 
Soltow Lee. (1965). Toward Income Equality in Norway. Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, P17. 
 
Soltow Lee. (1968). Long run changes in British income inequality. Economic 
History Review, Apr, pp.17-29. 
 
Song, Shunfeng, Erqian Zhu, and Sankar Mukhopadhyay. (2009). Urban Poor in 
China: A Descriptive Analysis. The Chinese Economy 42, pp.44-62. 
 208 
 
 
State Council. (1998). “关于改造农村电网改革农电管理体制实现城乡同网同价请示的通
知” (“Transforming Electricity Gird and Reform the Administration of Electricity 
Prices in Rural Areas to Achieve Uniform Price Between Urban and Rural Areas.”), 
3 October, document 134. 
 
State Council. (2003). “电价改革方案” (“Electricity Pricing System Reform 
Scheme”), 9 July, document 62. Available: 
[http://www.chinapower.com.cn/article/1078/art1078750.asp]    
 
State Council. (2013). “关于深化收入分配制度改革的若干意见” (“Several Opinions on 
Deepening the Reform of the Income Distribution System”), 3 February, document 
06. Available: 
[http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-02/05/content_2327531.htm] 
 
State Grid Corporation of China. (1998). “关于加强农村电价管理、切实减轻农民
负担的决定 ” (“Strengthen the administration of electricity prices in rural area and 
reducing the burden on farmer”). Document 02. 
 
Stock, James H., Jonathan H. Wright, and Motohiro Yogo. (2002). A survey of weak 
instruments and weak identification in generalized method of moments. Journal of 
Business & Economic Statistics 20.4. 
 
Su, Qi. (2001). Economic inequality and economic growth. Institute of 
Management, Humboldt-University, Berlin. 
 
Suls, Jerry, Rene Martin, and Ladd Wheeler. (2002). Social comparison: Why, with 
whom, and with what effect? Current directions in psychological science, 11(5), 
159-163. 
 
Sun, W.K., J.Y. Lu, and C.E. Bai. (2007). An analysis of income mobility in rural 
China. Economic Research Journal No. 8, 43–57. 
 
Tanner M.S. (2011). Unrest in China and the Chinese State’s Institutional 
 209 
 
Responses. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on 
China’s Internal Dilemmas. Available: 
[http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2.25.11Tanner.pdf ] 
 
Tesser, A., and J. Campbell. (1982). Self-evaluation maintenance and the perception 
of friends and strangers. Journal of Personality 50(3), 261-279. 
 
The 12th Five-Year Plan. (2011). China’s Five-Year Plan: 2011-2015. The National 
People Congress.    
 
The Economist. (2014). A Modern Max. Available: 
[http://www.economist.com/printedition/2014-05-03]  
 
The Local Chronicles of Guangxi Province: Electricity Industry Volume, 1992, 
China Water Power Press. 
 
The Local Chronicles of Wuhan City from 1980 to 2000: Electricity Industry 
Volume, Wuhan University Press. 
 
Theil, Henri. (1967). Economics and Information Theory. Vol. 7. Amsterdam: 
North-Holland.  
 
Tian, Ye. (2012). The Effect of Income Inequality on Economic Growth in China. 
Economics & Business Journal: Inquiries & Perspectives. Volume 4 Number 10. 
 
Todorov, Valentin. (2010). Outlier detection in survey data, UNIDO. Available: 
[http://www.statistik.tuwien.ac.at/ameli/presentations/Thu3/ameli-todorov.pdf] 
 
Tsui, Kai-yuen. (1996). Economic Reform and Interprovincial Inequalities in China. 
Journal Of Development Economics 50: 353-368. 
 
U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2011). Available: [http://www.eia.gov/], 
accessed 15 October. 
 
 210 
 
Vaghely, Ivan P., and Pierre-André Julien. (2010). Are opportunities recognized or 
constructed?: An information perspective on entrepreneurial opportunity 
identification. Journal of Business Venturing 25.1: 73-86. 
 
Van Kerm, Philippe. (2004). What lies behind income mobility? Reranking and 
distributional change in Belgium, Germany and the USA. Economica 71: 223-39. 
 
Van Kerm, Philippe. (2007). Extreme incomes and the estimation of poverty and 
inequality indicators from EU-SILC. IRISS Working Paper Series 2007-01, 
CEPS/INSTEAD. 
 
Venables, W. N. and B. D. Ripley. (2002). Modern Applied Statistics with S. 4th 
Edition, US: Springer. 
 
Venkataraman, S., S. D. Sarasvathy, N. Dew, and W. R. Forster. (2012). Reflections 
on the 2010 AMR decade award: Whither the promise? Moving forward with 
entrepreneurship as a science of the artificial. Academy of Management 
Review 37(1), 21-33. 
 
Venn, D. (2011). Earnings Volatility and its Consequences for Households. OECD 
Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 125, OECD Publishing. 
Available:[http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg3v00zgslw-en] 
 
Vriend, Nicolaas J. (1996). Rational behaviour and economic theory. Journal of 
Economic Behaviour and Organization, Vol.29: 263-285. 
 
Wan, Guanghua, Ming Lu, and Zhao Chen. (2007). Globalization and regional 
income inequality: empirical evidence from within China. Review of Income and 
Wealth 53.1: 35-59.  
 
Wang, Haigang. (2005). The household income mobility and its equalizing long-term 
income in China. Economic Research Journal 1, 56−66 (in Chinese).  
 
 211 
 
Wang, Haigang. (2007). Research on Income Distribution and Mobility in China, 
Guangzhou. Sun Yat-sen University Press, China. 
 
Wang, Xiaoning. (2013). Why do Workers and Farmers Miss Chairman Mao?  
Independent Chinese Pen Center. 17 Fed. Available: 
[http://blog.boxun.com/hero/201302/wxn/61_1.shtml]  
 
Weather Underground. (2012). Available:  
[http://www.wunderground.com/], Accessed: 09/2012. 
 
Weisskoff, Richard. (1970). Income distribution and economic growth in Puerto 
Rico, Argentina and Mexico. Review of Income and Wealth, Dec.1970, pp.303-332.  
 
Whalley, John, and Ximing Yue. (2009). Rural income volatility and inequality in 
China. CESifo Economic Studies 55.3-4: 648-668.  
 
White, H. (1980). A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix and a Direct 
Test for Heteroskedasticity. Econometrica 48, 817–838.  
 
White, Judith B., Ellen J. Langer, Leeat Yariv, and John C. Welch IV. (2006). 
Frequent Social Comparisons and Destructive Emotions and Behaviours: The Dark 
Side of Social Comparisons. Journal of Adult Development, Vol. 13, No. 1. DOI: 
10.1007/s10804-006-9005-0. 
 
Wills, John. (1977). Residential demand for electricity in Massachusetts. Working 
paper NO. MIT-EL: 77-016 WP. The work was supported by National Science 
Foundation Fellowship. 
Wills, T. A. (1981). Downward Comparison Principles in Social Psychology. 
Psychological bulletin 90(2), 245. 
 
 212 
 
Wolff, Richard D. (2013). A Socialism for the 21st Century. Truthout. 07 June. 
Available: [http://truth-out.org/news/item/16797] 
 
Wooldridge, J.M. (2002). Econometric Analysis of Cross-Section and Panel Data, 
MIT Press, Sec. 10.5.4, p. 274. 
 
World Bank, (2004) Beyond Economic Growth: An Introduction to Sustainable 
Development, 2nd Edition, Washington, D.C. 
 
World Bank. (2010). World Development Indicators 2010. Washington, DC, p. 91. 
Available:[ http://data.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/section2.pdf ] 
 
World Bank. (2010). Development Data Group, (ed.) World Development Indicators 
2010. World Bank-free PDF. Washington, DC. 
 
Wu, Xiaogang, and Jun Li. (2013). Economic Growth, Income Inequality and 
Subjective Well-being: Evidence from China. Population Studies Centre Research 
Report 13-796, University of Michigan. 
 
Xu, Shaofeng, and Wenying Chen. (2006). The reform of electricity power sector in 
the PR of China. Energy Policy 34, pp. 2455-2465. 
 
Xue, Jinjun. (1997). Urban-rural income disparity and its significance in China. 
Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics 38.1: 45-59. 
 
Yang, D. T. and H. Zhou. (1999). Rural–urban disparity and sectoral labour 
allocation in China. Journal of Development Studies 35(3), 105–133. 
 
Yao, Chunsheng, Chongying Chen, and Ming Li. (2012). Analysis of rural residential 
energy consumption and corresponding carbon emissions in China. Energy Policy 41, 
pp. 445–450. 
 
Yao, Shujie. (1999). Economic growth, income inequality and poverty in China under 
economic reforms. The Journal of Development Studies 35.6: 104-130.  
 213 
 
 
Yin, H., S. Li, and Q. Deng. (2006). Income mobility in urban China. Economic 
Research Journal 10, 30−43 (in Chinese). 
 
Yitzhaki S., Lerman R. (1991) Income Stratiﬁcation and Income Inequality. Review 
of Income and Wealth, 37(3), pp. 313-.29. 
 
Zanella, Giulio. (2004). Social interactions and economic behaviour. University 
Wisconsin-Madison and University of Siena. 
 
Zhang, C., and T. C. Heller. (2007). Reform of the Chinese electric power market: 
economics and institutions. Edited by Victor D. and Heller T.C., The Political 
Economy of Power Sector Reform. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Zhang, Q., J.W. Mi, and J.K. Huang. (2007). Income mobility and income 
distribution: evidence from rural China. Economic Research Journal 11, 123–139. 
 
Zhang, Yingqiang and Eriksson Tor. (2010). Inequality of opportunity and income 
inequality in nine Chinese provinces 1989-2006. China Economic Review 21 
607-616.   
 
Zhao, Xiaoli, Thomas P. Lyon, and Cui Song. (2012). Lurching towards markets for 
power: China’s electricity policy 1985-2007. Applied Energy 94, pp. 148-155. 
 
Zhao, Zhong. (2008). Earnings instability and earnings inequality in urban China: 
1989-2006. Available: SSRN 1136432 (2008).  
 
Zhengyi, Wang. (2004). Conceptualizing economic security and governance: China 
confronts globalization. The Pacific Review 17.4 (2004): 523-545. 
 
Zhou, Qiongwen. (1959). Ten Year Storm. Times Critique Press. Available: 
[https://www.marxists.org/chinese/reference-books/zjw1959/index.htm]  
 
Zhu, Cuiping, and Guanghua Wan. (2012). Rising inequality in China and the move 
 214 
 
to a balanced economy. China & World Economy 20.1 (2012): 83-104.  
 
Zhu, Nong, Xubei Luo, and Cuizhen Zhang. (2008). Growth, inequality and poverty 
reduction: A case study of eight provinces in China. Chinese Journal of Population 
Science 2008.2: 12-23.  
 
